Opinion
No. 10-04-00007-CV
Opinion delivered and filed February 23, 2005.
Appeal from the 77th District Court, Limestone County, Texas, Trial Court # 26,300-a-1.
Affirmed.
Percy L. Isgitt, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, and Edward T. McFarland, Attorney at Law, Lufkin, TX, for appellant/relator.
Bruce A. Campbell and Nicole T. Leboeuf, Campbell Leboeuf, P.C., Addison, TX, for appellee/respondent.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA (Chief Justice GRAY concurring).
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a professional negligence case involving a guardian ad litem in federal court. Patricia Wilz appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Jack Sanders. Wilz appeals in three issues: (1) error in shielding Sanders (guardian ad litem) with judicial immunity; (2) error in granting no-evidence summary judgment; and (3) error in finding that the Ward's father's misappropriation was a superseding cause to Sander's alleged breaches of duty as guardian ad litem. We will affirm the summary judgment.
Wilz asserted a fourth issue regarding severance; however, this issue was withdrawn in a letter brief following oral argument.
BACKGROUND
Jon Flournoy (the "Ward") became permanently disabled in a car accident. The Ward's father, Kenneth Flournoy ("Flournoy"), as next friend of the Ward and in his own capacity, sued Ford Motor Company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division ("federal court"). A settlement was reached and the federal court appointed Jack Sanders as guardian ad litem for the Ward. While the settlement in the federal court was pending, a guardianship proceeding was filed in the County Court at Law of Harrison County. Joe Hughey, a probate lawyer, was appointed attorney ad litem for the Ward, and Flournoy was appointed guardian of the Ward.
In a fairness hearing, Sanders told the federal court that the settlement was in the best interest of the Ward. The federal court approved the settlement in a judgment dated April 1, 1991, which became final when the probate court of Harrison County approved (1) the actions of Flournoy, as guardian of the person and estate of the Ward, in settling the suit and (2) the federal court's apportionment of the settlement funds. The Ward's proceeds were then transferred into a guardianship account.
For the next eight years, Flournoy and his wife misappropriated the Ward's funds (approximately $380,000), which depleted all of the Ward's settlement proceeds. Flournoy and his wife institutionalized the Ward. Wilz, who is the Ward's mother, then applied for a guardianship of the Ward, which was granted in Limestone County. Wilz sued Fluornoy and his wife, their surety, and the attorneys (including Sanders). Sanders filed a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motion. The trial court granted the motion without specifying the grounds and severed the cause from the remaining defendants.
This motion contained seven traditional grounds for summary judgment and 19 no-evidence grounds.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment
When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for the ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).
We review the decision to grant or deny a summary-judgment motion de novo. See Rucker v. Bank One Texas, N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied). The standards for reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment are well established. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to the summary judgment as a matter of law. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); Ash v. Hack Branch Distributing Co., 54 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). The reviewing court must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and all doubts resolved in her favor. American Tobacco, 951 S.W.2d at 425; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. If the movant for summary judgment is a defendant, then the movant must negate at least one of the elements of the non-movant's cause of action, or alternatively, the movant must conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Clifton v. Hopkins, 107 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied). The non-movant need not respond to the motion for summary judgment unless the movant meets his burden of proof. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Tex. 1999). But if the movant meets his burden of proof, the non-movant must present summary-judgment evidence to raise a fact issue. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
We apply the same standard in reviewing the grant or denial of a no-evidence summary-judgment motion as we would in reviewing a directed verdict. Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. We review the summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. A no-evidence motion will be defeated if more than a scintilla of probative evidence exists to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element challenged by the movant. Id. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if it would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003) (business disparagement case). Evidence attached to a no-evidence motion should not be considered unless it creates a fact issue. See Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004).
Judicial Immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts performed in the course of judicial proceedings over which they have jurisdiction. Turner v. Pruitt, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1961); Houston v. West Capital Fin. Servs., 961 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, writ dism'd w.o.j.). When judges delegate their authority or appoint others to perform services for the court, the judge's judicial immunity may follow the delegation or appointment, which is called derived judicial immunity. Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992).
DERIVED JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Because Sanders was appointed guardian ad litem in a federal court, we will apply federal law to determine whether Sanders is entitled to derived judicial immunity.
Functional Approach
The United States Supreme Court adopted a functional approach to determine whether a party is entitled to immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994-96, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In Imbler, the Court stated:
[The prosecutor's] activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 563, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) ("Running through our cases . . . is a `functional' approach to immunity questions . . [under which] we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions."). The United States Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to various persons whose involvement with the judicial process has been thought to warrant protection from interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision-making. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1116, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (private witnesses in judicial proceedings); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913-15, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107-09, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (state trial judge).
