Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2592-KHV.
July 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Ronald Woods appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security to deny disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment [On] The Pleading[s] (Doc. #14) filed April 16, 2004, which the Court construes as a motion for judgment based on the parties' briefs. For reasons set forth below, the Court overrules plaintiff's motion.
Procedural Background
On July 1, 1999, plaintiff filed his disability application with the Social Security Administration. He alleged a disability onset date of May 5, 1998. See Transcript Of Proceedings Before The Social Security Administration("Tr.") 244, attached to defendant's Answer (Doc. #9) filed February 27, 2004. Plaintiff's benefit application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On March 31, 2000, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act and that he was not entitled to benefits. On August 17, 2001, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the Commissioner to this Court. On August 6, 2002, at the request of the Commissioner, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration. On November 18, 2003, after a second administrative hearing, an ALJ again concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. The decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), § 1383(c)(3).
Factual Background
The following is a brief summary of the evidence presented to the ALJ.
Plaintiff is 54 years old. He completed the eleventh grade and later received a GED. Tr. 247-48. Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled due to hepatitis C, hypertension, arthritis in his neck, depression, substance and alcohol abuse and memory problems. Tr. 272. In his appeal, plaintiff challenges the ALJ decision only as to depression, substance and alcohol abuse and memory problems. Accordingly, the Court limits the factual background to those issues.
Plaintiff started drinking alcohol at the age of 17 and using drugs at the age of 21. Tr. 124, 248-49. Plaintiff has not worked since 1981. Tr. 262-63, 315-16, 349, 443. He was in prison for approximately two years and received disability benefits until 1996 or 1997 when the Social Security Administration terminated them because of alcohol abuse.
On July 26, 1999, T.A. Moeller, Ph.D., a psychiatrist, evaluated plaintiff at the request of Disability Determination Services. Tr. 191-96A. Plaintiff reported that he could not drive because of blackouts. Tr. 196. Dr. Moeller noted that it was difficult to assess plaintiff because of the slowness of his responses. Tr. 196. Dr. Moeller concluded that plaintiff was experiencing difficulties because of continued alcohol use. Tr. 196A. Although plaintiff was not clearly impaired during the evaluation, he admitted that he drank alcohol on a regular basis. Tr. 196A. Dr. Moeller concluded that at that point, plaintiff was not able to sustain simple, gainful employment because of an atypical psychotic disorder and substance abuse issues. Tr. 196A.
On July 27, 1999, Jack L. Perkins, M.D., also evaluated plaintiff at the request of Disability Determination Services. Tr. 197-200. Plaintiff reported that he drank six beers a week and one half pint of liquor a week. Tr. 198. Dr. Perkins noted that plaintiff shops for food, cooks and cleans his house. Tr. 199. As to plaintiff's mental status, Dr. Perkins noted that the exam revealed no evidence of delusion, hallucination or paranoia. Tr. 199-200. Dr. Perkins found that plaintiff's memory was slightly impaired, but that he related well and could handle his own funds. Tr. 200.
In November of 1999, plaintiff sought therapy at Comcare of Sedgwick County, Kansas for depression, anxiety and stress. Tr. 233. At the time plaintiff sought therapy, a staff psychiatrist rated plaintiff's global assessment of functioning (GAF) at 60, which indicated that plaintiff had some moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning. See Tr. 230, 232; DSM-IV at 32. Plaintiff was referred to Charles A. Gaynor, Ph.D., a psychiatrist, for therapy. From November 23, 1999 through February 2, 2000, plaintiff attended three of six scheduled counseling sessions with Dr. Gaynor. Tr. 228-29. Dr. Gaynor noted that plaintiff reported memory problems and other difficulties, but he did not opine about plaintiff's ability to work. Tr. 228.
The GAF is a subjective determination of "the clinician's judgment of the individual's overall level of functioning," based on a scale of one (low) to 100 (high). American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) ("DSM-IV") at 30. The scale does not evaluate impairments caused by physical or environmental factors.See id.
At a GAF of 60, plaintiff was at the top of the category from 51 to 60. The next GAF category from 61 to 70 indicates some mild symptoms but that the individual is generally functioning pretty well. See DSM-IV at 32.
