Witcig v. Witcig

21 Citing cases

  1. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer

    456 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 18 times

    We reject the wife's argument that the husband's retirement plan should have been treated as part of the marital estate, subject to division by the trial court. On this point, we find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1980) persuasive and quote the following from that decision: We recognize . . . that there are jurisdictions that treat pension interests as marital assets, subject to division by the court.

  2. Kullbom v. Kullbom

    306 N.W.2d 844 (Neb. 1981)   Cited 34 times
    In Kullbom v. Kullbom, 209 Neb. 145, 306 N.W.2d 844 (1981), this court determined that by virtue of 42-366(8) (Cum. Supp. 1982) "the law of this state now requires that pension plans and retirement plans shall be included as part of the marital estate for the purposes of the division of property...."

    It is well established that dissolution of marriage cases are tried de novo on the record; however, this court, in reaching its decision, will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980); Boroff v. Boroff, 204 Neb. 217, 281 N.W.2d 760 (1979). Although alimony and allocation of property rights are distinguishable and have different purposes in marriage dissolution proceedings, they are still closely related in the matter of determining the amount to be allowed, and circumstances may require that they be considered together to determine whether the court has abused its discretion.

  3. Cole v. Cole

    304 N.W.2d 398 (Neb. 1981)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that court is to determine amount of alimony based upon evidence of conditions and circumstances existing at time of trial and if there is change, alimony award can be modified

    The scope of review of a dissolution action in this court is well established, as follows: "`While in a divorce action the case is to be tried de novo, this court will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.'" Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 311, 292 N.W.2d 788 791 (1980); Boroff v. Boroff, 204 Neb. 217, 281 N.W.2d 760 (1979); Grummert v. Grummert, 195 Neb. 148, 237 N.W.2d 126 (1975). The rules for determining alimony or division of property in an action for dissolution of marriage provide no mathematical formula by which such awards can be precisely determined.

  4. In re Marriage of Mack v. Mack

    108 Wis. 2d 604 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that a federal pension in lieu of Social Security is not the functional equivalent of Social Security because Social Security is not property like a pension

    "The legislative history [of 5 U.S.C.A. ยง 8345(j)(1)] . . . makes it clear that the purpose of that statute was to permit federal cooperation with state law and court orders, and to remove federal preemption from the area. . . . See S. Rep. No. 95-1084, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News p. 1379." Witcig v. Witcig, 292 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1980).Accord Monsma v. Monsma, 618 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1980); Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1978); Marriage of Laster, 643 P.2d 597 (Montana 1982).

  5. Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer

    491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)   Cited 174 times
    Holding that retirement benefits may be considered marital property or as a source of income for alimony, but courts should be careful not to double count

    While it initially ruled that only the $44,000 actually contributed to the plan could be treated as a marital asset, it subsequently allowed, over objection, testimony as to the benefits' estimated present value. Upon appeal, the First District, citing Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980), rejected the wife's claims that the retirement plan should have been recognized as a marital asset, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations. It therefore found error in the lower court's failure to award permanent periodic alimony.

  6. Ray v. Ray

    222 Neb. 324 (Neb. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    However, when the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). The determination of alimony is initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Ford v. Ford, 219 Neb. 13, 360 N.W.2d 495 (1985).

  7. Bryan v. Bryan

    222 Neb. 180 (Neb. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Providing that a trial court may consider, among other things, the marketability of the shares when determining the fair market value of a business

    However, where the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Awards of alimony and the division of marital property are matters which are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record establishes that the trial court has abused its discretion.

  8. Burhoop v. Burhoop

    380 N.W.2d 254 (Neb. 1986)   Cited 7 times
    In Burhoop v. Burhoop, 221 Neb. 657, 661, 380 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1986), a case concerning an award of alimony, we said that "the earning capacity of both parties in a dissolution of marriage should be considered" and that "[t]he actual earning capacity of a spouse is frequently more important than the profitability of that spouse's business in determining the propriety of an award of alimony."

    It is also the law, however, that where the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Awards of alimony are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record establishes that the trial court has abused its discretion.

  9. Shald v. Shald

    346 N.W.2d 406 (Neb. 1984)   Cited 10 times

    While in a divorce action the case is to be tried de novo, this court will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Cole v. Cole, 208 Neb. 562, 304 N.W.2d 398 (1981); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). We cannot say that the court erred in the value it placed on the real estate and Shald's Market.

  10. Lacey v. Lacey

    215 Neb. 162 (Neb. 1983)   Cited 8 times

    Tavlin v. Tavlin, 194 Neb. 98, 104, 230 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1975). See, also, Cole v. Cole, 208 Neb. 562, 304 N.W.2d 398 (1981); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Under Neb. Rev. Stat. ยง 42-365 (Reissue 1978), "When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of property as may be reasonable" under the circumstances of the case.