Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-05108-HMH-JDA
10-20-2023
Anthony Woods, Shantika Woods, Plaintiffs, v. Brookside Pointe Apartments, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Anthony Woods (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this action against the above-named Defendant. This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint filed in this action in accordance with applicable law, the Court concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed.
The Complaint also lists Shantika Woods as a party to this action, but only Anthony Woods signed the Complaint. A plaintiff may not file or maintain a lawsuit on behalf of others. See Myers v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that although an individual has the right to represent himself/herself by statute-28 U.S.C. § 1654-that right does not “create a coordinate right to litigate for others”). Because only Anthony Woods signed the Complaint, the Court construes him as the sole Plaintiff in this action.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends the Court has federal question jurisdiction, and he cites the following in support: “Fair Debt Collection Practices [Act (‘FDCPA')], extortion, false and misleading, defamation, unsworn claims.” [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant “owes $100,000 due to false claims, invasion of right to privacy, extortion for reserve notes and violating their own agreement.” [Id. at 5.] As to the statement of the claim, Plaintiff alleges as follows, verbatim:
Around June[,] an application was endorsed and we were [discriminated] against and deferred to another debt collector in order to move into the property. The application was sold and we were not informed of the details. So they furnished a false and misleading agreement that did conclude the consumer transaction. Brooks Pointe says that they don't accept cash, checks, money orders, so how are we as natural people . . . supposed to tender payment.[Id.] Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
We are seeking a dismissal of the writ of ejectment and compensation for our rights being violated. We have responded with a notarized conditional acceptance and they never rebutted with an affidavit.[Id.]
Plaintiff has also attached various documents to his Complaint including (1) a letter from Plaintiff to Defendant dated October 1, 2023 [Doc. 1-1]; (2) an Affidavit “that all accounts are prepaid” [Doc. 1-2]; (3) a copy of a portion of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f [Doc. 1-3]; (4) an Affidavit of Truth [Doc. 1-4]; and (5) a “Notice to Court and All Court Officers” [Doc. 1-5].
Further, the undersigned takes judicial notice of an eviction action pending against Plaintiff in the North Greenville Summary Court. See Brookside Pointe Apartments v. Anthony Woods, No. 2023CV2311101797, available at https://www2.greenvillecounty.org/ SCJD/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “2023CV2311101797”) (last visited Oct. 19, 2023).
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Further, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his Complaint is accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Petitioner's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Further, this Court possesses the inherent authority to review pro se pleadings to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (“[C]ourts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”).
DISCUSSION
For the reasons below, this case is subject to summary dismissal.
Lack of Jurisdiction
First, this case is subject to dismissal because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a litigant must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings, McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]”
Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained in the Petition and the causes of action in the underlying state court proceedings do not fall within the scope of either form of this Court's limited jurisdiction.
Federal Question Jurisdiction
First, federal question jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “To determine whether a plaintiff's claims ‘arise under' the laws of the United States, courts typically use the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which focuses on the allegations of the complaint.” Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp., 848 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists ‘only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'” Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006) (citations omitted).
As stated, Plaintiff alleges that federal question jurisdiction exists over this eviction action because the case involves violations of the FDCPA. [Doc. 1 at 3.] However, Plaintiff fails to present allegations to state a cognizable claim under the FDCPA. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts only vague and conclusory assertions rather than any specific factual allegations to show an FDCPA violation. As such, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is plausible as required under Iqbal and Twombly. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (noting that “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (same).
Additionally, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements for an FDCPA claim. “To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) he was the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt as defined in the FDCPA; (2) defendants are debt collectors as defined in the FDCPA; and (3) the defendants engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA.” Adams v. AT&T, No. 7:20-cv-02015-TMC-KFM, 2020 WL 4820495, at *2 (D.S.C. July 15, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 4820202 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2020). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendant is a debt collector as defined in the FDCPA. Indeed, courts have noted that landlords and/or property management companies are not debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA when they are collecting their own debts. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Sawyer Prop. Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 948 F.Supp.2d 525, 531 (D. Md. 2013), aff'd, 593 Fed.Appx. 204 (4th Cir. 2014); Butler v. United Prop. Assocs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-487, 2017 WL 11572177, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017) (“Defendant, as a property management company, is not a ‘debt collector' under the FDCPA.”).
The Fourth Circuit has explained that the FDCPA “defines a debt collector as (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has failed to include sufficient allegations that would establish that Defendant is a “debt collector” under any of these three scenarios.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA and, as such, federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case. See Brooks-McCollum v. Aspen Prop. Mgmt. Co., 551 Fed.Appx. 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FDCPA because the property management company was not a debt collector and that the district court therefore lacked federal question jurisdiction).
Diversity Jurisdiction
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the diversity statute's requirements. The diversity statute requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ; Anderson v. Caldwell, No. 3:10-cv-1906-CMC-JRM, 2010 WL 3724752, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3724671 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2010). Complete diversity of the parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he lives in South Carolina and also alleges that Defendant is incorporated under the laws of South Carolina and has its principal place of business in South Carolina. [Doc. 1 at 1-2, 4.] Accordingly, the parties are not diverse as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims under either federal question or diversity grounds and the Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal on this basis. Further, even if the Court were to find that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the Complaint would still be subject to dismissal for the following additional reasons.
