In August 2012, Petitioner moved the Ninth Circuit to remand the case to this Court. Motion for Remand, Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104 (No. 74). He argued, pursuant to Martinez, that PCR counsel's ineffective performance constituted cause for the default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. The Court of Appeals denied remand.

" "To fairly present a claim in state court, a petitioner must describe the operative facts supporting that claim." Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). A general allegation of a right is not sufficient to alert a court to separate specific factual instances related to that right.

Petitioner's noted general and specific arguments highlight rather than ameliorate his failure to exhaust, as he concedes. See Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (general allegation that prosecutor engaged in "pervasive misconduct" does not alert a state court to separate instances of purported misconduct). Nor can he rely upon or incorporate operative facts not present in the state record.

"A prosecutor's actions constitute misconduct if they 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). The "appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is 'the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.'"

Petitioner is entitled to relief, if at all, only if the admission of Sheldon's expert testimony or the State's failure to notice Sheldon as an expert "was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair," Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.1986)), and petitioner was actually prejudiced by the error. See Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 637 (1993). A petitioner suffers actual prejudice if the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict."

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The exception occurs where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim."

Rule 32.9(c) “requires that a petitioner present the issues and material facts supporting a claim in a petition for review and prohibits raising an issue through incorporation of any document by reference, except for appendices.” Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(iv)). Citing Rule 32.9, the court determined that Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly raised on review:

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The exception occurs where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim."

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The exception occurs where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim."

This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The exception occurs where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim."