Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 01-3337 SECTION "T"(1)
February 10, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgement filed on behalf of the Defendant, Nalco Chemical Company ("Nalco"). The parties requested, and were granted, oral arguments which were heard on January 28, 2004. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
Nalco operates a specialty chemical facility in Garyville, Louisiana. Ms. Woodland began her employment as a receptionist at the Nalco facility in Garyville on September 7, 1983. In October of 1984, Ms. Woodland was promoted to the material control department as a general clerk B with a corresponding pay raise. In November of 1986, Ms. Woodland was promoted to the position of general clerk A with a corresponding pay raise. In November of 1998, Ms. Woodland was again promoted, this time to the position of senior clerk with a corresponding pay raise. In July of 1994 Ms. Woodland was transferred to the preventative maintenance department, where she remained until her termination.
While employed in the preventative maintenance department, Ms. Woodland's job duties included clerical support to the preventative maintenance superintendent and engineer, Mr. Carey Pigott("Mr. Pigott"). Mr. Pigott was Ms. Woodland's supervisor and as such conducted performance evaluations of the plaintiff, which were later reviewed by his supervisor, Mr. Raymond Byerley ("Mr. Byerley"). Mr. Byerley was Nalco's maintenance superintendent at the Garyville facility, as such he supervised the preventative maintenance department.
On August 18, 2000, Mr. Pigott retired and/or resigned from Nalco. Following the resignation of Mr. Pigott, management reviewed the preventative maintenance department in its entirety and determined that the department was unnecessary. Management decided to contract out the work once done by the preventative maintenance department to Southern Maintenance, Inc., an outside contractor.
Ms. Woodland was informed of the elimination of the preventative maintenance department on August 24, 2000 and offered a separation agreement with a severance package, which she refused. Previous to the filing of this suit, Ms. Woodland had already filed claims against Nalco in accordance with the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC"); both of which were dismissed as meritless. This Motion for Summary Judgement was filed on October 29, 2003 and after numerous continuances an Opposition was filed on January 21, 2004. In the plaintiff's opposition, she abandons all of her claims with the exception of two. She maintains her claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA and her claim for retaliatory termination, therefore all of her claims are voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/VRISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act:
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was designed to remove barriers that prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to accommodate her for her alleged disability in violation of the ADA.
In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability and that the negative employment action occurred because of the disability. Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1998) citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to qualify under the ADA, therefore, a plaintiff must first establish that she has a disability. Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093, 117S.Ct.770, 136 L.Ed.2d 715 (1997). The term "disability" encompasses three possible conditions: (1) a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of an individual, (2) a record of such impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1119, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R, § 1630.2(g).
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the ADA's definition of "disability" contemplated impairments that substantially limit those activities that are of central importance to daily life. Thus an ADA claimant can not merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment in order to prove disability status. The Court held that the ADA requires such a claimant to offer evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by the impairment, in terms of their own experience, is substantial. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., 534 U.S. at 186.
Under the regulations promulgated by the EEOC, the term "substantially limits" means:
(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general poulation can perform the same major life activity.Sherrod. 132 F.3d at 1119, citing 29 C.F.R. § 12102(2)(A).
Additionally, a "major life activity" consists of such tasks as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. " Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1119, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(i).
In order to establish a substantial limitation on working, the claimant must demonstrate a significant restriction in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Id. at 1120, citing Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995). Evidence of disqualification from a single position or narrow range of jobs will not support a finding that an individual is substantially limited from a major life activity. Id. In the present case, plaintiff asserts that she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, a debilitating condition for which there is no cure, in 1998. The disease allegedly causes the plaintiff pain and aches from which there is no relief and it places limitations on the range of her motion and movement. The plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any amount of competent evidence to support such a contention. She has neglected to provide the Court with any medical documentation or expert opinions to justify a finding by this Court in favor of her. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that Ms. Woodland has failed to adduce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she has a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working.
Ms. Woodland has also failed to prove that she has a "record of impairment." In order to make out a claim for discrimination based on a record of impairment, the plaintiff must show that at some point in the past, she was classified or misclassified as having a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 321 (5th Cir. 1997). Ms. Woodland points to various accommodations the defendant allegedly made for her and to the Functional Capacity Exam (F.C.E.) as evidence that Nalco classified her as if she was disabled. While it is difficult for this Court to conclude that these limited actions by an employer justify a finding that they are treating every employee they accommodate as disabled, in the instant case, we will allow the plaintiff such a conclusion. However, even granting the plaintiff the aforementioned conclusion, it is still the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden under the requirements of the ADA because she has not successfully shown how one of her major life activities was substantially limited. Consequently, Ms. Woodland has failed to raise a genuine issue regarding whether she has a record of impairment limiting a major life activity.
Lastly, Ms. Woodland has failed to produce evidence that Nalco regarded her as disabled. In order for an employer to have regarded an impairment substantially limiting in the activity of working, the employer must regard an individual as significantly restricted in the ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs. Bridges, 92 F.3d at 332. Ms. Woodland attempts to prove that she was regarded as disabled by again citing the accommodations afforded to her by the defendant and by alleging that defendant did not consider her for some allegedly open positions. The defense has produced undisputed evidence which shows that Nalco attempted to place Ms. Woodland in other positions, but there simply were none available for which she was qualified. The defense correctly asserts that they are not by law required to create a new position for Ms. Woodland. Foreman v. Babcock Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5 th Cir. 1997). After seven years of employment, the plaintiff's department was eliminated, the defendant tried to place her in another position, and the defendant offered her a severance package. Such evidence could only permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Nalco believed Ms. Woodland to be a qualified employee. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that Nalco did not regard Ms. Woodland as disabled.
C. Retaliatory Discharge:
Next, Ms. Woodland claims that she was retaliated against by the Defendant both in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for having participated in a protected activity and in violation of the ADA for having filed complaints based on her disability. Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to retaliate against any employees for opposing unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(3)(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the activity and the adverse action. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997); Shirley v. Chrysler First. Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).
In an action for retaliation under Title VII, the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant retaliated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Raggs v. Miss Power Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). Again, the plaintiff has made blanket accusations, yet provided no proof to the Court to substantiate them. The plaintiff's last day of work at Nalco was on August 24, 2000 and her employment was officially terminated in September of 2000 and she didn't file an EEOC complaint until March 19, 2001. The defense contends, and the plaintiff has provided no proof to prove otherwise, that at the time of the plaintiff's discharge, six to seven months before she filed her complaint with the EEOC, they had no knowledge of her intent to file said complaint. The defense contends that the plaintiff's termination preceded and was wholly unrelated to her complaint with the EEOC. It is undisputed that the plaintiff's entire department was eliminated and the proof has shown that the plaintiff was released in accordance with that decision, and in this Court's opinion for no other reason. Given the lack of proof by the plaintiff and the lengthy time period between her discharge and the filing of her complaint, the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove factors two and three outlined in Mattern, therefore, this claim is also without merit and must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION:
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged various Title VII and ADA claims against the defendant, most of which were abandoned previous to the hearing on this Motion for Summary Judgement. At the time this motion was heard, there were only two remaining claims for the Court to address: the failure to accommodate claim pursuant to the ADA and the retaliatory discharge claim. The Court has addressed both of these remaining issues and determined that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be tried.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgement, filed on behalf of Defendant, Nalco Chemical Company be and the same is hereby GRANTED.