Opinion
C/A 23-cv-06377
02-05-2024
Cedric L. Woods, Petitioner, v. William Langdon, Warden of Allendale Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Cedric L. Woods, a pro se state prisoner, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2000, Petitioner was convicted in a jury trial in Aiken County and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for first degree burglary (case G031704/indictment 2000GS0200496), twenty years' imprisonment (concurrent) for attempted armed robbery (case F644947/indictment 2000GS0200493), thirty years' imprisonment (concurrent) for kidnapping (case F644948/indictment 2000GS0200494), and ten years' imprisonment (consecutive) for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (case G031703/indictment 2000GS0200495). See Petition, ECF No. 1 at 1; see also Aiken County Second Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Aiken/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx [search case numbers listed above] (last visited Jan. 30, 2024).
On June 9, 2011, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the same Aiken County convictions and sentences (first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery, kidnapping, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature) he challenges in the present Petition. The respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted and Petitioner's petition was dismissed. See Woods v. Pate, No. CIV.A. 3:11-1353-JMC, 2012 WL 3775966 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2012). On February 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a second petition pursuant to § 2254 as to these same Aiken County convictions and sentences, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the petition without prejudice as a successive petition, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, and the District Judge granted Petitioner's motion and dismissed the action without prejudice. Woods v. Pate, No. 9:14-cv-00345-JMC (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2014) at Docket Nos. 1, 8, 10, and 12.
Petitioner filed a third petition pursuant to § 2254 as to the same Aiken County convictions and sentences on December 12, 2016, which was dismissed without prejudice as a successive petition on April 12, 2017. See Woods v. Cohen, No. 9:16-CV-03890-JMC, 2017 WL 1344637 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2017). Petitioner filed a fourth petition pursuant to § 2254 as to the same Aiken County convictions and sentences on May 8, 2017, which was dismissed without prejudice as a successive petition on September 20, 2017. See Woods v. Pate, No. CV 9:17-01195-JMC, 2017 WL 4168576 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2017).
Petitioner's ground for relief is “Rule 245, subject matter jurisdiction[.]” ECF No. 1 at 5. He requests “relief from custody[.]” ECF No. 1 at 15.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se habeas petition is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). The Court screens a petitioner's lawsuit to determine “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.
Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even when considered under this less stringent standard, for the reasons set forth below, the Petition submitted in this case is subject to summary dismissal.
III. DISCUSSION
This action should be summarily dismissed because this is a successive § 2254 petition. “Under the AEDPA, an individual may not file a second or successive § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus or [a 28 U.S.C.] § 2255 motion to vacate sentence without first receiving permission to do so from the appropriate circuit court of appeals.” In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997). The “gatekeeping” mechanism created by the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to provide:
The prospective applicant must file in the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the district court. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel has 30 days to determine whether “the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of” § 2244(b). § 2244(b)(3)(C); see §§ 2244(b)(3)(B), (D).Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996).
For a petition to qualify as “successive,” a prior petition must have been adjudicated on the merits. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-89 (2000); see also Henderson v. Bazzle, C/A No. 9:08-978-MBS-GCK, 2008 WL 1908535, at *3 (D.S.C. April 29, 2008) (for a petition to qualify as “successive,” the prior petition must have been adjudicated on the merits which includes a prior dismissal of a petition as untimely). The present Petition qualifies as a successive § 2254 action because Petitioner's first § 2254 petition (Civil Action No. 3:11-1353-JMC) challenged the same convictions and sentences and was decided on the merits. See Woods v. Pate, 2012 WL 3775966, at *1. Therefore, this action should be summarily dismissed because it is successive and Petitioner has not alleged that he received permission from the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive petition.
The issue of successiveness of a habeas petition may be raised by the court sua sponte. Rodriguez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 694, 697 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997); Simmons v. South Carolina, No. 6:14-cv-4803-RBH, 2015 WL 2173233, at *4 (D.S.C. May 8, 2015).
Petitioner may be attempting to assert a claim that relies on a new rule of constitutional law or on new evidence. A petitioner may be able to present a claim for the first time in a successive habeas petition where the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), or, if the claim is based on newly discovered evidence, where the petitioner can make a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice within the meaning of § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) and § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). See Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2000). However, even if Petitioner could show that his ground satisfies these strict requirements, the Fourth Circuit is still the proper tribunal to make that decision when authorization is requested, not the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005) (“[B]efore the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)'s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). Therefore, because Petitioner did not first obtain permission from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to file this successive § 2254 Petition, this Court does not have jurisdiction and the Petition is subject to summary dismi Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (holding that failure of petitioner t authorization to file a “second or successive” petition deprived the district court of jurisd consider the second or successive petition); Abraham v. Padua, Civil Action No. 6:11-c RMG, 2012 WL 4364643, at * 1 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2012) (noting that the district “[c]o jurisdiction to hear [Petitioner's] second claim for habeas relief until authorized by the . Circuit”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition in this action be DIS without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).