Opinion
# 2020-044-542 Claim No. 121043 Motion No. M-95832
12-15-2020
ANDREW C. WOEHREL v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
THE LAW OFFICE OF ALFRED PANICCIA, JR., ESQ. BY: Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq., of counsel HON. LETITIA JAMES, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Michele M. Walls, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Court found defendant had improperly calculated interest on Court's judgment in appropriation matter, and found that claimant was entitled to nearly $43,000 of additional interest.
Case information
| UID: | 2020-044-542 |
| Claimant(s): | ANDREW C. WOEHREL |
| Claimant short name: | WOEHREL |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 121043 |
| Motion number(s): | M-95832 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE |
| Claimant's attorney: | THE LAW OFFICE OF ALFRED PANICCIA, JR., ESQ. BY: Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq., of counsel |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. LETITIA JAMES, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Michele M. Walls, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 15, 2020 |
| City: | Binghamton |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant filed this claim to recover for damages resulting from the appropriation in 2009 by defendant State of New York (defendant) of two parcels of real property owned by claimant and located in the Town of Ashland, Chemung County, New York (the 2009 Appropriations). Both the 2009 Appropriations and earlier appropriations in 1999 were carried out as part of a Department of Transportation (DOT) project to improve and upgrade State Route 17 (Route 17). The first appropriation in 2009 was a 0.895 acre parcel improved with a motel with adjoining campground (the Motel Parcel) and the second appropriation was a 0.6 acre portion of an approximately 1.96 acre contiguous parcel improved with a house and various other structures (the House Parcel), as well as two temporary easements totaling 0.25 acres. The date of taking of both the Motel Parcel and the House Parcel was March 17, 2009 and the claim for both appropriations was filed on March 15, 2012 and duly served. The Court denied defendant's summary judgment motion for a finding that claimant had no legal access to his property, on the basis that there existed questions of fact as to whether claimant had established a prescriptive easement (Woehrel v State of New York, UID No. 2015-044-520 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., July 1, 2015]). Thereafter and with the consent of the parties, the Court held a trial limited to the sole issue of legal access at the time of the 2009 Appropriations and found that claimant did have legal access to both the House Parcel and the Motel Parcel pursuant to a valid prescriptive easement over property belonging to Coldiron Fuel Center, Ltd (Woehrel v State of New York, UID No. 2016-044-004 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., May 26, 2016]).
Trial of the remaining issues was held in the Binghamton District on January 18-19, 2017. After post trial submissions, the Court issued a Decision dated June 13, 2017 finding that claimant was entitled to an award of $203,000 for the Motel Parcel, plus $138,500 for the House Parcel, less $23,000 for the value of the remainder, or a total of $318,500 in direct damages for the taking of fee title (Woehrel v State of New York, UID No. 2017-044-007 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., June 13, 2017]). Claimant was also awarded $900 for the value of the temporary easements, for a total of $319,400, with statutory interest thereon pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 19 (1) from the vesting date of March 17, 2009 to the date of the decision, and thereafter to the date of judgment.
The Judgment which was entered on January 25, 2018, among other things, Ordered and Adjudged that claimant recover against defendant:
the sum of $319,400.00 with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum from March 17, 2009 to June 13, 2017, the date of decision, to wit; the sum of $236,835.10, amounting to the sum of $556,235.10, and with interest at the rate of nine percent per annum on said sum of $556,235.10 from June 13, 2017 to October 4, 2017, and from November 14, 2017 to January 25, 2018, the date of entry of judgment herein, to wit; the sum of $25,308.70 amounting in all to a total sum of Five Hundred Eighty-One Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three and 80/100 Dollars ($581,543.80), for all damages resulting from the appropriation[s].
The Judgment also provided for recovery of the claim filing fee of $50.00. The Judgment was affirmed on appeal (Woehrel v State of New York, 178 AD3d 1169 [3d Dept 2019]). On April 3, 2020, defendant issued two checks, one in the amount of $199,400.00 and the other in the amount of $174,926.58 for a total amount of $374,326.58 which it stated was in full satisfaction of the Judgment, including accrued interest. Counsel for claimant requested and eventually received an explanation of the manner in which the interest was calculated. Claimant disagreed with the calculation and now moves for the Court to calculate the interest due on the Judgment. Defendant opposes the motion. Claimant replies.
Before addressing the merits of the motion, some additional background information will be helpful. Prior to the 2009 Appropriations, defendant determined that just compensation for the Motel Parcel was $120,000 and for the House Parcel was $64,700. Claimant ultimately rejected these amounts as payment in full for the 2009 Appropriations, but eventually elected to accept the offers as advance payments. In response to claimant's request for an explanation of the interest calculation, defendant represented that it deposited the two sums into separate eminent domain accounts with the Comptroller pursuant to EDPL 304 (E) (2), based upon the project's classification as a federally-funded project. As set forth previously, this Court awarded claimant total damages of $319,400 and had earlier distributed the advanced payment of $120,000 plus accrued interest to a mortgage creditor, leaving a balance of $199,400 due to claimant as of March 17, 2009. In calculating the interest due, defendant broke the $199,400 into two distinct sums: $64,700 (the advance payment for the House Parcel) and $134,700 (the difference between the amount due and the House Parcel [$199,400 - $64,700]). Using the statutory rate of interest of 9%, defendant calculated the interest due on the $134,700 from March 17, 2009 (date of appropriation) through June 13, 2017 (date of Decision) to be $99,880.05. The interest on the sum of these two numbers ($234,580.05) from June 13, 2017 through October 4, 2017 and then from November 14, 2017through January 25, 2018 (date of entry of judgment) was calculated to be $10,673.39. The interest on the new sum of $245,253.44 ($234,580.05 + $10,673.39) from January 25, 2018 through March 30, 2020 (the alleged date of payment) totaled $48,130.99. The total interest on the $134,700 was $158,684.43. Claimant objects to this total interest calculation only to the extent that he asserts that he is owed an additional four days of interest because the checks were not issued until April 3, 2018.
With respect to the $64,700 advance payment, defendant asserts that the money, including 9% interest from March 17, 2009 (date of appropriation) through April 2, 2009 (date of deposit) which was $242.63 was deposited into Eminent Domain Account W061803 (Account W061803) and accrued interest at the rate earned in the State's Short-Term Investment Pool (STIP) pursuant to Finance Law § 97-dd. Account W061803 accrued interest of only $1,690.11 from April 2, 2009 through November 14, 2017. Defendant then calculated interest based upon the sum of $66,632.74 ($64,942.63 + $1,690.11) at 9% from November 14, 2017 to March 30, 2020 (the purported date of payment) to be $14,259.41. The total interest on the $64,700 was $15,949.52. Claimant argues that because defendant was not authorized to deposit the offer into an eminent domain account, he should receive the statutory interest rate of 9% from vesting through the date of payment.
As claimant correctly notes, the total interest shown on the Court of Claims Pay Package Preparation Worksheet (the Worksheet) is $174,633.95 ($99,880.05 + $10,673.39 + $48,130.99 + $1,690.11 + $14,259.41) and when added to the $199,400 owed to claimant totals $374,033.95. However, defendant actually paid claimant a total of $374,326.58, or an apparent extra $292.63. In reviewing the Worksheet and supporting documentation, the principal amount deposited into the Account W061803 on April 2, 2009 was $64,942.63 ($64,700 advance payment + $242.63 [interest at 9% for 15 days]). , When the $50 for the filing fee awarded in the Decision and Order dated June 13, 2017 and reflected in the Judgment entered January 25, 2018 is added to this interest, the total is $292.63. Thus, there is no discrepancy and claimant received the proper amount according to defendant's calculations.
The Court will now address the merits of the motion. Claimant contends that because the State failed to comply with several statutory requirements of EDPL 304 (E) (2) with respect to a federally-funded project, it was not authorized to deposit the offer for the House Parcel into Account W061803. Claimant further argues that defendant cannot now, 11 years after the fact, attempt to justify the deposit by asserting that it was authorized to do so under different statutory sections such as EDPL 304 (B), (C), or (E) (1). Claimant asserts that as a result, defendant was obligated to pay statutory interest of 9% rather than the STIP rate.
Conversely, defendant argues that deposit of the advance payment was proper for various reasons: 1) claimant did not return the signed agreement either accepting the monies as payment in full or as an advance payment within 90 days of the offer so the deposit was necessary pursuant to EDPL 304 (B); 2) there was sufficient evidence of conflicting claims to the property such that the deposit was appropriate pursuant to EDPL 304 (E) (1); and 3) that claimant did not execute and return closing papers within 90 days after their delivery to him on April 6, 2010 as required pursuant to EDPL 304 (C).
Eminent Domain Procedure Law Article 3 requires that once a decision is made to acquire property, the condemnor must endeavor to provide just compensation by issuing a written offer containing a sum that represents the highest appraised value of the property received by the condemnor and that the condemnee may either accept the offer as payment in full or treat it as an advanced payment and reserve its right to file a claim for additional compensation (EDPL 301-304). Pursuant to EDPL 304 (B), if the condemnee does not accept or reject the offer within 90 days of receipt, it will be deemed rejected. If the offer is rejected or if the "condemnee unreasonably fails to provide the condemnor with all papers reasonably necessary to effect a valid transfer of title as acquired, within ninety days of receipt, the condemnor's obligation to pay interest on the amount of the offer shall be suspended until such time as the condemnee accepts the offer as either payment in full, or an advance payment, or provides the necessary title papers as the case may be" (EDPL 304 [C]).
There are three instances in which the amount of the offer may be deposited into an eminent domain account. The first situation is where the condemnee has accepted the State's offer either in full or as an advance payment, but the Attorney General's Office has determined that there is a conflict of title or a conflict arises which prevents the Attorney General from certifying the persons entitled to payment of damages caused by the appropriation (EDPL 304 [E] [1]). In this scenario, the Attorney General so informs the Comptroller who then deposits the amount of the offer into an interest-bearing account (id.). The second instance is where the condemnee either rejects the offer or is deemed to have rejected the offer by failing to act within 90 days after appropriation (EDPL 304 [E] [2]). In this circumstance, the condemnor may, with the written approval of the Attorney General, request that the Comptroller deposit the offer amount into an interest-bearing account (id.). The third situation allows a deposit any time after the vesting of title when the appropriation is made in connection with a federally-funded project and the condemnor finds that an immediate deposit must be made so that the project can continue (id.). In such a case, the condemnor may directly request the Comptroller to deposit the funds into an interest-bearing account without approval of the Attorney General, as long as an offer has been made to the condemnee (id.). Once the deposit is made, the Comptroller notifies the Attorney General (id.). In any event and regardless of which of the three situations apply, the Attorney General must notify all interested parties of the deposit and inform them that any of them may commence a distribution proceeding (EDPL 304 [E] [1], [2]). As long as the deposit is in an interest-bearing account, the obligation to pay statutory interest is terminated (id.). Essentially, claimant argues that because defendant's initial justification for the deposit was that as a federally-funded project the deposit was necessarily required to be made immediately in order to facilitate the letting of a construction contract pursuant to EDPL 304 (E) (2), defendant cannot now attempt to justify the deposit on a different statutory authority. This contention is not persuasive. The Court notes that "there is nothing in the [EDPL] that would require such specificity or that compels the State to identify the specific grounds on which it has made the deposit" (Freiman v State of New York, UID No. 2014-049-045 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Aug. 20, 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted] at 6; see also SPJ v State of New York, UID No. 2020-045-036 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, May 20, 2020]). Accordingly, if the deposit was appropriate under any of the three scenarios set forth in EDPL 304 (E) (1) or (2), claimant would not be entitled to statutory interest. Nevertheless, the burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements rests upon defendant (Matter of Sagres 9, LLC v State of New York, 164 AD3d 903, 905 [2d Dept 2018]).
As a general rule, the Court would need to address each individual requirement in each of the three instances where a deposit would be authorized. However, that analysis is not necessary in this case. In support of this motion, claimant has provided an affidavit wherein he states that he never received notice from the Attorney General that the money for the House Parcel had been deposited and that he or any interested party could apply for its distribution. In response, defendant argues that claimant had notice from other sources. Specifically, defendant has submitted a copy of a letter from DOT Regional Director Peter E. White dated January 7, 2010 which advised claimant that the money offered for the House Parcel may be collected by entering into an agreement with the State, which claimant had not yet done. The letter additionally states that a "[d]istribution of the money offered . . . may be initiated upon the request of any interested parties . . . to the Attorney General's office." However, this letter was sent before claimant had even signed an agreement. Further, there is no evidence that any other interested party was sent a copy. Moreover, this "notice" does not satisfy the statutory mandate that "the [A]ttorney [G]eneral shall notify all parties claiming an interest in the fund that the amount payable thereunder has been deposited and is subject to an application by an interested person or persons to a distribution proceeding" (EDPL 304 [E] [1] [emphasis supplied]; see also EDPL 304 [E] [2]).
