(3) State laws "concerning the . . . [l]imitation on contributions and expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political committees." 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b); see also WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 942 (8th Cir. 2023) ("[The] FEC regulation defines the statute's scope."). The regulations provide that FECA does not preempt state laws concerning the "[m]anner of qualifying as a candidate or political party organization"; "[d]ates and places of elections"; "[v]oter registration"; "[p]rohibition of false registration, voting fraud, theft of ballots, and similar offenses"; "[c]andidate's personal financial disclosure"; and "[a]pplication of State law to the funds used for the purchase or construction of a State or local party office building to the extent described in 11 CFR 300.35." 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(c).
Federal law can preempt state law in one of three ways: (1) by express statutory language, (2) by occupying the entire legislative or regulatory field, or (3) by conflicting with the state law. See WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2023). These labels and categories, however, “are not rigidly distinct.”
Congress can preempt state law in the following three ways: “(1) expressly though statutory language like a preemption clause; (2) implicitly when a state law ‘conflict[s] with' or stands as an obstacle to federal law; or (3) implicitly by ‘occup[ying] a legislative field,' leaving no room for state law.” WinRed v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2023). CVS Pharmacy argues Plaintiff's claims conflict with federal law in that she seeks to impose a requirement that is different from what is required under the FDCA.
SFLA also asserts in Count I that South Dakota's low spending threshold subjecting certain speech to the disclosure requirement makes the statute overbroad and may apply to general political speech and not just election-related speech. This Court's ruling would be different if SDCL § 12-27-16 indeed applied to general political speech because political speech “is at the very core of the First Amendment's protections.” Winred, Inc, v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 947 (8th Cir. 2023). But, as discussed previously, the statute does not apply to general political speech but only to communications concerning a candidate or ballot issue, thus limiting the range of speech swept into South Dakota's regulatory scheme.
The Court takes judicial notice of information provided on WellBiz's website, https://wellbizbrands.com. See WinRed, Inc v. Ellison, 581 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1167 n.9 (D. Minn. 2022), aff'd, 59 F.4th 934 (8th Cir. 2023) (taking judicial notice of information provided on a party's website).
There is simply no conflict between the State's interest in ensuring its consumers are not misled by false advertising and any federal interest in regulating environmental pollution. For the same reason that state consumer protection laws are generally not preempted by federal legislation, see, e.g., Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1992) (federal Hazardous Substances Act does not preempt Connecticut's consumer protection law); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020) (federal Higher Education Act does not preempt Pennsylvania's consumer protection law); WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934 (8th Cir. 2023) (Federal Election Campaign Act does not preempt Minnesota's consumer protection law), New York City's consumer protection law is not preempted by whatever federal common law might govern transboundary pollution.
.” WinRed, Inc v. Ellison, 581 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1165 n.6 (D. Minn. 2022), aff'd sub nom., 59 F.4th 934 (8th Cir. 2023). That request is denied.
When Congress includes an express preemption clause in a statute, and a state statute is outside the scope of that express clause, there is a presumption against implied preemption. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); see also WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 944 (8th Cir. 2023). Here, Congress expressly preempted state laws only "with respect to election to Federal office."
"Congress can preempt state law in one of three ways: (1) expressly though statutory language like a preemption clause; (2) implicitly when a state law 'conflict[s] with' or stands as an obstacle to federal law; or (3) implicitly by 'occup[ying] a legislative field,' leaving no room for state law." WinRed v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1993)). "Congressional intent is the touchstone for determining the preemptive effect of a statute."
Federal law can preempt state law in one of three ways: (1) by express statutory language, (2) by occupying the entire legislative or regulatory field, or (3) by conflicting with state law. See WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, 59 F.4th 934, 941 (8th Cir. 2023). These labels and categories, however, “are not rigidly distinct.