Opinion
8:20-cv-01915-JMC-JDA
05-18-2021
Joshua M. Wolfe, Plaintiff, v. Warden Charles Williams, Associate Warden Alyson Glidewell, Associate Warden Thomas Robinson, Associate Warden Leeman, Dr. McRee, Defendants.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants and a motion from Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. [Docs. 51; 62.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Plaintiff, an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) proceeding pro se, filed this action in this Court, alleging multiple federal constitutional claims against prison staff relating to events that allegedly occurred during his confinement. [Doc. 1.] On January 12, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 51.] By Order of this Court the next day, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 52.] On March 29, 2021, the Clerk docketed a response from Plaintiff opposing the summary judgment motion and a motion from Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. [Docs. 60; 61.] Then, on April 12, 2021, Defendants filed a response opposing Plaintiff's motion to amend his Complaint. [Doc. 67.] Both of these motions are now ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff alleges that, while he was being detained in the Spartanburg County Detention Center in the Fall of 2017, he noticed a throbbing pain in his scrotum. [Doc. 1 at 10-11.] After complaining, he received an ultrasound at Spartanburg Regional Hospital, and it was discovered that Plaintiff had two cysts on his left testicle. [Id. at 11.] A nurse practitioner told Plaintiff that these cysts typically go away on their own. [Id.]
Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff alternates between discussing one cyst and two cysts. [E.g., Doc. 1 at 10 (“cyst discovered”); id. at 11 (“I had two (2) cyst”).] It appears that Plaintiff may be intending to use the word “cyst” at times as a plural.
Plaintiff was transferred to the Turbeville Correctional Institution (“Turbeville”), and he noticed continued pain and the cysts had grown in size. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he “wrote countless grievances/staff request[s] to [the] medical dep[artment] but all were ignored.” [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he also orally grieved to prison staff, but was never seen for the issue while at Turbeville from January 2018 through August 2018. [Id.]
Plaintiff was then transferred to McCormick Correctional Institution (“McCormick”) on August 16, 2018. [Id.] Plaintiff sent a request to staff form to the medical department and filed a grievance on the kiosk. [Id.] Plaintiff was then sent to the medical department and, after being evaluated, was sent to Richland County Image Care for his second ultrasound on the two cysts. [Id.] After receiving his ultrasound, weeks passed without anyone telling him anything, so Plaintiff again reported to medical. [Id.] Defendant Dr. McRee issued Plaintiff a jock strap, but Plaintiff alleges that it did not help him. [Id.] Plaintiff told medical that he had to stop working out due to the pain, and he was told to take Tylenol. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that, during the month of November, his pain became so bad that it began waking him up and interfering with his sleep and that it hurt to use the restroom. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiff was then sent to see a urologist at Kirkland Correctional Institution on December 13, 2018. [Id.] The urologist told Plaintiff that he would get the issue handled. [Id.] However, Plaintiff alleges months went by without him hearing anything, prompting him to file another grievance on February 5, 2019, which was denied. [Id.] On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff went to the McCormick medical department to complain about the delays in treatment. [Id.] Plaintiff “was told the contract for [the SCDC] medical department had expired and [Plaintiff] was waiting for a new contract” to continue treatment. [Id.] On April 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed his third grievance. [Id.] Plaintiff sent a request to staff form to Defendant Associate Warden Alyson Glidewell about the fact that he was not getting any treatment. [Id.] However, he received no response. [Id.] Plaintiff wrote a letter to the SCDC's general counsel's office, and he asked his roommate to write an affidavit. [Id.] On April 16, 2019, Plaintiff wrote another grievance. [Id.] The response to this grievance, which was signed by Defendant Warden Charles Williams, stated that “‘the urologist on the [SCDC] contract retired at the end of 2018 . . . you are currently awaiting appointment with new urologist, however the contract is still not complete [and] no appointments have been set statewide.'” [Id.]
After receiving this response to his grievance, Plaintiff wrote a staff request to Glidewell on May 8, 2019, filed a grievance on the kiosk, and also wrote a request to staff to Williams on May 23, 2019. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he received no responses to these. [Id.]