Defendant additionally asserts that because claimant received proper notification from the Attorney General's Office that the advance payment for the Motel Parcel was on deposit and a distribution proceeding could be initiated by him or any other interested party, he implicitly was aware that such a proceeding was available with respect to the advance payment for the House Parcel. This argument similarly lacks merit. The eminent domain account for the House Parcel was separate from the account pertaining to the Motel Parcel. Moreover, there may have been different interested parties associated with each account. Claimant and all other interested parties were statutorily entitled to a separate notice that a deposit had been made into Account W061803 for the House Parcel and that any of them could commence a distribution proceeding. The failure to provide the notice required by EDPL 304 (E) (1) and (2) with respect to the House Parcel is fatal. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant was not authorized to deposit the advance payment into a special-interest bearing account under either EDPL 304 (E) (1) or (2) and consequently, the obligation to pay statutory interest remained in effect.
Moreover, defendant's reliance on either EDPL 304 (B) or (C) as authorization to deposit the funds is misplaced. As set forth previously herein, EDPL 304 (C) provides for the suspension of interest in the situation where the condemnee has rejected the offer or the offer is deemed rejected pursuant to EDPL 304 (B) or if the closing papers have not been submitted to the condemnor within 90 days of the condemnee's receipt. The statute also provides that the suspension of interest is lifted when the "condemnee accepts the offer . . . or provides the necessary title papers as the case may be" (EDPL 304 [C]). Neither EDPL 304 (B) or (C) provide any authorization for defendant to deposit the offer into an eminent domain account. Because defendant was not authorized under any statutory section to deposit the offer for the House Parcel into an interest-bearing or eminent domain account, defendant's obligation to pay the statutory rate of interest was not terminated.
The Court will now address the issue of the amount of additional interest actually due. Although EDPL 304 (B) and (C) do not authorize a deposit, they do operate to affect the interest due on an offer and may require suspension of interest in this case. It is undisputed that claimant received a written offer for the House Parcel on February 5, 2009 and had 90 days (or until May 6, 2009) to accept it or it would be deemed rejected (EDPL 304 [B]). Because claimant did not execute an agreement to accept the offer as an advance payment until April 6, 2010, interest must be suspended from May 6, 2009 until April 6, 2010. On that date, interest resumes at the statutory rate of 9%.
However, defendant has asserted that claimant received closing documents on April 6, 2010 and because he did not return them within 90 days, interest should again be suspended. As evidence of the delivery of the closing documents, defendant has submitted the affidavit of Judith Jacobson, a DOT Real Estate Officer 1. Jacobson states that she has "caused an exhaustive search regionally and statewide in an attempt to find any documentation which [would] assist in the defense of this motion." Jacobson indicates that she reviewed records from both the Regional Office in Hornell and the Main Office in Albany and consulted with other DOT employees, but has admitted that they did not have any independent recollection of the project.
Jacobson also notes that since 2009, DOT has maintained an electronic database called Sesame to track the progression of paperwork necessary for acquisition of and the payment offer for appropriated properties. Based upon her review of the Sesame database, Jacobson concludes that claimant was made an offer on February 5, 2009 and provided with an agreement to accept the offer as either payment in full or an advance payment. She notes that the appropriation maps for both the Motel Parcel and the House Parcel were filed on March 17, 2009 and the advance payments were deposited with the Comptroller on April 2, 2009. Jacobson also asserts that based upon DOT records, claimant was provided with a second set of the offer papers and agreements on January 8, 2010 and that claimant met with Matthew Biswanger and Clair Mallory to execute the agreements on April 6, 2010. She further states that "with a reasonable degree of certainty" claimant was provided with closing papers at the time he signed the agreements. She apparently relies on the Sesame Negotiation Control Log which has the date "4/6/10" under the column "CP to Claimant" for her conclusion. Jacobson indicates that April 6, 2010 is the same date that Biswanger notarized claimant's signature on the agreements. She additionally observes that the Sesame database also correctly reflects several other dates such as the date of vesting and when the offer and advance payments were made.
The Court finds that none of the evidence submitted by defendant supports a finding that the closing papers were delivered to claimant on April 6, 2010. Initially, Jacobson does not indicate that she was personally involved with the appropriations of any of claimant's property. Further, she specifically stated that the employees she consulted who were involved with the project had no independent recollection of the incident. Jacobson's only basis for her conclusion that claimant received the closing papers on April 6, 2010 is because that date is listed on the Negotiation Control Log.