A number of courts have held various participants in judicial proceedings absolutely immune from liability for their actions taken in performance of their roles as "integral parts of the judicial process." See, e.g., Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) (social worker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, 110 S.Ct. 1118, 107 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1990); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829, 108 S.Ct. 98, 98 L.Ed.2d 59 (1987); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891 (8th Cir.) (court-appointed psychiatrist), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 108, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1985) (probation officer); Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983) (pathologist assisting coroner); Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1981) (members of state supreme court and clerk), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840, 103 S.Ct. 90, 74 L.Ed.2d 83 (1982); Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy trustee); T W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1978) (court-appointed receiver); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970) (probation officer and court-appointed medical examiner), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 2217, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971); Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1980) (partition commissioner); Wagner v. Genesee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 607 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Mich. 1985) ("friend of the court" in family court proceedings).
The Fifth Circuit adopted the functional approach in decisions denying absolute immunity to social workers. See Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1213-15 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding absolute immunity is not essential to the proper functioning of child protective service workers); Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1361-63 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding child protection workers not entitled to absolute immunity for their conduct in filing an allegedly false verified complaint seeking the removal of two children from a home, which the court analogized to a probation officer's filing of a probation report that causes arrest of a person on probation).
Guardians Ad Litem
The Sixth Circuit held that a guardian ad litem for a child in a dependency and neglect proceeding and a subsequent proceeding to terminate the parents' parental rights was entitled to absolute immunity. Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984). The court stated that the guardian ad litem:
must act in the best interests of the child he represents. Such a position clearly places him squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal. A guardian ad litem must also be able to function without the worry of possible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied parents.
Id. Other courts have reached similar results that guardian ad litems should be free to operate without the prospect of liability. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (guardian ad litem for child in divorce proceeding acted as "agent of the court"); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir.) (guardian ad litem for children in investigation of alleged sexual abuse immune from performance of "delegated functions"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) (guardian ad litem for children in custody dispute immune for acts as "agent of the court"). In Ward v. San Diego County Department of Social Services, the guardian ad litem of a child performed factual investigations and made recommendations to the court regarding the placement which was thought to be in the child's best interests. Ward. v. San Diego County Dep't of Social Servs., 691 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D. Cal. 1988). The court stated:
As guardian ad litem, [the guardian] was acting as an extension of the court by performing the quasi-judicial functions of investigating the facts and reporting to the court what placement was in [the child's] best interests.
A guardian ad litem serves to provide the court with independent information regarding the placement or disposition which is in the best interests of the child. This independent determination is crucial to the court's decision. The threat of civil liability would seriously impair the ability of the guardian ad litem to independently investigate the facts and to report his or her findings to the court. As a result, the ability of the judge to perform his or her judicial duties would be impaired and the ascertainment of truth obstructed.
Id.
Although the Third Circuit did not reach the issue, it provided the following guidance:
Under [the functional] approach, a guardian ad litem would be absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations to the court in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or arm of the court, not only in status or denomination but in reality. This does not exhaust the list of functions which would be absolutely immune, and each function would have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, the district court should, if faced with this issue again, analyze each of the functions performed by [the guardian ad litem] and determine if acts allegedly committed pursuant to those functions warrant immunity under the foregoing analysis.
Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989).
Arguments
Among other grounds, Sanders asserted the following traditional summary judgment ground:
Sanders is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiff take nothing on her claims, because the undisputed summary judgment evidence establishes as a matter of law that Sanders is exempted from liability for his actions as guardian ad litem in the Federal Court Action under the doctrine of derived judicial immunity.
Sanders argues that we should apply the functional approach and affirm the summary judgment because he, as guardian ad litem, is entitled to derived judicial immunity.
Wilz argues that a Texas case, Byrd v. Woodruff, controls this court's analysis. In Byrd, a Texas appellate court found that the guardian ad litem appointed under Rule 173 does not act as an "arm of the court" because the ad litem is acting as a personal representative and advocate for the interest of the minor, which are not duties the court normally performs. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 708-10 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). She argues that Sanders is not entitled to immunity because he was "appointed to represent the interests of the Ward, displacing Kenneth Flournoy, the Ward's father, as next friend, in the Federal lawsuit." She asserts that a guardian ad litem is not an agent of the court, but instead acts to protect the best interests of his ward.
Application
We agree that a guardian ad litem should be absolutely immune when acting as an "integral part of the judicial process." See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335, 103 S.Ct. at 1116. Following the United States Supreme Court, we will apply the functional approach to determine whether Sanders as a guardian ad litem is absolutely immune. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-96; Gardner, 874 F.2d at 146. To be entitled to summary judgment in this case, Sanders had to prove as a matter of law that his appointment contemplated that he act as an "arm of the court" and that he did not depart from the scope of his appointment.
United States District Judge Sam B. Hall, Jr. appointed Sanders as guardian ad litem in an order stating:
The Court has been advised by the parties or their attorneys that all matters in the above-styled cause have been settled and compromised, and that the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem is necessary. It is, therefore,
. . .
It is further ORDERED that Jack Sanders, Jr., attorney at law in Marshall, Texas, shall be appointed Guardian ad Litem.
