Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-3035-KHV
February 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Pro se plaintiff Donnie L. Wishom, an inmate at Ellsworth Correctional Facility ("ECF") in Ellsworth, Kansas, brings suit against Mike Hill, former Sedgwick County Sheriff; Mike Steed, current Sedgwick County Sheriff; the Sedgwick County Detention Facility ("SCDF"); John Doe I, population control officer at the SCDF; and John Doe II, administration captain at the SCDF. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Hill. Steed And Sedgwick County Detention Facility's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) filed May 20, 2003. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants' motion in part.
Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A "genuine" factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga. Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l. Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 10th Cir. 1990):see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574. 586-87 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. While the Court holds pro se pleadings to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as any other litigant. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5. 9 (1980):Green v. Dorrell 969 F.2d 915.917 (10th Cir. 1992). The Court may not assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant.Hall v. Bellmon 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Deepwater Invs., Ltd, v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment may be granted if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Andersoa 477 U.S. at 250-51. "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52
Factual Background
The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.At 3:15 p.m. on February 12, 1999, Wichita Police Officer S.M. Saffell arrested plaintiff without a warrant for possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia and driving on a suspended driver's license. Officer Saffell also charged plaintiff with a traffic violation — failure to signal a turn. At 4:05 p.m., Officer Saffell stated the reasons for plaintiff's arrest in an affidavit, and placed plaintiff in custody of the Sedgwick County Sheriff while a warrant was sought for his arrest. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the SCDF for five days, until 10:20 p.m. on February 17, 1999.
The Sheriff of Sedgwick County operates the SCDF, which is located in the Eighteenth Judicial District. Mike Hill was Sheriff at the time of plaintiff's arrest and incarceration. Gary Steed became Sheriff in January of 2001, long after the events in question.
As a matter of policy and practice, the District Attorney ("DA") for the Eighteenth Judicial District visited the SCDF on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays to review all cases in which an officer had arrested a suspect without a warrant and placed the suspect in custody in the last 24 hours. If the DA or her designated assistant ("ADA") intended to file charges, he or she reviewed the matter with a district judge who made an independent decision as to probable cause. If the judge found probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed the crime, he or she established bond. If not, the suspect was released.
Plaintiff was not taken before a magistrate for a probable cause determination or afforded a bail hearing while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff notified detention officers on all shifts that he had no bond and had not appeared before a magistrate.
On February 13, 14 and 15, 1999, ADA David Lowden went to the SCDF and reviewed 17 cases with the Honorable Thomas Malone, district judge for the Eighteenth Judicial District. They did not review plaintiff's case. On February 16, 1999, the Honorable Clark Owens, II reviewed Officer Saffell's affidavit and found that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Judge Owens set bond at $5,000.00. The following day, ADA Mark Jordan directed plaintiff's release because the DA did not intend to immediately file charges.
On March 23, 1999, ADA Jordan filed a criminal complaint charging plaintiff with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of K.S.A. § 65-4160(a) on February 12, 1999. Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to that charge and on January 21, 2000, the court sentenced him to the custody of the Kansas Secretary of Corrections but placed him on probation.
Four months later, on May 24, 2000, the court revoked plaintiff's probation and committed him to the custody of the Kansas Secretary of Corrections. On June 14, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate his sentence, arguing that his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated when he was held without bail for five days and without a probable cause hearing. Exhibit 4 toMemorandum In Support (Doc. #38). On December 18, 2001, the Honorable Joseph Bribriesca denied plaintiff's motion. Exhibit 5 toMemorandum In Support (Doc. #38). Judge Bribriesca noted that plaintiff's motion was essentially a request to withdraw his guilty plea and that under K.S.A. § 22-3210, a judgment of conviction could only be set aside and a plea withdrawn if plaintiff presented evidence of manifest injustice. Id.
On January 29, 2001, plaintiff filed this suit. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that when defendants incarcerated him for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond, they violated his Fourth Amendment right to due process, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Complaint (Doc. #1) filed January 29, 2001. Plaintiff brings suit against former Sheriff Hill and Sheriff Steed in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive and exemplary damages, and a declaratory judgment or preliminary injunction. Id. at 3.
In his motion to vacate his sentence, plaintiff alleged that he was held without a probable cause hearing for five days. This suit alleges that defendants held him for six days.
