E.g., Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1994). As in any case, we look to see whether the ALJ made any legal errors (e.g., Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1993)), but we have found none here. Thus, our task is to determine whether the ALJ's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence.
A court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if the decision is reasonably drawn from the record and is supported by substantial evidence, even if some evidence may also support the claimant's position. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); see also Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1993). The ALJ does have a duty to develop a full and fair record.
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . .Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) recites the familiar 5-step process that guides Commissioner's sequential evaluation of a disability claim: In determining disability, the ALJ was required to address each of the following questions in sequential order: (1) Is the claimant presently employed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments severe? (3) Do his or her impairments meet or exceed any of the specific impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 which the Secretary acknowledges to be conclusively disabling? (4) Have the claimant's impairments limited his or her remaining or "residual" functional capacity to the point that he or she is no longer able to perform the demands and duties of a former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work in the national economy given his or her age, education and work experience?
In fact, the regulation defining "substantial gainful activity," sec. 404.1572, states that part-time work may be considered substantial. See Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that claimant's part-time work as automobile salesman two afternoons a week constituted substantial gainful activity); cf. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming ALJ ruling that claimant's short-term job as gate guard, which ended five months later when construction was completed, is his past relevant work, even though the job no longer exists). 20 C.F.R. sec. 404.1575, in pertinent part, provides:
We have held that, when the Appeals Council has denied review, evidence submitted for the first time to the Council, though technically a part of the administrative record, cannot be considered in determining the correctness of the ALJ's decision. Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1993); Eads v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health Human Servs., 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993); Micus v. Bowen, 979 F.2d 602, 606 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1992). Although we may conduct a limited review of the newly submitted evidence when a claimant alleges that the Appeals Council's refusal to review the ALJ's decision is based on a mistake of law, Eads, 983 F.2d at 817, Mr. Diaz makes no such allegation on appeal. Additionally, we note that the Appeals Council treated the newly submitted evidence as a part of Mr. Diaz's petition to reopen his case.
ANALYSIS Because the Appeals Council denied review of Luna's application, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Secretary, 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1993), and this court will only consider evidence that was before the ALJ. Id.; Eads v. Secretary of the Dept. of Health and Human Services, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993); Micus v. Bowen, 979 F.2d 602, 606 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Social Security regulations create a five-step, sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. Id. Under this test, the administrative law judge must address the following questions: 1) Is the claimant presently employed? 2) Is the claimant's impairment severe? 3) Do the impairments meet or exceed any of the specific impairments the Secretary acknowledges to be conclusively disabling? 4) Have the claimant's impairments limited his or her remaining or residual functional capacity so that he or she is no longer able to perform the demands and duties of a former occupation? 5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work in the national economy given his or her age, education and work experience? Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1993). If the ALJ reaches a negative conclusion at any step, other than at step three, this conclusion precludes a finding of disability. Id. at 323.
There the role of the district court is only to determine whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1993). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the court may not decide facts anew, the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1210, 1213-14 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Bucklo, J.).
The question before the court is not whether claimant is actually disabled, but rather whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that claimant is not disabled. See Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987); Pope, 998 F.2d at 480; Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1993). "Substantial evidence," means evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
The question before the court is not whether claimant is actually disabled, but rather whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that claimant is not disabled. See Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987); Pope. 998 F.2d at 480; Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir. 1993). "Substantial evidence," means evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."