Plaintiff did not seek psychological treatment between February 2, 2000 and November 9, 2002. On April 22, 2002, Michael M. Vesali, M.D., a neurologist, examined plaintiff for daily headaches. Tr. 433-34. Dr. Vesali noted that on a mini-mental status exam, plaintiff scored 28 out of 30 and that his mood and affect were essentially normal. Tr. 434.
On November 9 and 25, and December 7 and 21, 2002, plaintiff had psychological therapy with Kerin Schell, Ph.D. Tr. 415-29. Dr. Schell diagnosed major depressive disorder, single episode, severe with psychotic features. Tr. 415. Dr. Schell rated plaintiff's global assessment of functioning (GAF) at 35, which indicated that plaintiff had some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking or mood.See Tr. 417; DSM-IV at 32. Plaintiff reported that he heard demons everyday and that he had painted a red cross on his forehead to keep them away. Tr. 421. Plaintiff also reported that he had had memory problems since the early 1970s when he was hit on the head with a meat cleaver. Tr. 428. Dr. Schell's progress notes reflect that plaintiff had been sober since November of 2001. Tr. 428.
On January 30, 2003, Dr. Moeller again evaluated plaintiff at the request of Disability Determination Services. Dr. Moeller found a marked contrast between this examination and his previous one in July of 1999. Plaintiff reported that he had quit drinking in 1996. Tr. 351. Plaintiff stated that he was unable to drive because of memory problems, but he showed Dr. Moeller a commercial driver's license which had been issued in 2001. Tr. 354. Dr. Moeller noted that although plaintiff complained of demons, he interacted well and comfortably, utilizing appropriate humor and laughter. Tr. 355. Dr. Moeller diagnosed plaintiff with psychotic disorder, and probable alcohol abuse and said that malingering could not be ruled out. Id. Dr. Moeller concluded that no clear data suggested that plaintiff was not capable of engaging in simple, gainful employment. Id.
The first ALJ hearing was held on March 16, 2000. At that hearing, plaintiff reported that he saw demons every day. Tr. 251. Plaintiff testified that he lived with his 11 year old son. Tr. 253. Plaintiff testified that he and his son kept up the house, but that plaintiff's sister checked on them every evening. Tr. 259-60. Plaintiff testified that for more than a year, he had problems remembering things. Tr. 255. Plaintiff testified that he saw a psychiatrist about once a week. Tr. 256. Plaintiff testified that on a typical day, he slept and watched TV. Tr. 254.
On August 6, 2002, at the request of the Commissioner, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration. At the second ALJ hearing on August 20, 2003, plaintiff testified that he had not looked for work because demons were after him. Tr. 443, 445. Plaintiff testified that demons had been after him for a long time and that he had painted a red cross on his forehead to keep them away. Tr. 441. Plaintiff still lives with his son. Plaintiff testified that he generally stays in his room during the day and his son or other family members get groceries and clean the house. Tr. 447.
In his order of November 18, 2003, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant filed his application under Title XV on July 1, 1999.
2 The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of his filing.
3. The evidence supports that the claimant has hepatitis C, an affective disorder or other psychosis and a history of alcohol and/or substance abuse, impairments that singularly or in combination are "severe," but that his impairments, do not meet or equal the requirements of any listed impairment in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant is not credible to the extent the claimant alleged he is unable to work, as set forth in the rationale portion of this decision.
5. The claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light exertional level work. The claimant's ability to perform light work is diminished in that he is limited to standing no more than 6 hours in an 8 hour work day, sitting no more than 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; frequent stooping and crouching. The claimant is able to do no climbing of ropes, ladders or scaffolds and he cannot be in an environment around dangerous machinery. The claimant is limited to work that is non-complex with the ability to recall no more than 4-5 step instructions. The claimant is slightly limited in his ability to carry out detailed instructions and the ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions. He is moderately limited in his ability to interact with the public.