Plaintiff wrote another grievance on May 28, 2019, which was denied. [Id. at 13.] Plaintiff's mother called multiple times and drafted an affidavit. [Id.] On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff sent another grievance on the kiosk, which was also denied. [Id.] Plaintiff was then sent to Greenwood Urologist Center on June 20, 2019, and was told he needed surgery to remove the cysts. [Id.] He was informed that he needed another ultrasound because so much time had passed since his last one. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that again months passed without further action. [Id.] Plaintiff wrote another request to staff form asking about his ultrasound. [Id.] Plaintiff then sent another grievance/staff request on December 8, 2019. [Id.] And Plaintiff wrote another grievance on the kiosk addressed to Williams and Defendant Associate Warden Thomas Robinson, explaining that he still had not received any treatment on December 30, 2019. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in 2020, the pain had become so severe that it started to hurt to put pressure on his left leg and to sit down. [Id.] Plaintiff wrote a request to staff form to medical on January 6, 2020, explaining this pain. [Id.] On January 8, 2020, he spoke to Associate Warden Turner about his medical issues through his cell door. [Id.] Turner wrote his name down and promised to find out what was happening. [Id.]
On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff sent a staff request to Dr. McRee, complaining that he had not received his ultrasound. [Id. at 14.] Plaintiff also sent a grievance stating that his dorm had four sick-call weeks cancelled back to back. [Id.] On January 9, 2020, Plaintiff wrote to Robinson and Turner asking for a follow up on what they were doing about his excessive delays. [Id.] Plaintiff never received a response. [Id.] Plaintiff finally was seen for his third ultrasound on January 14, 2020, and was told that SCDC would provide him with the ultrasound results. [Id.] On January 21, 2020, Plaintiff reported to the McCormick medical department and spoke to Nurse Overman, who informed Plaintiff that the ultrasound confirmed the cysts had grown in size and Plaintiff would be sent to Greenwood Urologist for further treatment. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that the cysts had grown drastically and that he can no longer work out, the pain wakes him up in his sleep, and he cannot walk or sit without throbbing pain. [Id.] Plaintiff was informed that he had an appointment with Greenwood Urologist in March. [Id.] However, as of April, he had not been taken to that appointment. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that it has been over two years since he discovered the cysts and that they continue to grow. [Id.] He has lost some feeling in his left testicle, and he is concerned that it will impact his ability to have children. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends Defendants' treatment of him violated his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and constituted a violation of his right to due process. [Id. at 6.] For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has cysts connected to his left testicle that are growing rapidly, that it hurts to use the restroom and to sit down, that the pain wakes him up from sleep, that he feels throbbing when he exercises, and that it hurts when he applies pressure to his left leg. [Id. at 15.] For relief, he requests compensatory damages and injunctive relief. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
(1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Because there is no doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983 claims, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978), a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (setting forth elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983). A plaintiff must establish three elements to prevail under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices[ ]”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Id. (citations omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Defendants advance several argument in support of their summary judgment motion. Initially, they argue that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to claims against them in their official capacities [Doc. 51-1 at 3-5] and to qualified immunity regarding claims brought against them in their individual capacities [id. at 9-12]. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that could support his claims and [id. at 5-9] and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies [id. at 12-16].
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
To the extent Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983, the Court agrees that Defendants are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment from Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity, ” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself, ” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. And that protection extends to SCDC employees. Johnson v. Stirling, No. 9:18-3028-RMG, 2021 WL 1232658, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2021). As a result, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983, the undersigned recommends that such claims be dismissed because Defendants in their official capacities are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
Deliberate Indifference Claim
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment and states a cause of action under § 1983 because deliberate indifference constitutes “the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Deliberate indifference exists when prison officials know of a substantial risk to a prisoner's health or safety and consciously disregard that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). Within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness” to violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must demonstrate (1) his medical condition was a sufficiently serious one and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by the prison officials. Goodman v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 096996, 2011 WL 1594915, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2011) (quoting Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998)). As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
Since, we said, only the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'” implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege “deliberate indifference” to his “serious” medical needs. “It is only such indifference” that can violate the Eighth Amendment; allegations of “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, ” or of a “negligent . . . diagnos[is], ” simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (emphasis and alteration in original) (citations omitted). Further, in the context of prisoner medical care, the Constitution requires only that prisoners receive adequate medical care; a prisoner is not guaranteed his choice of treatment. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988); see Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318 (4th Cir. 1975); Hirons v. Director, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.1965)) (“Prisoners are entitled to reasonable medical care.”); see also, e.g., Barton v. Dorriety, No. 9:10-cv-1362, 2011 WL 1049510, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2011). The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Russell, 528 F.2d at 319. Additionally, to establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that the non-medical personnel failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Moreover, because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment that the medical personnel deemed necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that any of the Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. After being transferred to McCormick in August 2018, Plaintiff received an ultrasound, and Dr. McRee issued Plaintiff a jock strap and told him to take Tylenol to help with the pain. [Docs. 1 at 11; 31-1 at 27.] When his pain reportedly increased, Plaintiff was sent to see a urologist on December 13, 2018. [Docs. 1 at 12; 31-1 at 26-27, 66-67.] Unfortunately, the SCDC's medical contract with the urologist expired at the end of the year, thereby delaying any follow-up treatment with the urologist. [Docs. 1 at 12; 31-1 at 26, 38, 67.] Plaintiff was able to see a new urologist on June 20, 2019, however, and Plaintiff reported that he had been informed that he would need surgery to remove his cysts and that he would need another ultrasound. [Docs. 1 at 13; 31-1 at 14, 24, 32; 51-4 at 2-3.] Plaintiff indeed received this ultrasound on January 14, 2020, and he was told on January 21, 2020, that the ultrasound confirmed that his cyst had grown and that Plaintiff would be sent to the urologist for further treatment, although he had not yet had this appointment as of April 2020. [Docs. 1 at 14; 31-1 at 9, 14; see also id. at 30, 41 (records noting that Plaintiff's urologist had rescheduled Plaintiff's March 27, 2020, appointment to May 4, 2020, and then to May 29, 2020).]
