Opinion
NO. 01-10-00861-CV
08-30-2012
WINDWOOD PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, INC., A TEXAS NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, Appellant v. THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) AND PREBYTERY OF NEW COVENANT, INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the 281st District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2008-53684
OPINION
This case involves a property dispute between a local church and its parent denominational church. The local church, Windwood Presbyterian Church, Inc. ("Windwood") filed suit against The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) ("PCUSA") and Presbytery of New Covenant, Inc. ("the Presbytery") (collectively, "the denominational church"), seeking a declaration that the denominational church had no legal, equitable, or other interest in the property on which Windwood's church campus is located. The denominational church moved for summary judgment, contending that PCUSA is a hierarchical church, and, as such, its decision on church property matters is entitled to deference by civil courts. The trial court granted summary judgment, and this appeal followed. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Windwood Presbyterian Church, Inc. is a non-profit corporation that maintains the civil affairs for Windwood Presbyterian Church, which is located at 1055 Spring-Cypress Road in Houston, Harris County, Texas. Windwood was incorporated and its first trustees were elected in 1971. The 1971 articles of incorporation pledge the assets of the corporation to the establishment and maintenance of a place of religious worship. In the articles, Winwood trustees were given the power to buy, sell, and mortgage property for the church. The articles further provide that the members of the corporation could assign other duties to the trustees, "provided they do not infringe upon the powers and duties of the Session or of the Board of Deacons as defined in the Book of Church Order, Presbyterian Church in the United States."
Windwood was at the time of its incorporation a member of Presbyterian Church of the United States ("PCUS"), which, because of a split at the time of the Civil War, was comprised of churches in the southern part of the United States. The PCUS did not have any trust provisions in its constitution at the time of Windwood's incorporation. However, in 1983, the PCUS merged with the churches from the northern part of the United States to form the Presbyterian Church as it exists today, the PCUSA. Windwood has been a member of the PCUSA since the merger of the two churches in 1983.
As a part of the reunification, and in response to a Supreme Court decision outlining how hierarchical churches might retain church property in the event of a dispute between a local church and its hierarchy, PCUSA amended its church constitution—the Book of Order—to provide:
All property held by or for a particular church, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is used in programs of a particular church or of a more inclusive governing body or retained for the production of income, is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
The Book of Order also contains a provision permitting a local church, within eight years of the formation of the PCUSA, to opt out of the trust provision if it had not been subject to a similar provision before the formation of the PCUSA. Windwood never exercised this right.
The property at issue in this case was given to Windwood by warranty deeds dated December 27, 2000 and May 12, 2003, after Windwood joined the PCUSA, and more than eight years after the amendments to the Book of Order. Neither deed references a trust in favor of PCUSA.
On October 1, 2007, Windwood amended its articles of incorporation to add a declaration that all real property held by the corporation constituted a trust held for the benefit and enjoyment of the members of the local church only.
In 2008, Windwood filed suit against PCUSA and the Presbytery seeking a declaration that (a) the denominational church has no legal, equitable, or other interest in the property; (b) no trust interest of any kind exists in favor of the denominational church, or if such a trust was created, it has been revoked; (c) all property held by or titled in Windwood's name is held by its ownership pursuant to its 2007 Articles of Incorporation and the terms of the deeds; and (d) that neither PCUSA nor the Presbytery has any right to determine the ownership of the property.
PCUSA moved for summary judgment, contending that (1) PCUSA is a hierarchical church, and as such (2) Texas courts must defer to the governing church authority for resolution of property issues. Windwood responded that (1) there are fact questions about whether PCUSA is a hierarchical church, and, even if it is (2) the trial court should apply "neutral principles" of law in determining ownership of the property, and (3) PCUSA did not have a legally cognizable interest in the property. The trial court granted the PCUSA's motion, and this appeal followed.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
To resolve the issues in this case, we first consider the historical development of church property disputes and how they are affected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1940), provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. Following this constitutional mandate, civil courts may not intrude into inherently "religious" or "ecclesiastical" matters. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 398—99 (Tex. 2007). In Texas, this doctrine has been referred to as one of "ecclesiastical abstention" or "ecclesiastical exemption." See Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see also Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 555 n.13 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); Schismatic & Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church v. GraceUnion Presbytery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine stands for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them." Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713—14, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 (1976). Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine or practice.