The federal court later approved the compromise settlement after a hearing stating in its judgment that:
. . ., and the Court being of the opinion that it would be in the best interest of the Plaintiff to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of Jon Flournoy, and the Court having under separate order appointed attorney Jack Sanders, Jr. to serve in such capacity and it being made known to the Court by the duly appointed attorney ad litem that in his opinion the settlement as announced is in the best interest of the incapacitated adult, Jon Flournoy, the Court does hereby approve the compromise settlement and enters the following judgment.
Based on Judge Hall's order, we assume he means "guardian" and not "attorney" ad litem in this judgment.
Sanders testified that he briefly met with Flournoy, not the Ward, the morning of the settlement hearing. In Sander's summary judgment affidavit, he states:
. . .
I was appointed guardian ad litem for the Ward in the Federal Court Action by order dated March 4, 1991. I was never asked to have any involvement in the First Guardianship Proceeding [in Harrison County].
. . .
Pursuant to the Federal Court's order, I was to investigate and evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement and report to the court whether the Compromise Settlement Agreement was in the best interests of the Ward to assist the court in its determination of whether the Compromise Settlement Agreement should be approved by the Federal Court.
. . .
My only connection to the Ward was a guardian ad litem in the Federal Court Action. I have never had an attorney-client relationship with the Ward.
. . .
As guardian ad litem for the Ward, I conducted a thorough investigation of the damages suffered by the Ward, the adequacy of the settlement, the proposed distribution of the settlement proceeds among the interested parties, the proposed manner of disbursement of the settlement proceeds, and the amount of the attorney's fee charged by Mr. Baxter's firm. In accordance with my normal practice, I would have discussed the case in detail with Mr. Baxter. I would also have reviewed Mr. Baxter's entire file, including the documentation supporting disbursements to be made from the settlement proceeds. At the March 22, 1991 fairness hearing in the Federal Court Action, I reported to the Federal Court my belief that the Compromise Settlement Agreement was fair and reasonable and in the best interest of the Ward to accept.
Mr. Baxter represented Flournoy in federal court and in the guardianship proceeding in Harrison County.
We find that the undisputed evidence shows that the federal court appointed Sanders to assist the court by investigating the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement and report to the court whether the settlement was in the best interests of the Ward. See Ward, 691 F. Supp. at 240. Also, there is nothing in the summary judgment evidence to indicate that Sanders acted outside the scope of his appointment or that he departed from his role as a functionary of the court in making a recommendation to the court. Thus, we hold that the summary judgment evidence was sufficient to establish the affirmative defense of derived judicial immunity. See Gardner, 874 F.2d at 146. Sanders, as guardian ad litem, was required to make an independent determination that was crucial to the court's decision; therefore, any threat of liability would impair his ability to independently investigate the facts, which would impair the judge's ability to perform his duties. See Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458; Ward, 691 F. Supp. at 240. We distinguish this case from Byrd because Sanders was not appointed under Texas Rule 173 to displace and act in place of Flournoy, the next friend of the Ward; he was appointed by the federal court under Federal Rule 17(c), and Flournoy, as next friend of the Ward, was not replaced by Sanders. See Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 708-10. Also, the summary judgment evidence indicates that Sanders was not the Ward's personal representative or advocate. See id. In addition, even if we rely on Texas law, we would reach the same conclusion because the Texas Supreme Court has also adopted the functional approach. Dallas County, Texas v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 556-57 (Tex. 2002) (applying the functional approach to find that the court reporter was not entitled to derived judicial immunity because she "did not exercise discretion comparable to that of a judge").
The burden shifted to Wilz to present evidence of a fact issue. See Siegler, 899 S.W.2d at 197. However, Wilz has not presented any summary judgment evidence contraverting the scope of Sanders' appointment or that he acted within the scope of his appointment. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Sanders' motion for summary judgment. See id.
We overrule issue one. We do not reach issues two and three. See State Farm, 858 S.W.2d at 380.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the summary judgment.
CONCURRING OPINION
I cannot agree to immunize, as a matter of law, all attorneys appointed to review settlements on behalf of incapacitated persons. There is at least some conflict in this record about whether Sanders was acting as an attorney ad litem or guardian ad litem. But in either event, his duties were to protect the ward, not act as an arm of the court to decide a matter as would a special master. Protecting the ward is the service for which a fee was paid. I will, however, acknowledge that there is a vast difference between the duties of a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem, though the extent and nature of those respective duties is not, at this time, clear. Indeed, the subject has recently been the focus of discussion, analysis, and review by the Texas Supreme Court Rules Advisory Committee in its consideration of amending Rule 173 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
But the resolution in this case is not dependent on whether Sanders properly performed his duties, whatever they were, as a guardian ad litem or an attorney ad litem. That is because Sanders's duties, whatever they were, were concluded a decade before this litigation. During that decade, the ward's legal guardian and the legal guardian's wife engaged in illegal acts that wholly depleted the ward's estate; a classic superseding cause. It would not have mattered what Sanders did a decade ago. The legal guardian, who was the ward's father, and his new wife stripped the ward's estate. Only when there was nothing left to take was the ward institutionalized. Because of this superseding cause, I concur only in affirming the judgment that Wilz take nothing from Sanders.