Winner v. Winner

Full title: MARION L. WINNER, APPELLANT, v. LINDA G. WINNER, APPELLEE

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District

Date published: Nov 25, 1980

390 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

Opinion

No. 80-59.

November 25, 1980.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Ira L. Dubitsky, Judge.

Steinberg Sorota and Samuel S. Sorota, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Koeppel, Stark Newmark and Robert Gellman, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is the third appeal which appellant husband has brought in connection with matters complained of relative to the dissolution of the marriage of the parties to this cause, 376 So.2d 924.

In this appeal appellant is seeking reversal of an order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida awarding his former wife the sum of $18,000 as and for reasonable attorneys fees due her attorneys, Koeppel, Stark Newmark for services rendered in an effort to enforce the court's final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The fee of $18,000 was apportioned as follows: $8,300 for services rendered in case no. 76-27588 in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida; $8,000 for services rendered in case no. 79-195CA, in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Florida; and $1,700 for services rendered in the Courts of Alabama.

It is appellant's contention that the trial court erred in its award of each of these fees. We cannot agree.

We have carefully considered appellant's contentions in the light of the record, briefs and arguments of counsel and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BARKDULL, Judge, concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I concur in the affirmance of the award of fees for services rendered in the Circuit Court of Dade County and in the courts of Alabama, as these were proceedings seeking to directly enforce the trial court's final judgment. However, I dissent from so much of the opinion that approved fees for the Monroe County action, as this was an independent action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance in an attempt to collect a judgment rendered in behalf of the former wife. I think once she elected to take a money judgment she was then in the same position as any other judgment creditor and was not entitled to fees for the bringing of an independent action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance. I don't think that such a proceeding falls under the provision for "enforcement" under Section 61.16, Florida Statutes. Therefore, I would reverse this part of the order under review.