The Court has determined that reliance upon the Negotiation Control Log is not appropriate. As claimant correctly notes, Jacobson has not provided any information concerning the entry of data into Sesame, including when the entries are made. This lack of information is particularly troublesome given that several dates listed in other portions of the Negotiation Control Log were three to four years before DOT allegedly started utilizing the database. Further, although Jacobson states that the heading CP to Claimant refers to closing papers to claimant, she does not explain the heading "CP Rec'd." Regardless of whether the term is closing papers received or closing papers recorded as suggested by claimant's counsel (or has some other meaning), according to the Negotiation Control Log, the event pertaining to the House Parcel purportedly took place on January 17, 2006 - more than three years before the appropriation. Without deciding whether the Negotiation Control Log is hearsay, the Court finds that the information contained therein is insufficient to meet defendant's burden to prove that the papers reasonably necessary to effect a transfer of title had been delivered to claimant on April 6, 2010, particularly when combined with the absence of any copy of the papers or correspondence concerning their transmittal. Accordingly, the Court finds that no further suspension of statutory interest on the advance payment for the House Parcel is warranted.
Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Michele M. Walls, dated Sept. 30, 2020, in Opposition to Motion, Exhibit B at 3.
Id. at 4.
It is undisputed that defendant previously distributed $120,000 plus accrued interest - which had been deposited in an eminent domain account as an advanced payment for the Motel Parcel - to a mortgage creditor pursuant to a distribution proceeding conducted by this Court (see infra).
EDPL 514 (A) provides that the condemnee is entitled to lawful interest unless an advance payment has been made or deposited into an interest-bearing account or an eminent domain account established pursuant to State Finance Law § 97-dd. The lawful or statutory interest is currently 9% (State Finance Law 16; see also CPLR 5004).
The parties agreed that interest was suspended from October 4, 2017 through November 13, 2017 due to claimant's delay in providing closing documents to the Attorney General's Office. The Court notes that the statute refers to this documentation as "all papers reasonably necessary to effect a valid transfer of title as acquired" rather than as closing documents (EDPL 304 [C]). Nevertheless, the Court will use the terms closing documents or closing papers with the understanding that they refer to the documents defined by the statute.
Affidavit of Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq., sworn to Aug 18, 2020, in Support of Motion, Exhibit B at 1.
id. at 5.
Based upon the supporting documentation for the undisputed interest rate on the $134,000, it appears that statutory interest is calculated at 9% annually (or 0.025% daily) based upon a 360-day year (30-day month). Using this information, the calculation for the 15 days of interest between March 17, 2009 and April 2, 2009 [13 days left in 30-day month of March + 2 days in April] would be as follows: [$64,700 x 0.025% x 15 days = $16.175 x 15 = $242.625 rounded up to $242.63. This amount of interest was not reflected in the Worksheet.
Although the supporting documentation for the calculation indicates that the deposit was made on April 9, 2020, that date appears to be incorrect (Affidavit of Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq., sworn to Aug 18, 2020, in Support of Motion, Exhibit B at 5). So, contrary to the handwritten notation that claimant had received an unwarranted seven days of interest at 9%, the Court finds that the principal balance deposited was correct as of April 2, 2009.
Affirmation of AAG Michele M. Walls, dated Sept. 30, 2020, in Opposition to Motion, Exhibit D.
id. at 2.
Defendant also argues that because a judgment has been issued and an appeal taken, this action is final and claimant is barred from raising the issue of the rate of interest by the doctrine of res judicata. This contention is not persuasive. Defendant correctly states that such doctrine precludes litigation between the same parties of an issue which arose out of the same transaction as a cause of action which was or could have been raised in a prior proceeding (see e.g., Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260 [2005]). However, claimant has not commenced another action. Instead, claimant has brought a motion within the action that culminated in and which directly concerns compliance with the interest provisions of the existing Judgment (Court of Claims Act § 9 [8]; see e.g. Wilson v State of New York, 73 Misc2d 931 [Ct Cl 1973]). Notably, claimant is not now questioning defendant's determination to place the advance payment for the Motel Parcel into a special interest-bearing account subject to the STIP rate of interest. If he were, defendant's res judicata defense would be appropriate as the issue of the interest rate with respect to the Motel Parcel could have been litigated and decided in the prior distribution proceeding held before this Court.