Plaintiff has received substantial medical care regarding his testicle issue. Although he is frustrated that his ultrasounds and his appointments with the urologists have not come as quickly as he would like, there is no basis for any reasonable inference that any medical staff, including Defendant Dr. McRee, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. And although Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the steps that have been taken to address his pain-providing him a jock strap, recommending Tylenol as needed, and sending him to urologists for further care-there is no reasonable basis for an inference that Dr. McRee was not providing Plaintiff adequate medical care, let alone evidence that Dr. McRee actually believed Plaintiff was not receiving adequate care. As explained above, the
Constitution requires only that a prisoner receive adequate medical care; the Constitution does not mandate that a prisoner receive the medical treatment of his choice. See, e.g., Jackson, 846 F.2d at 817. A plaintiff also does not state a constitutional violation when, like here, he believes he should have been afforded better or different treatment.
As for Defendants Warden Williams, Associate Warden Robertson, Associate Warden Leamon, and Associate Warden Glidewell, they are not trained medical personnel and are therefore entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of prison medical personnel concerning the course of treatment the medical personnel deemed medically necessary and appropriate for Plaintiff. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence that could give rise to a reasonable inference that any of these Defendants had reason to believe that he was not receiving appropriate treatment from prison medical staff.
The Court employs the spellings of “Robertson” and “Leamon” noted by Defendants in their Answer. [Doc. 18 at 1.] As Plaintiff alleges, Leamon was an assistant warden at Turbeville, whereas Williams, Glidewell, and Leamon were warden, associate warden, and assistant warden at McCormick. [Doc. 1 at 7-8.]
Finally, the Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff bases his opposition to summary judgment on the theory of supervisory liability with regard to any of the Defendants, that opposition fails because Plaintiff has failed to allege that any Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of subordinates engaging in pervasive or widespread conduct that posed a risk of injury to detainees like Plaintiff. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Therefore, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that Defendants could be liable for violating Plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment rights under § 1983 under a theory of supervisory liability. Thus, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
The Court also concludes that Defendants' summary motion should be granted regarding Plaintiff's due process claim. “[T]o recover under the due process clause, a plaintiff m[us]t establish that defendants acted with something more than mere negligence.” Golson v. Dep't of Corr., 914 F.2d 1491, at *1 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion); see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of our injury to life, liberty, or property.”). For the reasons explained, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that any of the conduct alleged in this case rose above negligence. Accordingly, the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted to Defendants to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of his due process rights.
Plaintiff has moved to amend his Complaint to add new Defendants, allegations, and exhibits. [Docs. 62; 62-1; 62-2; 62-3.] Relatedly, he argues that the Court should defer ruling on the merits of Defendants' summary judgment motion because he has only “begun discovery on the Spartanburg Detention Center to learn the defendant's name.” [Doc. 60 at 1.] The Court recommends denying the motion to amend the Complaint because an amendment at this stage in the litigation would unfairly prejudice Defendants, whose summary judgment motion had been pending for two and a half months when Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion [Doc. 51] be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's motion to amend his Complaint [Doc. 62] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Finally, because the undersigned concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned does not separately address the issues of qualified immunity or exhaustion of administrative remedies.