Plaintiff does not state what declaratory or injunctive relief he seeks.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff does not state a claim for wrongful detention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), bars plaintiff's claims.Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #37).
Plaintiff responded to defendants' summary judgment motion four days late and without leave of Court. See Plaintiffs [sic] Response To Defendants [sic] Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #40) andPlaintiffs [sic] Memorandum In Support Of Defendants [sic] Motion For Summary Judgment And Motion To Dismiss Defendants [sic] Motion ("Plaintiff's Memorandum") (Doc. #41), both filed June 16, 2003. Further, plaintiff has not complied with D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b), which requires that (1) a memorandum in opposition contain a concise statement of material facts as to which the nonmovant contends a genuine issue exists, (2) each fact in dispute be numbered by paragraph and refer with particularity to the record, and (3) when the nonmovant relies on facts not in movant's memorandum, each additional fact be listed in a separately numbered paragraph and supported by record references. Nevertheless, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. The burden shifts to the nonmoving party only if the summary judgment motion is properly supported. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970) (cited in Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 2002 WL 31732484, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2002)). The Court must "first examin[e] the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its initial burden of demonstrating that no material issues of fact remain for trial and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Reed, 2002 WL 31732484, at *3. Although the Court will not consider unsupported factual statements, defendants will not be prejudiced by consideration of plaintiff's arguments and the Court therefore will consider plaintiff's response.
Analysis
As noted, plaintiff claims that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by incarcerating him for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived him of (1) his right to due process under the Fourth Amendment, (2) his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and (3) his right of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint (Doc. #1) at 2-3. As to the last claim, plaintiff apparently claims that the SCDF policy of detaining inmates for more than 48 hours without a probable cause hearing or bail violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. He does not, however, allege that the policy classified him or treated him any different than it did any other inmate (i.e. on the basis of race, age or gender, etc.). THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS THAT PLAINTIFF SHOW CAUSE IN WRITING ON OR BEFORE FEBRUARY 20, 2004, WHY THIS CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff also claims that defendants' policy of depriving inmates of a probable cause hearing or bail within 48 hours of incarceration violates K.S.A. § 22-2901. In part, Section 22-2901 states that a person arrested on probable cause, without a warrant, "shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate." This statutory claim is not part of plaintiff's complaint.
The Court notes that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states the substance of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. See Cooper Indus, v. Leatherman Tool Group. Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) ( Eighth Amendment incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (incorporating Fourth Amendment into Fourteenth Amendment).
I. Failure To State A Claim For Wrongful Detention Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for wrongful detention because plaintiff does not state a claim under Section 1983. Specifically, defendants claim that (1) plaintiff cannot sue the SCDF; (2) this case does not implicate the Eighth Amendment; (3) in their individual capacities, former Sheriff Hill and current Sheriff Steed are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) plaintiff does not state an official capacity claim against either Sheriff; and (5) plaintiff's claims are merely a collateral attack on his criminal conviction. Memorandum In Support (Doc. #38) at 7-11.
Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff(1) does not allege that in their official capacities, either Sheriff committed overt acts or had knowledge of the facts of this case; (2) plaintiff cannot show that the SCDF had a policy, practice or custom ofholding inmates for more than 48 hours without a probable cause hearing or bond; and (3) even if plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, neither Sheriff is responsible because a single isolated incident does not rise to the level of policy making. Memorandum In Support at 8-9.
Plaintiff argues that (1) defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because he had a clearly established right to a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of incarceration and no objectively reasonable officer could believe otherwise; and (2) through their actions or inactions defendants established a policy or custom which deprived inmates of a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest, in violation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs [sic] Memorandum In Support Of Defendants [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment And Motion to Dismiss Defendants [sic] Motion ("Plaintiff's Response") (Doc. #41) filed June 16, 2003, at 5-6.
Section 1983 provides that "[e]veryperson who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It does not create substantive rights, but provides remedies for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).
To establisha cause of action under Section 1983, plaintiff must prove that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal right. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Section 1983, suit against a sheriff in his official capacity and suit against the county are the same. See Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316, n. 2 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Personal or individual capacity suits under Section 1983 seek to impose personal liability on a government official for actions taken under color of state law. Id.
A. Suit Against SCDF
Defendants admit that plaintiff may sue former Sheriff Hill and current Sheriff Steed, but correctly note that plaintiff may not sue the SCDF because it is a subordinate governmental agency. Fuguate v. Unified Gov'tofWvandotte County/Kan. City, Kan., 161 F. Supp.2d 1261, 1266 (D. Kan. 2001) (absent specific statue, subordinate governmental agencies lack capacity to sue or be sued); Wright v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's Dep't, 963 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (D. Kan. 1997) (county sheriff's department is agency of county and not capable of being sued):Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 491, 630 P.2d 186, 190 (1981) (absent express statutory or ordinance authority, agency does not have capacity to sue or be sued). The SCDF lacks the capacity to sue or be sued. The Court therefore sustains defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims against the SCDF.
B. Eighth Amendment Analysis
As noted above, defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment does not apply because plaintiff was not convicted at the time of the incident at question. "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. . . .[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-672, n. 40 (1977); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n. 16 (1979). As noted below, pretrial detainees are entitled to protection under the due process clauses of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Here, plaintiff was not convicted at the time in question. The Eighth Amendment therefore has no application, see City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp. 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), and the Court sustains defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
C. Qualified Immunity
Former Sheriff Hill and current Sheriff Steed contend that under the doctrine of qualified immunity, they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's individual capacity claims. Memorandum In Support (Doc. #38) at 11. Specifically, they argue that (1) plaintiff does not allege that their conduct caused his constitutional injuries, and (2) they are not individually liable for merely supervising or controlling the facility where the alleged violation occurred. Id. Plaintiff responds that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of his incarceration, the Supreme Court had clearly established his right to a probable cause hearing within 48 hours, and no objectively reasonable official could consider a six-day incarceration without such a hearing to be constitutionally valid. Plaintiff's Memorandum (Doc. #41) at 7.
Qualified immunity safeguards government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their actions violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The purpose of qualified immunity is to avoid excessive disruption of governmental functions and to dispose of frivolous claims in the early stages of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). It "protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2001),cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). It is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01 (quotingMitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Consequently, the Supreme Court has explained that "courts should resolve the `purely legal question,' Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 23 (1991), raised by a qualified immunity defense `at the earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hunter v. Brvant, 502 U.S. 224.227 (1991)).
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the standards for summary judgment motions raising the qualified immunity defense.Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-06. As a threshold question, the Court must consider whether the facts alleged, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,. . . show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. at 201. If the nonmoving party fails to meet his burden on this threshold inquiry, the qualified immunity inquiry is finished. Id. If, however, a favorable view of the facts alleged shows the violation of a constitutional right, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established at the time of defendants' unlawful actions. Id. In other words, the Court assesses the objective legal reasonableness of the officials' actions at the time of the alleged violation and asks whether "the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right." Id. at 202. "This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. at 201.
Applying these standards, the Court must determine whether plaintiff has satisfied this heavy two-part burden. Holland, 268 F.3d at 1186. If plaintiff fails to meet either part of the inquiry, the Court must grant qualified immunity. Id. (citation omitted).
1. Former Sheriff Hill
a. Violation Of Constitutional Right
The Court first turns to the question whether plaintiff has demonstrated that former Sheriff Hill violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff must establish an affirmative link between a particular defendant's conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.Id. at 1187 (citations omitted); see also Foote v. Spiegel 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (citationomitted) (individual liability under Section 1983 must be based on personal involvement in constitutional violation).
As noted above, plaintiff alleges that former Sheriff Hill violated his Fourth Amendment right to due process when he incarcerated plaintiff for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond and that "no objectively reasonable official could consider the initial six day period of incarceration brief." Former Sheriff Hill argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffhas not alleged specific conduct by which he caused a constitutional injury. As noted, however, plaintiff alleges that former Sheriff Hill incarcerated him for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Plaintiff's Memorandum (Doc. #41) at 4; see also Complaint (Doc. #1) at 2.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest. 420 U.S. at 126. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. 500 U.S. 44 (1991), in which plaintiff's challenged a two-day county requirement which excluded weekends and holidays, the Supreme Court held that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein." 500 U.S. at 56. Once the detention exceeds 48 hours, the government has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which justifies continuing detention. Id. at 57.
Here, the record indicates that former Sheriff Hill incarcerated plaintiff for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Defendant has not attempted to justify that detention. On this record, genuine issues of material fact exist whether former Sheriff Hill violated plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourth Amendment.
b. Clearly Established Right
Ordinarily, for plaintiff to demonstrate that a law is clearly established, "there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Medina v. City County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992);Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (right clearly established if contours of right sufficiently clear so reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 194-95.
Defendants concede that under Gerstein andMcLaughlin, plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following his warrantless arrest. Because plaintiff has satisfied his burden to show a clearly established right, former Sheriff Hill must demonstrate that his actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information he possessed at the time. See Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1990). Former Sheriff Hill provides no evidence which suggests that plaintiff's incarceration was objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information he possessed at the time. The Court is therefore required to deny his motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.
2. Sheriff Steed
Plaintiff alleges that current Sheriff Steed violated his Fourth Amendment right to due process by incarcerating him for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Sheriff Steed, however, did not become Sheriff until January of 2001, nearly two years after plaintiff's arrest. On these facts, no reasonable jury could find that his conduct denied plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Court therefore finds that Sheriff Steed is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's individual capacity claims against him.
D. Official Capacity Claims
As noted above, defendants argue that plaintiff does not state an official capacity claim because (1) he does not allege that in their official capacities, either Sheriff committed overt acts or had knowledge of the facts of this case; (2) plaintiff cannot show that the SCDF had a policy, practice or custom of holding inmates for more than 48 hours without affording them a probable cause hearing or bond; and (3) even if plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, neither Sheriff is responsible because a single isolated incident does not rise to the level of policy making.
As noted above, suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the county. Meyers, 151 F.3d at 1316. n. 2: see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166(1985) (suit "is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity"); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55 (official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent").
1. Former Sheriff Hill
Plaintiff brings official capacity claims against former Sheriff Hill. Suit against a person in his former official capacity, however, has no meaning. See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 818 (2d Cir. 1997). When a sheriff is replaced or ceases to hold office pending final resolution of an official capacity claim, his successor is automatically substituted as the party. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 n. 11 (1985) (citations omitted). Sheriff Steed replaced Sheriff Hill in January of 2001, and plaintiff brings suit against him in his official capacity. Substitution is not necessary and plaintiff's official capacity claim against the former Sheriff is redundant. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff's official capacity claims against Sheriff Hill.
In addressing plaintiff's official capacity claim against current Sheriff Steed (a claim against the county), the Court still analyzes Sheriff Hill's conduct.
2. Current Sheriff Steed
As noted above, plaintiff's official capacity claims against Sheriff Steed are directed against the county. County liability under Section 1983 does not automatically spring from the acts of county employees,Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986), but results when the county itself causes the wrong. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818. Such wrongs may arise from official policy, e.g. "acts which the [county] has officially sanctioned or ordered," or from the act of an ultimate county decision-maker. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80. In seeking summary judgment on plaintiff's official capacity claims, defendant argues that at the time of plaintiff's arrest, the county had a policy and practice which afforded detainees a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of incarceration, as required byMcLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44. As stated above, however, liability may also arise from the act of an ultimate county decision-maker.Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480. Plaintiff's official capacity claims can therefore survive summary judgment if he can show a genuine issue of material fact that an ultimate county decision-maker caused the violation of his right to be free from unconstitutional detention under the Fourth Amendment.
Under Kansas law, the sheriff is responsible for taking care of the jail of his county and its prisoners. K.S.A § 19-811. He therefore serves as an ultimate county decision-maker in matters involving the county jail. Cf. Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Indiana law). To prevail on his official capacity claim, plaintiff must show a genuine issue of material fact whether Sheriff Hill caused him to be detained without a probable cause hearing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could so find. As stated above, the record indicates that Sheriff Hill incarcerated plaintiff for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Defendants have not attempted to justify that detention. On this record, genuine issues of material fact preclude the Court from determining as a matter of law that Sheriff Hill did not cause a violation of plaintiff's rights. The Court therefore overrules defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's official capacity claim against Sheriff Steed.
D. Collateral Attack On Criminal Conviction
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff's claim is a collateral attack on his criminal conviction and is therefore barred. Relying on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establisha claim under Section 1983 because a state tribunal has not reversed, expunged or declared his conviction invalid, and a federal court has not called it into question by issuing of a writ of habeas corpus. Memorandum In Support (Doc. #38) at 10. In support of this argument, defendants specifically note that plaintiff voluntarily entered a plea agreement on November 12, 1999, and he did not bring this action until after his probation was revoked and the state court denied his motion to dismiss/vacate sentence. Id.