Watson v. Jones and Hierarchical Deference Review
For over 100 years, church property disputes were governed by the seminal case of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). The Court in Watson declared that, when asked, civil courts have jurisdiction to resolve secular church disputes over ownership of church property:
[T]he courts when so called on must perform their functions as in other cases.80 U.S. at 714.
Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.
To decide how to resolve such disputes, the Court drew a distinction between "congregational" or "independent" churches and more hierarchical churches. To determine property disputes in congregational churches or those "governed solely within," "the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations." Id. at 724—25.
However, in a hierarchical form of church organization, the Court said, the local church "is itself part of a large and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and ecclesiastical government." Id. at 726. In such instances, "we are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments." Id. at 726—27.
The Court then held that:
All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.Id. at 729. Thus, the Court in Watson adopted an approach to resolving property disputes in hierarchical churches that has since been described as "hierarchical deference." Under the rule of hierarchical deference, a civil court must first determine the organizational structure of the church and then, if it determines that the church is hierarchical, it must defer to the decision of the highest judicatory body of the hierarchical church.
Post-1969 Cases and the "Neutral Principles of Law" Review
In 1969, the Supreme Court indicated that neutral principles of property law might be used to resolve church property disputes so long as application of those principles did not draw state courts into religious controversies. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969) involved a property dispute between two Georgia churches and the Presbyterian Church in the United States, with which they were affiliated. The two local churches had withdrawn from the general church over doctrinal disputes. 393 U.S. at 442, 89 S. Ct. at 602. The local churches sought a judicial determination that the general church had substantially departed from the tenets of faith that existed at the time of the local church's affiliation and that, as a result, the implied trust through which church property is held for the general church had terminated. 393 U.S. at 443—44, 89 S. Ct. at 603. In resolving the dispute, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the local churches that the "substantial abandonment" standard applied and submitted to the jury the question of whether the general church organization had substantially abandoned the tenets of faith and practice as they existed at the time of affiliation. 159 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. 1968), rev'd, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S. Ct. 601 (1969). In so doing, the Georgia court permitted a jury examination into tenets of faith of the parent church.
Citing Watson, the Supreme Court reversed, explaining that Georgia's "departure-from-doctrine" approach was unconstitutional because it required the civil court to determine matters "at the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion." 393 U.S. at 450, 89 S. Ct. at 607. The Court remanded the case, holding that the Georgia court needed to develop a method of resolving church property disputes that did not draw state courts into religious controversies. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is awarded." Id. at 449, 89 S. Ct. 606.
In a concurring opinion to Maryland and Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 90 S. Ct. 499 (1970), a case dismissed for lack of a federal question, Justice Brennan cautioned that the hierarchical deference approach should be used "only if the appropriate church governing body can be determined without the resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious policy." Id. at 370, 90 S. Ct. 501. Justice Brennan also noted that a state could adopt any of several approaches for resolving church property disputes, including (1) Watson's hierarchical deference approach, (2) the use of "neutral principles of law" under which civil courts can determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporations law, and (3) the passage of special statutes governing church property arrangements. Id. at 368—70, 90 S. Ct. 500—01.
In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979), the majority of the court adopted Justice Brennan's position that the hierarchical deference view was one of several possible methods for resolving church property disputes. Once again, the Court emphasized that state courts must not resolve church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Subject to that restriction, the Court said that the First Amendment does not otherwise dictate that a state must follow a particular method in resolving church property disputes. A state may adopt "any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." Id. at 602 (quoting Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368, 90 S. Ct. at 500 (Brennan, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
One acceptable approach, referred to as the "neutral principles" approach, permits the state courts to examine legal documents of title, state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the secular provisions of church documents, including the terms of the local church charters and the provisions of the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S. Ct. 3025. A neutral-principles approach, the Court explained, "relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Id.
Texas Cases Involving Church Property Disputes
The Texas Supreme Court has not specified either the hierarchical approach or the neutral principles method as the required method in Texas for resolving church property disputes.
In Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W. 360, 363 (Tex. 1909), the court cited Watson in resolving a dispute between rival factions of a local Presbyterian church. The court carefully avoided any ecclesiastical issues, including whether the local church possessed the authority to enter into a union with the Presbyterian denominational church. Id. at 364. The court then considered "perhaps the only question in the case of which this court has jurisdiction," i.e., how the union with the denominational church affected the possession and control of the local church property. Id. The court examined the deed, which was in the name of the local church, but recognizing that the local church "was but a member of and under the control of the larger and more important Christian organization," held that only those members of the local church loyal to the denominational church were entitled to use and possession of the property. Id. at 365.