Affidavit of Judith Jacobson, sworn to Sept. 29, 2020, in Opposition to Motion, ¶16.
In her affidavit, Jacobson also attempts to justify the contention that defendant's deposit into Account W061803 was authorized because the project was federally-funded and the immediate deposit was required for the project to continue. In light of the Court's determination that the deposit was not authorized due to the Attorney General's failure to provide the required notice (supra), no further discussion of that portion of her affidavit is necessary.
Although Biswanger notarized claimant's signature on both agreements, it is unclear where Jacobson obtained the information that Clair Mallory was also present.
Affidavit of Judith Jacobson, sworn to Sept. 29, 2020, in Opposition to Motion, ¶ 29.
Affirmation of AAG Michele M. Walls, dated Sept. 30, 2020, in Opposition to Motion, Exhibit G.
Id.
The Court has calculated the interest due on the principal balance for the House Parcel ($64,700) as follows:
Date Event Elapsed time
Interest starts 3/17/2009 vesting
Interest stops 5/6/2009 no agreement in 90 days 1 mo 20 days
Interest starts 4/6/2010 agreement signed
Interest stops 4/3/2020 payment 9 years 11 mo 28 days
The Court finds that the date of payment is the date that the Comptroller issued the checks (infra).
Keeping in mind that interest is calculated based upon a 360-day year (30-day month), the total amount of time interest is due is 10 years, 1 month, and 18 days or 3,648 days (3,600 + 30 +18). The total interest due for the period March 17, 2009 through April 3, 2020 is $59,006.40 ($64,700 x 0.025% x 3,648). However, this amount must be reduced by the interest claimant was already paid on the principal balance for the House Parcel, i.e. $16,192.15, which is comprised of the sum of $242.63 for the 15 days from vesting to the unauthorized deposit into the STIP account (March 17, 2009 - April 2, 2009), the $1,690.11 for the time from deposit in the STIP account to the date the closing documents were received (April 2, 2009 - November 14, 2017), and the $14,259.41 from November 14, 2017 through March 30, 2020 (the purported date of payment). Accordingly, defendant owes claimant additional interest on the advance payment for the House Parcel in the amount of $42,814.25 ($59,006.40 - $16,192.15). Moreover, Claimant is entitled to statutory interest of 9% per annum on this amount from April 3, 2020 until the date of payment.
Lastly, claimant has requested an additional four days of interest on the principal balance of the remaining amount due (initially the $134,700 due from the date of vesting) from March 30, 2020 which was the purported day of payment through April 3, 2020 when the Comptroller issued the checks. Other than to argue that claimant is not entitled to payment of any additional interest, defendant has not directly addressed this issue. Without any explanation as to why the date of the checks should not be used as the date of payment, the Court finds that payment was made on April 3, 2020. However, because interest is calculated on a 30-day month, claimant is only entitled to three additional days. The balance due at the time judgment was entered was $245,253.44 and the daily interest rate is 0.025%. The interest for the additional three days is $183.94 ($245,256.44 x 0.025% x 3). Claimant is also entitled to statutory interest of 9% per annum on this amount from April 3, 2020 until the date of payment.
In conclusion, claimant's motion is granted to the extent that claimant is entitled to additional interest in the amount of $42,814.25 for the House Parcel and interest in the amount of $183.94 for an additional three days on the remaining balance due. Accordingly, claimant is entitled to total additional interest of $42,998.19, plus statutory interest of 9% per annum on this amount from April 3, 2020 until the date of payment. Let judgment be entered accordingly.
December 15, 2020
Binghamton, New York
CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read on claimant's motion: 1) Notice of Motion filed August 14, 2020; Affidavit of Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq. sworn to August 18, 2020, and attached exhibits; Affidavit of Andrew C. Woehrel, dated August 12, 2020; Memorandum of Law dated August 14, 2020. 2) Affirmation in Opposition of Michele M. Walls, AAG, dated September 30, 2020, and attached exhibits; Affidavit of Judith Jacobson, sworn to September 29, 2020; Memorandum of Law dated September 30, 2020. 3) Reply Affidavit of Alfred Paniccia, Jr., Esq. sworn to October 13, 2020, and attached exhibits. Filed Papers: Claim filed on March 5, 2012.
The Court notes that identical copies of an unsworn affidavit and attached exhibits were also filed.