¶ 10 Courts will enforce a covenant not to compete if it is reasonable and lawful. Wood v. May, 73 Wash.2d 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). We test reasonableness by asking (1) whether the restraint is necessary to protect the employer's business or goodwill, (2) whether it imposes on the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure the employer's business or goodwill, and (3) whether enforcing the covenant would injure the public through loss of the employee's service and skill to the extent that the court should not enforce the covenant, i.e., whether it violates public policy.

Courts will enforce a covenant not to compete if it is reasonable and lawful. Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). We test reasonableness by asking (1) whether the restraint is necessary to protect the employer's business or goodwill, (2) whether it imposes on the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure the employer's business or goodwill, and (3) whether enforcing the covenant would injure the public through loss of the employee's service and skill to the extent that the court should not enforce the covenant, i.e., whether it violates public policy.

Courts will enforce a covenant not to compete if it is reasonable and lawful. Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). We test reasonableness by asking (1) whether the restraint is necessary to protect the employer's business or goodwill, (2) whether it imposes on the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure the employer's business or goodwill, and (3) whether enforcing the covenant would injure the public through loss of the employee's service and skill to the extent that the court should not enforce the covenant, i.e., whether it violates public policy.

The general rule in Washington is that consideration exists if the employee enters into a noncompete agreement when he or she is first hired. Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 310-11, 438 P.2d 587 (1968); Racine, 141 Wash. at 609; Knight, Vale Gregory v. McDaniel, 37 Wn. App. 366, 368, 680 P.2d 448 (1984). A noncompete agreement entered into after employment will be enforced if it is supported by independent consideration.

Chapman Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645, 647 (Me. 1988). Before a court reaches this question, however, the party seeking to enforce a noncompetition provision must show that (1) the provision is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship, such as an employment contract or a contract for the purchase and sale of a business, Restatement (Second) Contracts § 187 (1981), (2) the provision is supported by adequate consideration, Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 310-11, 438 P.2d 587, 589-90 (1968); see also Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tenn. 1984), and (3) there exists a legitimate interest that the provision is designed to protect.

A steadily increasing number of courts have recently embraced the persuasive views of Williston and Corbin and have issued lesser restraints against particularized competitive activities where the circumstances disclosed that such was the fair and reasonable course. See Fullerton LumberCo. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955); Ebbeskotte v. Tyler, 127 Ind. App. 433, 142 N.E.2d 905 (1957); Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 157 So.2d 133 (1963); Credit Bureau Management Co. v. Huie,254 F. Supp. 547 ( D. Ark. 1966); Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968); Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 674, 682; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 289 at 1224 (1963); cf.Cedric G. Chase Photo. Lab v. Hennessey, 327 Mass. 137, 97 N.E.2d 397 (1951); John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d 548 (1952); Plunkett Chemical Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953); Denny v. Roth, 296 S.W.2d 944 ( Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956); Ramey v. Combined American Ins. Co., 359 S.W.2d 523 ( Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962) ; but cf.Baker v. Starkey, 259 Iowa 480, 144 N.W.2d 889 (1966); Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc.,176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964). In Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, supra, the defendant had been employed as manager of the plaintiff's lumberyard in Clintonville, Wisconsin.

¶ 18 A restrictive covenant protects an employer's business as warranted by the nature of employment. Wood v. May, 73 Wash.2d 307, 310, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). An employee who joins an established business gains access to his employer's customers and acquires valuable information as to the nature and the character of the business. Id.

59. Under Washington law, a restrictive covenant is valid and enforceable to protect the business and good will of the employer, including (i) the employer's investment in employee training, Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 438 P.2d 587, 589-90 (1968); (ii) confidential information and trade secrets, Perry v. Moran, 109 Wn.2d 691, 748 P.2d 224, 230 (1987); Central Credit Collection Control Corp. v. Grayson, 7 Wn. App. 56, 499 P.2d 57, 58 (1972); and (iii) customer relationships, Knight, Vale and Gregory v. McDaniel, 37 Wn. App. 366, 680 P.2d 448, 452 (1984). 60. ISC introduced substantial evidence that it possesses all three types of interests.

Instead, Genex recites an explanation of the test Washington courts apply to determine the reasonability of restrictive covenants. Wood v. May, 73 Wash.2d 307, 310 (1968) (en banc). Washington courts have exercised their equitable powers to reform some otherwise unenforceable covenants but this is more akin to a "general rule of contract law" than to a fundamental public policy.

(Citations omitted.) Knight, at 371-72. See also Wood v. May, 73 Wn.2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968); Columbia College of Music Sch. of Dramatic Art v. Tunberg, 64 Wn. 19, 116 P. 280 (1911). When one examines the actions of the defendant in this case under the light of the principles established by Wood v. May, supra; Racine v. Bender, supra; Knight, Vale Gregory v. McDaniel, supra; and Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., 85 Wn.2d 929, 540 P.2d 1373 (1975), those principles can only be upheld or the opinions reversed.