Several courts since Brown have interpreted it as adopting the hierarchical deference approach. See Green v. Westgate Apostolic Church, 808 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) ("Appellate courts have consistently followed the deference rule in deciding hierarchical church property disputes since the Texas Supreme Court adopted the rule in Brown."); Schismatic & Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church v. Grace Union Presbytery, Inc., 710 S.W.2d 700, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding Texas law "has consistently followed the deference rule" and declining to adopt the "neutral principles" application).
The latest court, however, to address the issue, noted that, by considering the deed in determining ownership of the property, the Brown court acted consistently with the "neutral principles" approach before properly deferring on the issue of which members of the divided church represented that ownership. See Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, 335 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. granted). Nevertheless, the court held that because the Texas Supreme Court had not adopted a particular approach to addressing church property issues, and because the United States Supreme Court had approved of both the hierarchical deference and the neutral principles approaches, the trial court did not err by failing to apply neutral principles of law. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that the neutral-principles exception is now an accepted method of resolving church property disputes. See Westbook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 399 (Tex. 2007). However, Westbrook did not mandate the application of the neutral-principles exception to church property cases, and, in that case, declined to apply "neutral principles" of tort law to a claim that a minister, in his role as a licensed professional counselor, had breached client confidentiality. Id.
With this background of the history of church property disputes as they relate to the First Amendment, we turn to the issues in this case.
PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In three issues on appeal, Windwood contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) there is a fact question about whether PCUSA is a hierarchical church; (2) the trial court erred by not applying the "neutral principles" standard for resolving this dispute; and (3) PCUSA failed to establish that is has a "legally cognizable" trust in the property
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the movant must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) (movant must conclusively prove all "essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law"). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, we must take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661; Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548—49 (Tex. 1985). If the movant shows that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence to raise a material fact issue that precludes summary judgment. See Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
Fact Question regarding Hierarchical Nature of PCUSA?
In issue one, Windwood contends that the denominational character of PCUSA is a fact question. Specifically, Windwood argues that whether PCUSA is a hierarchical church is a fact question and that the denominational church failed to establish such as a matter of law.
We agree that the denominational character of a church can be a fact question. Several factors are to be weighed in determining whether a church is hierarchical, including: (1) the affiliation of the local church with a parent church, (2) an ascending order of ecclesiastical judicatories in which the government of the local church is subject to review and control by higher authorities, (3) subjugation of the local church to the jurisdiction of a parent church or to a constitution and canons promulgated by the parent church, (4) a charter from the parent church governing the affairs of the local church and specifying ownership of local church property, (5) the respository of legal title, and (6) the licensing or ordination of local ministers by the parent church. Masterson, 335 S.W.3d at 890.
The denominational church presented evidence that PCUSA is governed by a system of governing bodies—the Session, the Presbytery, the Synod, and the General Assembly. The Book of Order—its constitution—provides that an individual or particular church is represented by a governing body called a "Session," which consists of the pastor, the associate pastors, and the elders. The Session is "responsible for the mission and government of the particular church." Each individual church and Session is then governed by a Presbytery, which is a district governing body comprised of all active ministers in the district and representative elders from each individual church in the district. The Presbytery has significant authority over its member churches and minister members within its geographical boundries. A Presbytery reviews and governs the activities and action of the various churches within its geographical area, including exercise of jurisdiction in the event of disputes within, or appeals from actions of, the Sessions and churches within its region. Presbyterian polity establishes that ordained ministers of the word and sacrament are not members of the local congregation, but are instead members of the respective presbytery.
The Book of Order further provides that geographical groups of presbyteries are governed by a regional body called a Synod. The Synods are in turn governed by the General Assembly, the highest governing body in the PSUCA.
Windwood cites an opinion by The Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)—the highest authority for the internal adjudication of church matters for the PCUSA—as evidence that the church is actually "relational" rather than "hierarchical." In Johnson Church v. Heartland Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), the Judicial Commission of the General Assembly resolved a dispute between a presbytery and a local church over whether the presbytery could refuse to consider a local church's request for financial assistance if that church had not fulfilled its duty of paying its per capital apportionment. In that case, the Judicial Commission of the General Assembly ruled in favor of the local church. But, what is important is not whether the local church or the presbytery prevailed, but that the dispute between the two was resolved by the General Assembly, a higher authority in the church's structure. That the General Assembly's ruling was binding on the lower presbytery and local church organizations is evidence that the church's structure is hierarchical.
