Given the evidence regarding the cost of Britney's tuition and other necessaries and the evidence regarding the parents' and Britney's financial resources, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in awarding the mother $425 per month in postminority support. The father also argues that the trial court erred in ordering the collection of his postminority-support payments through an income-withholding order because, he says, such an income-withholding order violates this court's holding in W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001), that § 30-3-60, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes an income-withholding order only while the child is a minor. In W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., the child had reached the age of majority before the mother, who was the custodial parent, sought to recover a child-support arrearage from the father.

The father first argues on appeal that the juvenile court could not issue an IWO to collect a child-support arrearage because the child has reached the age of majority. The father cites W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), and Sheeley v. Chapman, 953 So.2d 1252 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), in support of his argument on appeal. Both of those cases have been superseded by statute. See§ 30–3–60 through –71, Ala.Code 1975. As this court recently explained:

C.H. correctly notes that there is no Alabama caselaw addressing this issue, but, nevertheless, he maintains that the plain language found in § 16-28-14 mandates reversal under the circumstances of this case. Relating to the rules of statutory construction, this court, in W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001), stated: "In construing a statute, this court looks to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature.

Both parties to this appeal acknowledge that there is no Alabama case addressing the issue in this case and that this case involves an issue of first impression. Relating to the rules of statutory construction, this court, in W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001), stated: "In construing a statute, this court looks to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature.

This Court found no authority stating that child support arrears belong to the child once the child reaches the age of majority. In W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So. 2d 777, 780-781 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's award of arrears to a mother who brought suit after her daughter had reached the age of majority. Id. at 781.

This Court found no authority stating that child support arrears belong to the child once the child reaches the age of majority. In W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So. 2d 777, 780 — 781 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's award of arrears to a mother who brought suit after her daughter had reached the age of majority. Id. at 781.

At one time, Alabama law did not allow the use of an IWO as a tool to collect unpaid child-support obligations from nonpaying obligors after the children who had been the subject of the underlying child-support awards had attained the age of majority. See W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777, 780 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), and Sheeley v. Chapman, 953 So.2d 1252, 1259 (Ala.Civ.App.2006). However, the statute relied upon in both W.L.S. and Sheeley,Ala.Code 1975, § 30–3–60, was amended in 2009 so as to allow for the issuance of IWOs for “enforcement post-majority of arrearages accrued during minority” as well as accrued interest.

" Blue Cross Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992))."W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777, 779 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001); see also Ex parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 721 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Ala. 1998) ("The word `shall' is clear and unambiguous and is imperative and mandatory."). In the present case, it is undisputed that "at the time of or prior to the completion of the sale," see § 32-8-87(p), K V did not disclose to Brown that the vehicle was a salvage vehicle in the manner set forth in § 32-8-87(p).

" DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998)."W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777, 779 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001). Additionally, "[s]ections of the Code originally constituting a single act must be read in pari materia in order to `produce a harmonious whole.'"

" DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998)."W.L.S. v. K.S.S.V., 810 So.2d 777, 779 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001). Additionally, "[s]ections of the Code originally constituting a single act must be read in pari materia in order to `produce a harmonious whole.'"