6. The claimant has no past relevant work.
7. The claimant is an individual approaching advanced age who has a high school education.
8. Transferability of work skills is not a material issue due to his lack of work experience.
9. The qualified vocational expert's credible testimony identifying a significant number of jobs and the framework of section 419.969 of Regulations No. 4, Rule 202.13 and 202.20 of Table No. 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4, warrant a finding that the claimant, considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, be found "not disabled."
10. The claimant has not been under a "disability," as defined by the Social Security Act at any time through the date of this decision.
Tr. 281-82.
Standard Of Review
The ALJ decision is binding on the Court if supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987). The Court must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards. See Castellano v. Sec'y of HHS, 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). While "more than a mere scintilla," substantial evidence is only "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Evidence is not substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) — or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion." Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
Analysis
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving disability under the Social Security Act. See Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity for at least 12 months due to a medically determinable impairment.See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a claimant is under a disability, the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential evaluation: (1) whether the claimant is currently working; (2) whether the claimant suffers froma severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the relevant regulation; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from continuing his past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any kind of work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. If a claimant satisfies steps one, two and three, he will automatically be found disabled; if a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, he must satisfy step four. If step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988).
Here, the ALJ denied benefits at step five, finding that plaintiff is capable of performing work in the national economy.
I. Plaintiff's Mental Impairments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two because he found that plaintiff had only a slight mental impairment. See Plaintiff's Brief On Appeal From The Social Security Administration (Doc. #10) filed March 15, 2004 at 2, 7. The ALJ found that plaintiff satisfied step two of the sequential evaluation process. In particular, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe mental impairments including "an affective disorder or other psychosis and a history of alcohol and/or substance abuse." Tr. 272, 281. Because the ALJ found in favor of plaintiff at step two, the Court liberally construes plaintiff's argument as a challenge to the ALJ credibility determination that plaintiff's mental impairments do not preclude all work.
The Tenth Circuit has set forth the proper framework for analyzing evidence of disabling pain or mental limitation-producing impairments. The relevant factors are (1) whether claimant proves with objective medical evidence an impairment that causes pain; (2) whether a loose nexus exists between the impairment and the subjective complaints of pain; and (3) whether the pain is disabling based upon all objective and subjective evidence. See Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994); Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987). In the final step, the ALJ should consider the following factors:
the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain relief, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence.Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1132 (10th Cir. 1988).
Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff's mental impairments created some limitations. In particular, the ALJ found that plaintiff is limited to work that is not complex with the ability to recall no more than four to five step instructions. Tr. 282. The ALJ also found that plaintiff is slightly limited in his ability to carry out detailed instructions and the ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, and is moderately limited in his ability to interact with the public. Id. The ALJ rejected plaintiff's testimony that his limitations preclude all work. The ALJ found that plaintiff was "only credible to the extent that he alleged medically determinable impairments, but not credible to the extent that he alleged he is unable to work." Tr. 280. In particular, the ALJ rejected plaintiff's testimony that he is unable to work because (1) plaintiff's work history and objective medical evidence did not support his complaints, and (2) plaintiff made inconsistent statements. Tr. 280.
A. Work History
In rejecting plaintiff's claim that he is unable to work, the ALJ relied on plaintiff's lack of work history. A plaintiff's lack of motivation to work may be considered in determining the credibility of his subjective complaints. See Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1995); Hunter v. Chater, 895 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (D. Kan. 1995). The ALJ noted that plaintiff had no earnings since 1981 and that despite long periods of time when plaintiff could have worked, he chose not to do so. Tr. 280. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff's apparent lack of effort to ever try working is some evidence of his motivation to receive benefits. Id. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ conclusion that plaintiff is not highly motivated to work.
B. Consistency Of Plaintiff's Complaints With Objective Medical Evidence
The ALJ rejected plaintiff's subjective complaints because they were not supported by the objective medical evidence of record.See Tr. 280; Luna, 834 F.2d at 165-66 (lack of objective medical evidence to support degree of pain alleged is important factor to consider in evaluating claim of disabling pain); Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990) (medical records must be consistent with nonmedical testimony as to severity of pain).
