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WOO YOO v. N.Y.C. HEALTH AND HOSP. CORP

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
May 1, 1997
239 A.D.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

Opinion

May 1, 1997

Appeal from Supreme Court, New York County (Stanley Sklar, J.),


The causes of action for conscious pain and suffering were properly dismissed on the ground that the notice of claim was not served within 90 days of accrual, which was, at the latest, the date of death, and no motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim was made within the one year and 90-days Statute of Limitations (McKinney's Uncons Laws of N.Y. § 7401[2] [New York City Health Hospitals Corporation Act § 20(2); L 1969, ch 1016, § 1, as amended]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[a]; [5]; 50-i; see, Rodriguez v. City of New York, 169 A.D.2d 532; Wieder v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 183 A.D.2d 677). In Wieder (supra), we specifically rejected the contention that causes of action for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering are so inextricably intertwined in the context of medical malpractice that the notice of claim time requirements applicable to the former should govern the latter, and we reject plaintiffs' argument that the 1990 amendment to McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of N.Y. § 7401(2) (L 1990, ch 804, § 122), excepting "an action for wrongful death" from the usual 90 days-after-accrual rule, requires acceptance of that contention. The "materially separate and distinct" nature of causes of action for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering is too well established ( see, Ratka v. St. Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 609-610) to accept that the Legislature, because it used the word "action" instead of "cause of action", intended the exception to apply not just to wrongful death causes of action but to all causes of action contained in an action that includes a wrongful death cause of action. We have considered plaintiff's other arguments and find them to be without merit, including the argument that a timely notice of claim was not a condition precedent to commencement of the action against the treating physician ( see, McKinney's Uncons Laws of N.Y. § 7401[6]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[b]; § 50-k; DeGradi v. Coney Is. Med. Group, 172 A.D.2d 582, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 860), and that to hold that it is would be violative of the State constitutional prohibition against legislative abrogation of "[t]he right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death" (NY Const, art I, § 16; see, Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 18).

Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Nardelli, Rubin and Williams, JJ.


Summaries of

WOO YOO v. N.Y.C. HEALTH AND HOSP. CORP

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
May 1, 1997
239 A.D.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Case details for

WOO YOO v. N.Y.C. HEALTH AND HOSP. CORP

Case Details

Full title:JAE WOO YOO, as Administrator of the Estate of FLOYD WILLIAMS, JR.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: May 1, 1997

Citations

239 A.D.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
657 N.Y.S.2d 189