We reject the wife's argument that the husband's retirement plan should have been treated as part of the marital estate, subject to division by the trial court. On this point, we find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1980) persuasive and quote the following from that decision: We recognize . . . that there are jurisdictions that treat pension interests as marital assets, subject to division by the court.
It is well established that dissolution of marriage cases are tried de novo on the record; however, this court, in reaching its decision, will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980); Boroff v. Boroff, 204 Neb. 217, 281 N.W.2d 760 (1979). Although alimony and allocation of property rights are distinguishable and have different purposes in marriage dissolution proceedings, they are still closely related in the matter of determining the amount to be allowed, and circumstances may require that they be considered together to determine whether the court has abused its discretion.
The scope of review of a dissolution action in this court is well established, as follows: "`While in a divorce action the case is to be tried de novo, this court will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.'" Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 311, 292 N.W.2d 788 791 (1980); Boroff v. Boroff, 204 Neb. 217, 281 N.W.2d 760 (1979); Grummert v. Grummert, 195 Neb. 148, 237 N.W.2d 126 (1975). The rules for determining alimony or division of property in an action for dissolution of marriage provide no mathematical formula by which such awards can be precisely determined.
"The legislative history [of 5 U.S.C.A. ยง 8345(j)(1)] . . . makes it clear that the purpose of that statute was to permit federal cooperation with state law and court orders, and to remove federal preemption from the area. . . . See S. Rep. No. 95-1084, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News p. 1379." Witcig v. Witcig, 292 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1980).Accord Monsma v. Monsma, 618 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1980); Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167 (Alaska 1978); Marriage of Laster, 643 P.2d 597 (Montana 1982).
While it initially ruled that only the $44,000 actually contributed to the plan could be treated as a marital asset, it subsequently allowed, over objection, testimony as to the benefits' estimated present value. Upon appeal, the First District, citing Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980), rejected the wife's claims that the retirement plan should have been recognized as a marital asset, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations. It therefore found error in the lower court's failure to award permanent periodic alimony.
However, when the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). The determination of alimony is initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Ford v. Ford, 219 Neb. 13, 360 N.W.2d 495 (1985).
However, where the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Awards of alimony and the division of marital property are matters which are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record establishes that the trial court has abused its discretion.
It is also the law, however, that where the evidence is in conflict, this court gives weight to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 218 Neb. 746, 359 N.W.2d 87 (1984); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Awards of alimony are initially entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record establishes that the trial court has abused its discretion.
While in a divorce action the case is to be tried de novo, this court will give weight to the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Cole v. Cole, 208 Neb. 562, 304 N.W.2d 398 (1981); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). We cannot say that the court erred in the value it placed on the real estate and Shald's Market.
Tavlin v. Tavlin, 194 Neb. 98, 104, 230 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1975). See, also, Cole v. Cole, 208 Neb. 562, 304 N.W.2d 398 (1981); Witcig v. Witcig, 206 Neb. 307, 292 N.W.2d 788 (1980). Under Neb. Rev. Stat. ยง 42-365 (Reissue 1978), "When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may order payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of property as may be reasonable" under the circumstances of the case.