Opinion
C/A 6:24-cv-00502-HMH-KFM
02-28-2024
Anthony Woods, Plaintiff, v. S.C. Department of Social Services, Child Support Enforcement, Cintas Headquarters, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge.
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the defendants. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on January 31, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed February 9, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 5). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, bringing his case into proper form. Nevertheless, upon review of the complaint, the undersigned recommends that it be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction based on violations of various federal statutes and seeks damages in the amount of 20 million dollars (id. at 3, 4).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
There are two types of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, is conferred upon the Court when a suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1 at 3). As set forth below, the plaintiff's claims fail to state a claim for relief; thus, the undersigned recommends that this matter be dismissed.
Because the plaintiff shares citizenship (South Carolina) with at least one defendant (a South Carolina state agency), diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case (see doc. 1 at 1, 4).
Federal Statutes
The plaintiff's complaint references a litany of federal statutes under which he seeks damages: 15 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (statute setting forth garnishment restrictions), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (federal criminal statute regarding conspiracy to deprive rights), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (federal criminal statute regarding deprivation of rights under color of law), 18 U.S.C. § 894 (federal criminal statute regarding collecting extensions of credit by extortion), 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (federal criminal statute regarding frauds and swindles), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (federal criminal statute regarding racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations (“RICO”)), 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (federal statute defining venue for a stockholder's derivative action) (see generally doc. 1). The plaintiff, as a private citizen, may not enforce federal criminal law. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). Federal rights of action, like substantive federal law, “must be created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). “To create a private right of action, Congress must speak[ ] with a clear voice and the statute must unambiguously express the intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, 743 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Where “Congress is silent or ambiguous, courts may not find a cause of action ‘no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter.'” Planned Parenthood S. At. v. Baker, 941 F.3d 687, 695 (4th Cir. 2019) (partially quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87). This holds true for federal criminal statutes. See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2000); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the Secretary of Labor is tasked with enforcement of the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1673 relied on by the plaintiff; thus, he does not have a private right of action to pursue any claims under this statute. See Papadopoulos v. Eaglebank, C/A No. GJH-17-2177, 2017 WL 6550672, at *3-4 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding no private right of action for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1673). Similarly, the sections of Title 18 and Title 28 cited by the plaintiff do not create a private right of action or unambiguously provide the plaintiff with either a private right or remedy. See Pinckney v. U.S. Gov't, C/A No. 2:19-cv-00939-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 4171117, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4168753 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2019). Further, the plaintiff has no standing to pursue this matter criminally because private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. Accordingly, because the plaintiff may not assert claims based upon alleged violations of federal criminal statutes, such claims are subject to summary dismissal.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep'tof Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, it appears that the plaintiff seeks to have child support garnishment orders issued by the South Carolina state court invalidated (doc. 1 at 4). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the plaintiff seeks an order from this court vacating orders entered in the South Carolina state court garnishing his wages for past due child support, the instant action is also subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claim
The plaintiff also appears to assert that the defendants have violated his rights pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by garnishing his wages (see doc. 1). To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt as defined in the FDCPA; (2) the defendant is a debt collector as defined in the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. See e.g., Boosahda v. Providence Dane LLC, 462 Fed.Appx. 331, 333 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam unpublished decision); Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011). Here, the plaintiff has failed to make any allegations in support of his FDCPA claim. Further, the defendants in this action are not debt collectors under the FDCPA, because “state officers and employees attempting to collect a debt in the performance of their official duties are not debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA.” Leonard v. LeBarron, C/A No. 2:21-cv-03487-DCN-MHC, 2021 WL 8362382, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 1488014 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2022). Additionally, child support obligations do not qualify as “debts” under the FDCPA; thus, the collection of past due child support cannot form the basis for an FDCPA claim. Leonard, 2021 WL 8362382, at *3 (collecting cases recognizing that child support obligations do not qualify as “debts” under the FDCPA). As such, to the extent the plaintiff asserts a claim under the FDCPA, it is also subject to summary dismissal.