As to plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ noted that plaintiff testified on March 16, 2000 that he had seen a psychologist on a weekly basis since November of 1999, but that the medical records showed a long gap in mental health treatment and no prescription for psychotropic medication. Tr. 279. The ALJ further noted that at the second hearing on August 20, 2003, plaintiff acknowledged that he had not kept up on the consultations in 1999. Id. On August 20, 2003, plaintiff testified that he was currently being treated by Dr. Schell, but the ALJ noted that the record did not reflect any treatment by Dr. Schell after December of 2002 and plaintiff was unable to identify any medications which a doctor had prescribed for his mental condition. Id.
The ALJ mistakenly referred to the date as November of 1998.
Plaintiff argues that his testimony about his mental impairment is supported by the reports of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Schell. Notably, however, Dr. Schell did not opine as to plaintiff's ability to work or to concentrate. Plaintiff's GAF score of 35 does not necessarily indicate problems related to his ability to work. See Zachary v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 790300, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2004) (GAF score of 45 without explanation does not support conclusion that impairment seriously interferes with ability to work); Whelchel v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 613925, at *5 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 2004) (same as to GAF score of 47). Moreover, Dr. Schell did not assess plaintiff with a GAF score of 35 for a significant period of time. See Tr. 417 (plaintiff's current GAF rating was 35); DSM-IV at 30 (rating reflects level of functioning at time of evaluation, rating may also be given for other time periods such as during past few months). In November of 1999, a treating psychiatrist gave plaintiff a GAF score of 65.
From July 1, 1999 (when plaintiff filed his application for benefits) through August 20, 2003 (the date of the second ALJ hearing), plaintiff sought psychiatric treatment on only seven occasions — three times during a two month period in late 1999 and early 2000 and four times during November and December of 2002, shortly after this Court remanded plaintiff's case. The record contains no other evidence of psychiatric treatment during this four year period. In April of 2002, Dr. Vesali, a neurologist who evaluated plaintiff for headaches, noted that on a mini-mental status exam, plaintiff scored 28 out of 30 and that his mood and affect were essentially normal. Tr. 434. Although medical evidence establishes that plaintiff complained to treating psychiatrists about demons and lost memory, no psychiatrist opined that he was unable to work and no doctor prescribed psychotropic medication. See Luna, 834 F.2d at 165-66; see also Talley v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990) (medical records must be consistent with nonmedical testimony as to severity of pain); see also Nichols v. Comm'r of Social Sec. Admin., 260 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1074 (D. Kan. 2003) (ALJ did not err in concluding that treatment of eight sessions over six-month period was not consistent with claim that plaintiff was totally disabled by depression and stress disorder). Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ conclusion that the medical records do not support the extent of plaintiff's subjective complaints.
On November 9, 2002, Dr. Schell stated that one of plaintiff's long term goals was to take psychotropic medication as prescribed. The record, however, does not reflect that such medication was ever prescribed or that plaintiff took such medication. See Tr. 416.
C. Plaintiff's Inconsistent Statements
The ALJ also noted several inconsistencies in plaintiff's statements. The ALJ may consider the consistency of plaintiff's statements in evaluating credibility. See Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34486 (consistency of individual's statements is strong indication of credibility, especially complaints made to treating or examining medical sources);Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (inconsistent statements about alcohol and drug use); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistent statements about alcohol use); Jackson v. Apfel, 162 F.3d 533, 538 (8th Cir. 1988) (inconsistent statements about cause of inability to work). Here, the ALJ noted that plaintiff testified at the first hearing that he had last consumed alcoholon July 4, 1999, but he reported in late July of 1999 that he was still drinking on a regular basis. See Tr. 196A, 198, 249-50. On January 30, 2003, plaintiff reported to Dr. Moeller that he had last consumed alcohol in 1996, Tr. 351, but in November of 2002, plaintiff reported to Dr. Schell that he had been sober since November of 2001. Tr. 426. The ALJ also noted that plaintiff testified that he had back pain, but that he denied that he had back pain during several doctor visits. Finally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff testified that he did not take shots for his liver condition, but the medical records indicated that he does take such shots. Plaintiff has not attempted to explain his inconsistent statements. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ conclusion that plaintiff gave inconsistent statements on several occasions.
