Opinion
22-55598
05-23-2023
BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, A Citizen of the United States, Resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands; HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL L.L.C., a U.S. Virgin Islands corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00079-RGK
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Benjamin Woodhouse and Havensight Capital LLC appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing their claims under prefiling vexatious litigant orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. In re Fillbach, 223 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Nike, Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc., and Gibson, Dunn, &Crutcher LLP because plaintiffs' complaint was within the scope of the district court's prefiling vexatious litigant orders, and plaintiffs failed to comply with the prefiling requirements. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) ("District courts have the inherent power to file restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants with abusive and lengthy histories of litigation. Such pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from filing further actions or papers unless he or she first meets certain requirements ...." (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking plaintiffs' amended complaints because plaintiffs did not seek and obtain leave of court to file an amended complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (explaining that a party may amend "only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave" when it cannot amend as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)); Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 403-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court has inherent power to control its docket, including power to strike items from the docket).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' requests for entry of default because plaintiffs' requests were frivolous. See Speiser, Krause &Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs' motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 22) and motion for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 31) are denied.
All pending requests in the briefing are denied.
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).