This evidence presented to the trial court addresses several of the factors that are significant in deciding whether a church is hierarchical. We hold that PCUSA, the denominational church, presented evidence that Windwood is "under [the PCUSA's] government and control, and bound by [the PCUSA's] orders and judgments." See Watson, 80 U.S. at 726—27; Jones, 443 U.S. at 595, 99 S. Ct. 3021.
In response, Windwood presented evidence that the PCUSA is a "relational" denomination, but its evidence does not undercut PCUSA's evidence that these relationships have a governing hierarchy. And, the Supreme Court has not recognized a "relational" form of church organization as one independent from a hierarchical or congregational form.. It has defined church organizations as either "congregational" or "hierarchical." Jones, 443 U.S. at 597—98, 99 S. Ct. 3022; Watson, 80 U.S. at 725—26. Windwood does not claim, nor did it present evidence to show, that it was a congregational church. Thus, we conclude that its evidence that it is a "relational" church does not raise a question of fact as to controvert proof of a PCUSA governing hierarchy.
Further, the Presbyterian Church is widely and long-recognized as a hierarchical organization. See e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 607; Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 442, 89 S. Ct. 601, 602; Schismatic & Purported Casa Linda Presbyterian Church, 710 S.W.2d 700 at 703; Presbytery of the Covenant v. First Presbyterian Church of Paris, 552 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ); Arkansas Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 303 (Ark. 2001); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So. 2d 402, 405 (Miss. 1985); Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Lake Huron, 384 N.W.2d 92, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); see also 52 A.L.R. 3d 324, 417 § 25 (1973) ("Although the Presbyterian form of church government is without question hierarchical, there has been a considerable amount of litigation over the right of local Presbyterian churches to withdraw from the general church and retain the use and control of local church property.") (emphasis added).
Recently, an Oregon Court of Appeals considered an argument that the PCUSA was not hierarchical, but was "a unique organization characterized by a 'representative form of church government.'" Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 255 P.3d 645, 659 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). The court held that it could not consider as dicta prior United States Supreme Court cases, such as Watson and Jones, referring to the Presbyterian Church as hierarchical because the cases turned on how the church was characterized. The court concluded that "the PCUSA, with its layers of supervisory authority, clearly qualifies [as a hierarchical church]. The fact that the various layers of church authority consist of groups of representatives does not alter the fact that the church is organized as a tiered structure with each level in the structure having authority over the one below it." Id.
Because the denominational church presented evidence of its tiered structure showing that it was a hierarchical church, and Windwood's evidence did not raise a fact issue on the question, we overrule Windwood's first issue on appeal.
Application of Hierarchical Deference or Neutral Principles of Law
In its second issue, Windwood contends the trial court erred by not applying neutral principles of law to resolve this dispute. Specifically, Windwood argues that Texas case law compels application of neutral principles of law, deference should only be used to resolve property disputes involving a schism in the church, and applying hierarchical deference improperly favors congregational churches over hierarchical churches. We address each argument respectively.
As noted earlier, the Texas Supreme Court has not mandated a method of resolving church property disputes. While Brown purports to be a hierarchical deference case and cites Watson, we acknowledge that by examining the deeds of the property involved, the Brown court was, to some degree, applying neutral principles of law, even though at the time, that method had yet to have been approved by the Supreme Court. The Texas Supreme Court has also recently noted that applying neutral principles of law is an acceptable method of resolving church disputes. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 399. However, the court has not mandated the application of either form of review. And, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that both methods are acceptable and state courts are not required to adopt any particular approach. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S. Ct. at 3025. Because the Texas Supreme Court has not established which method Texas courts must use, and the United States Supreme Court has recognized both methods, we conclude that the trial court would not have erred had it applying the hierarchical deference approach. See Masterson, 335 S.W.3d at 888. We believe that the hierarchical deference approach is a better fit in this situation because to hold otherwise would interfere with PCUSA's governance in property matters, as set forth in its Book of Order, and Windwood did not opt out of that governance though given the opportunity to do so. Further, as explained in our analysis of issue three, we believe that the result would be the same if applying neutral principles of law.