In Heck, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of his state court conviction in a Section 1983 action for damages. The Supreme Court held that:
in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under Section 1983, and district courts must therefore consider whether a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.Id. at 487. If it would, the district court must dismiss the complaint unless plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If the district court determines that plaintiff's action, even if successful, "will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." Id.
In Beck v. City of Muskogee, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit noted that "Heck applies only to those claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction."Beck made clear that Heck does not apply to claims which arise "out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure [which] are presumed to accrue when the actions actually occur" because a successful Section 1983 action on those theories does not necessarily imply that a plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. Id. at 558. Heck may, however, significantly limit the measure of damages available.See id. at 559 n. 3 (although Section 1983 suit for damages for illegal search and seizure may proceed where underlying conviction has not been invalidated, damages recovered cannot include those for being convicted and imprisoned unless conviction has been overturned).
Here, plaintiff's claims arise out of officials' actions toward him as a criminal suspect, and they therefore accrued at the time of his initial detention. Although Heck may limit the damages available to plaintiff, it does not mandate dismissal of his claim. The Court therefore overrules defendants' motion for summary judgment in this regard.
II. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
As noted, defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies or alleged physical injury, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
In general, exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under Section 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480 (quotingPatsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982). Prisoner suits are an exception. Section 1997e(a), provides that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." This procedural requirement is mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001).
The purpose of the PLRA exhaustion requirement is to improve prisonadministration, filter out frivolous claims, and clarify the contours of controversies for cases that are ultimately brought to court.United States v. Al-Marri 239 F. Supp.2d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). It is not jurisdictional; it simply codifies the administrative exhaustion doctrine. Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1074, overruled on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
Although it is undisputed that plaintiff was an inmate at ECF when he filed suit, Section 1997e(a) specifically applies to prisoner suits with respect to "prison conditions." The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the language of Section 1997e(a), holding that "prison conditions" encompass "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2003). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is therefore required for all prisoner suits seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences, regardless whether they involve general circumstances of incarceration or particular episodes, and whether they allege Eighth Amendment violations based on use of excessive force or some otherwrong.Id.: see also Booth, 532 U.S. at 739-40; Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001).
Suits regarding prison conditions, however, are not the only type of prisoner actions. The Supreme Court has described two broad categories of prisoner suits: (1) "those challenging the fact or duration of confinement itself;" and (2) "those challenging the conditions of confinement." McCarthy v. Bronsoa 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)) quoted in Porter, 534 U.S. at 527. Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the fact of confinement for six days without a probable cause hearing or bond. Plaintiff does not challenge a prison condition. Therefore, the PLRA does not apply and the Court overrules defendants' motion for summary judgment on this basis.
Even if the PLRA did apply, the moving party on summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 3 23: Hicks, 942 F.2d at 743. The burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial only after the moving party meets its burden. See Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241; see also Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586-87; Bacchus Indus., 939 F.2d at 891. Defendants do not specify whether administrative process was available at ECF or SCDF, or what relief it might have afforded plaintiff. As stated above, the PLRA requires that plaintiff exhaust "available" administrative remedies before filing suit under Section 1983. Without information whether ECF or SCDF provided administrative remedies for inmates to challenge the fact of confinement, it begs the question to argue that plaintiff did not exhaust.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Hill, Steed And Sedgwick County Detention Facility's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #37) filed May 20, 2003 be and hereby is SUSTAINED in part. The Court SUSTAINS defendants' motion as to plaintiff's claims against the Sedgwick County Detention Facility, his Eighth Amendment claim, his individual capacity claims against Sheriff Steed and his official capacity claims against Sheriff Hill. The Court OVERRULES defendants' motion as to plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Sheriff Hill and his official capacity claims against Sheriff Steed. The following claims therefore remain: plaintiff's equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, his Fourth Amendment individual capacity claim against former Sheriff Hill, and his Fourth Amendment official capacity claims against Sheriff Steed, which the Court construes as a claim against the county. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff show cause in writing ON OR BEFORE FEBRUARY 20, 2004, why his equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment should not be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.