In addition to the examples noted by the ALJ, plaintiff stated on several occasions that he was unable to drive because of memory and other problems, but in January of 2003 he showed Dr. Moeller a commercial driver's license which had been issued in 2001. Tr. 354.
D. Overall Evaluation Of Credibility Factors
In reviewing ALJ credibility determinations, the Court should "defer to the ALJ as trier of fact, the individual optimally positioned to observe and assess witness credibility." Casias v. Sec'y of HHS, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991). Credibility is the province of the ALJ. Hamilton v. Sec'y of HHS, 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). At the same time, the ALJ must explain why specific evidence relevant to each factor supports a conclusion that a claimant's subjective complaints are not credible. See Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995). "Findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings." Id. (quoting Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988) (footnote omitted)). So long as he sets forth the specific evidence on which he relies in evaluating claimant's credibility, the ALJ is not required to conduct a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence. White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2001); see Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). In making a finding about the credibility of an individual's statements, the adjudicator need not totally accept or totally reject the individual's statements. See Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34486. Rather, the ALJ "may find all, only some, or none of an individual's allegations to be credible." See id.
For reasons stated above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ decision to reject plaintiff's testimony about the limitations created by his mental impairment. Although the ALJ could have discussed the evidence in greater detail, the record need only demonstrate that he considered all of the evidence; an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Plaintiff apparently argues that the ALJ "admitted" that plaintiff's mental impairments caused "marked" limitations in maintaining social functioning. See Plaintiff's Brief On Appeal From The Social Security Administration (Doc. #10) filed March 15, 2004 at 4-5. The Court disagrees. At the second hearing, the ALJ asked the medical expert, Dr. Hutchinson, several questions:
Q (by ALJ): assume for present purposes that as I see in here, and as I — as based on notes, he appears to have been presenting at the time of the first hearing the — there is, for whatever reason, complication or interference with memory functions, and that's consistent, I think, with both [Moeller] and [Schell] studies, and even though not with the whole record but at least with their studies, for some reason that is present, any reason to find that at less than a marked level?
A (by Dr. Hutchinson): At less than marked?
Q: Right.
A: Yes, I think it would be less than marked.
Q: It would be marked, okay,
A: Yes.
Q: Any interference at all, if so, to what extent?
A: Well, I think that it would appear that he describes — you know, there is consistent memory difficulties. He had that one evaluation by Dr. [Moeller] in '99, but no other — no — I mean, which showed, you know, a very severe deficit memory. But there's no other indication in the record that his memory is that severely dysfunctional. So I would say moderate at the most.
Tr. 458. In context, the ALJ did not admit that plaintiff's mental impairments caused marked limitations. Based on Dr. Hutchinson's agreement to the ALJ's statement, the ALJ apparently intended to state that "it would be [less than] marked, okay." In any event, the ALJ's written decision, not his questions at the hearing, control the findings subject to review.
Plaintiff also argues that the vocational expert testified that if plaintiff had to miss more than two days of work a month, he would be disabled. The ALJ did not find that plaintiff's impairments would cause him to miss more than two days of work a month. Accordingly, the vocational expert's testimony on this issue is not material to the ALJ decision.
II. Plaintiff's Substance Abuse
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he did not follow 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 in considering plaintiff's substance abuse. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ had to first determine whether he was disabled and then determine the materiality of substance abuse. For purposes of step five, the ALJ is required to determine, as a threshold matter, whether plaintiff's mental impairment is disabling, without considering whether his alcoholism or substance abuse contribute to the impairment.Wilson v. Barnhart, 68 Fed. Appx. 169, 170 (10th Cir. June 20, 2003); Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2003); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a), 416.935(a). If, at this threshold stage, the ALJ determines that plaintiff's mental impairment is not disabling, then the inquiry ends and benefits are denied. Wilson, 68 Fed. Appx. at 170. Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's mental impairment is not disabling. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to assess whether alcoholism or substance abuse were contributing factors material to his mental impairment. See Tr. 272 (because ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled considering all impairments, not necessary to determine whether alcohol or drug addiction are contributing factors).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment [On] The Pleading[s] (Doc. #14) filed April 16, 2004, which the Court construes as a motion for judgment based on the parties' written briefs, be and hereby is OVERRULED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Judgment of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.