Section 1983 Claims
Some of the claims asserted by the plaintiff appear based on § 1983 (see doc. 1). Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Not a Person
Neither S.C. DSS or Child Support Enforcement are a “person” as defined by § 1983, thus, they are entitled to summary dismissal. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” As noted, this defendant is not a person; hence, it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Stroman v. York Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., C/A No. 0:18-cv-01632-JMC-PJG, 2019 WL 498387, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (finding that the York County Department of Social Services was not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983).
Even construing the plaintiff's complaint as asserting a claim for municipal liability against these defendants (and presuming these entities were appropriate entities for Monell liability), his claim fails (see doc. 1). As an initial matter, municipalities and other local governing bodies are considered “persons” and may be sued under Section 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, a county or city cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[N]ot every deprivation of a constitutional right will lead to municipal liability. Only in cases where the municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom' will liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest [s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”Id. (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217). Additionally, under Monell, municipal liability arises “only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.” Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, however, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations have failed to allege any constitutionally offensive action by an individual defendant. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that when a plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against individual officers, claims based upon supervisory and/or Monell liability also fail). As such, the plaintiff's claims against these defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Cintas Headquarters
The plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Cintas fail because this defendant did not act under color of state law. It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012). However, private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999). In distinguishing between state action and private action,
The judicial obligation is not only to preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoi[d] the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control, but also to assure that constitutional standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). State action may be found to exist “if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified several contexts in which private action may be found to constitute state action, such as “when the state has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if done by the state”; “when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor”; “when the state has sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor”; or “when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.” Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). The critical inquiry in each case is whether the private actor's conduct was fairly attributable to the state. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2001). “[T]he ultimate resolution of whether an actor was a state actor . . . is a question of law for the court.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 344 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, the plaintiff's complaint - appearing to allege that Cintas violated his rights by garnishing his wages for past due child support - “includes no facts that establish such a ‘close nexus' between” the defendants' challenged actions and the state such that their actions “may be ‘fairly treated' as those of the state itself.” See Perry v. Chattem, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-cv-00106, 2008 WL 983428, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2008). Indeed, there is nothing in the plaintiff's complaint to suggest that Cintas was a state actor (see doc. 1). Further, even if Cintas could be considered a state actor, any claims against it under § 1983 would be subject to dismissal because a company is not a person for purposes of § 1983. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178.
Frivolousness
The plaintiff's assertion that the defendants have violated his rights as a sovereign citizen by garnishing his wages for past due child support (doc. 1 at 15) is also subject to dismissal as frivolous. Adherents to the “sovereign citizen” theory “believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, C/A No. 3:12-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11,2013) (collecting cases describing the “sovereign citizen” movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013). These theories have repeatedly been rejected as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a ‘sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining claim by party that he was “outside” the jurisdiction of the United States to be “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous” and rejecting it “without expending any more of this Court's resources on their discussion”); Glover v. South Carolina, C/A No. 5:16-cv-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom., 700 Fed.Appx. 306 (4th Cir. 2017). As such, the plaintiff's sovereign citizen claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Litigation History
Of note, the plaintiff in this matter has continued to file duplicative litigation in this court - and this is his third case asserting frivolous allegations (and his second involving S.C. DSS). See Woods v. Brookside Pointe Apartments, C/A No. 6:23-cv-05108-HMH, 2023 WL 7924684 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2023); Woods v. S.C. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., C/A No. 6:23-cv-04812-HMH, 2023 WL 7222667 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2023). Further, in granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the undersigned noted that the plaintiff may be required to pay the filing fee at the conclusion of the case if the case was found to be without merit. See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972-74 (4th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff's duplicative filings have also hindered the court from fulfilling its constitutional duty. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004). As such, the undersigned recommends that the plaintiff be sanctioned.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Additionally, based upon the plaintiff's penchant for the filing of duplicative and frivolous actions in this court, the undersigned further recommends that the assigned United States District Judge sanction the plaintiff $405.00, payable to the Clerk of Court at 250 East North Street, Greenville, SC 29601, for filing this duplicative and frivolous action. It is further recommended that in the event the plaintiff attempts to file another action in this Court before payment of the filing fee and sanction from this case, the Clerk of Court be authorized to assign civil action numbers (for docket control purposes) so that the undersigned may (1) instruct the plaintiff to pay the sanctions (and if the sanctions are not paid, dismiss the action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process) or (2) certify that the action is not frivolous. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).