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff makes vague references to “extortion, false and misleading, defamation, unsworn claims[,]” “false claims, invasion of right to privacy, extortion for reserve notes and violating their own agreement.” [Doc. 1 at 3, 5.] To the extent Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting any state law claims, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over them as the Complaint lacks a cognizable federal law claim premised on federal question jurisdiction. See Hayduk v. Cannon, No. 6:19-cv-03355-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 2308697, at *11 (D.S.C. Apr. 14, 2020) (explaining that federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 2308283 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020), appeal dismissed, 2020 WL 7230262 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020).
Younger Abstention
As noted, the crux of this action is Plaintiff's attempt to challenge the pending state court eviction proceedings. Critically, for his relief, Plaintiff asserts he is “seeking a dismissal of the writ of ejectment.” [Doc. 1 at 5.] Nevertheless, this Court cannot grant the requested relief under the Younger abstention doctrine.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held that the Younger abstention doctrine applies “to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved,” Harper v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and district courts have held that abstention under Younger is appropriate when there are pending state court eviction proceedings, see, e.g., Mutzig v. North Carolina, No. 3:17-cv-146-RJC, 2017 WL 1754774, at *2 (W.D. N.C. May 3, 2017).
Abstention under Younger is appropriate when the following three-part test is met: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state court eviction proceedings, and he asks this Court to interfere with those proceedings; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Davis v. Morris, No. 3:15-cv-80-RJC-DSC, 2015 WL 11111354, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 3, 2015) (“Under the principles announced in [Younger], this federal court declines to interfere with an ongoing, tenant eviction action in Mississippi state court.”), aff'd, 622 Fed.Appx. 257 (4th Cir. 2015). The second element is also satisfied as it is well settled in this District that eviction “proceedings involve questions concerning the parties' landlord and tenant relationship, and those types of questions have been found to involve ‘important state interests.'” Setliff v. Fountain, No. 4:14-cv-2583-RMG, 2014 WL 4825623, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2014). Finally, the third element is satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court. Id.
Because all three of the elements are met, this Court should abstain from deciding Plaintiff's injunctive relief claims, and the Court should dismiss this case on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits”).
Frivolous Allegations
Lastly, putting aside the issues already discussed, it is equally clear that Plaintiff's Complaint is substantively without merit to the extent he is asserting claims as a sovereign citizen. As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).
In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity and that his conclusory assertions fail to state a cognizable claim for relief, particularly to the extent Plaintiff bases his claims on the sovereign citizen theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997). Although Plaintiff has not specifically identified himself as a sovereign citizen in his Complaint, his allegations and supporting documents bear all of the hallmarks of the sovereign citizen theory. For example, Plaintiff filed an “Affidavit of Truth” in which he makes the following assertions:
Be it known to all who call themselves “government”, their “courts”, agents, corporations and other parties, that we, Anthony-Vashaw: Woods and Shantika-Kybrett: Woods, are a natural, freeborn sovereign individual, without subjects. We are neither subject to any entity anywhere, nor is any entity subject to us. We neither dominate anyone, nor are we dominated.
Our authority for this statement is the same as it is for all free Sovereigns everywhere: the age-old, timeless, and universal respect for the intrinsic rights, property, freedoms, and responsibilities of the Sovereign Individual.
We may voluntarily choose to comply with the “laws” which others attempt to impose upon us, but no such “laws”, nor their “enforcers”, have any authority over us. We are not in any “jurisdiction”, for we are not of subject status.
. . . Since WE ARE NOT a UNITED STATES CORPORATE “CITIZEN” by LEGAL definition, and we are in a foreign jurisdiction to THE FEDERAL UNITED STATES CORPORATION known as The Common Law Jurisdiction of the republic for The United States Of America, no past, present or future LEGAL STATU[T]E of the FEDERAL UNITED STATES or STATUTE of one of its CORPORATE STATES shall apply to us, Anthony-Vashawn: Woods and Shantika-Kybrett: Woods, a Natural Sentient Man and Woman....[Doc. 1-4 at 1 (emphasis in original).] Plaintiff's filings are replete with other similar allegations.
Plaintiff's contentions are couched in terms of the sovereign citizen argument, which “has been rejected repeatedly by the courts.” Smith v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 5464723, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2013) (citation omitted). Adherents to the sovereign citizen theory “believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, No. 3:12-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2013) (collecting cases describing the sovereign citizen movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013).
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the sovereign citizen theory as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a ‘sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing the “sovereign citizen” theory as having “no conceivable validity in American law”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant claimed he was “outside” the jurisdiction of the United States; however, the court found this argument to be “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous” and rejected it “without expending any more of this Court's resources on discussion”); Glover v. South Carolina, No. 5:16-cv-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-6846, 2017 WL 5197454 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims in this case based on the sovereign citizen theory, his claims are subject to summary dismissal as frivolous.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the reasons above, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action without issuance and service of process and without leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).