Windwood argues that this case is distinguishable from others deferring to the decision of the highest body in a hierarchical church because in this case there is no "schism" or split in the church, as there was in Brown. Windwood points out that it has not attempted to leave the PCUSA. We see no distinction between a local church seeking a declaration that it is not bound by the trust provisions of the denominational church's constitution or a local church leaving the denomination and attempting to take the property with it. In both situations, the local church is manifesting its intent not to be bound by the denominational church's constitution.
Finally, Windwood argues that applying hierarchical deference impermissibly favors congregational churches over hierarchical churches. We disagree. In cases involving congregational churches, "the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations." Watson, 80 U.S. at 725. The hierarchical deference rule merely recognizes that in a hierarchical church, the local church "is itself part of a large and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and ecclesiastical government," id. at 726, and courts "are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments." Id. at 726—27. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly approved of hierarchical deference as an acceptable method of resolving church property disputes. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S. Ct. at 3025.
We overrule Windwood's second issue.
Result the Same When Neutral Principles of Law Are Applied
In Windwood's third issue on appeal, it argues that under either standard, the denominational church was required to show an agreement between the parties to create a trust in favor of PCUSA and that such trust is in a "legally cognizable" form.
However, even if we were to apply neutral principles of law to this dispute, the result would be the same. To conduct an analysis under neutral principles of law, we consider sources such as deeds to the property in dispute, the local church's articles of incorporation, the general church's constitution, canons, and rules, and relevant statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 600, 99 S. Ct. 3024.
Here, Windwood unquestionably holds title to the property, which is the fact it relies on most heavily in claiming ownership.
Windwood's 1971 Articles of Incorporation do not mention any trust in favor of the denominational church, but they do not forbid it. They do give the trustees the right to buy, sell, and mortgage property. The 1971 articles further provide that the members of the corporation could assign other duties to the trustees, "provided they do not infringe upon the powers and duties of the Session or of the Board of Deacons as defined in the Book of Church Order, Presbyterian Church in the United States [one of PCUSA's predecessors]."
In 1983, PCUS, of which Windwood was a member, merged with the northern church to form PCUSA. The PCUSA's Book of Order includes a specific trust provision in its favor.
Neither party cites any Texas statute regarding the ownership of church property as exists in other states. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-5-46 (West 2011) (entitled "Conveyances to churches or religious societies confirmed"); CAL. CORP. CODE § 9142(c)(2) (West 2011) (providing that trust can be created by articles of incorporation or instruments of superior religious body).
Thus, this Court must decide which controls—the fact that Windwood holds title to the property, or that it is a member of a hierarchical church whose constitution provides a trust in its favor over local church property? The answer to this question is found in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court case that first approved the neutral principles of law approach.
Responding to criticism from the dissent that the Watson deferential approach was the only way to ensure that religious freedom was protected, the Jones majority responded
The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to 'inhibit' the free exercise of religion any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods. Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter toId. at 606, 99 S. Ct. 3027 (emphasis added).
include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form."
Thus, the court in Jones used an express trust clause in the constitution of the general church as an example of a "legally cognizable form" for ensuring that the general church retains church property. After Jones, many hierarchical churches amended their constitutions to provide more explicit trust provisions, as the PCUSA did in 1983.
And, despite Windwood's claims to the contrary, many courts have upheld a trust in favor of the general church based on an express trust provision in its constitution. See Masterson, 335 S.W.3d at 891 (holding that despite title being held by local church, governing documents of church made clear that church property was to be held for denominational church); Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., 719 S.E.2d 446, 456 (Ga. 2011) ("Timberridge's act of affiliating with the PSUSA in 1983 with the trust provision already in its governing constitution demonstrated that Timberridge assented to that relinquishment of its property rights—rights it then chose not to reassert by leaving the new national church during the next eight years."); Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 493 (2009) ("The only intent a secular court can effectively discern is that expressed in legally cognizable documents. In this case, those documents show that the local church agreed and intended to be part of a larger entity and to be bound by the rules and governing documents of that greater entity."); Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 225 P.3d 645, 660 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding trust for denominational church because "the PCUSA did precisely what the [Jones] Court stated a church could do, namely, modify its charter, the Book of Order, to recite an express trust in favor of the PCUSA.").
Accordingly, after applying neutral principles of law, we hold that by joining the PCUSA in 1983 and remaining a member of that hierarchical church, Windwood has assented to following PCUSA's constitution, which includes a trust provision over Windwood's property in PCUSA's favor.
We overrule Windwood's third issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Huddle.
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602—606, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 3025—27 (1979).