The settlement entitled the plaintiffs to a judgment and, thus, the cause of action did not abate between settlement and final judgment. Id. at 882; see also Parker v. Parker, 319 A.2d 750, 751 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (husband's death after resolution of parties' dispute but before judgment did not abate divorce action because trial court had "made a definitive adjudication of the controversy, reflecting its conclusive determination that each party be granted a divorce"); Garrett v. Byerly, 284 P. 343, 358 (Wash. 1930) (concluding that cause of action does not abate when party dies after the verdict because party is "entitled to a judgment" at the time of his death (quoting Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 53 Pa. 343, 346 (1866))); Wilson v. Coop. Transit Co., 30 S.E.2d 749, 753 (W. Va. 1944) (negligence claim did not abate where the plaintiff died after verdict but before entry of judgment). ¶ 36 Undaunted, GTL contends that Casper was not entitled to a "final judgment" at the time of his death because the court had not yet computed attorney fees and prejudgment interest.
The settlement entitled the plaintiffs to a judgment and, thus, the cause of action did not abate between settlement and final judgment. Id. at 882 ; see also Parker v. Parker , 128 N.J.Super. 230, 319 A.2d 750, 751 (1974) (husband's death after resolution of parties' dispute but before judgment did not abate divorce action because trial court had "made a definitive adjudication of the controversy, reflecting its conclusive determination that each party be granted a divorce"); Garrett v. Byerly , 155 Wash. 351, 284 P. 343, 358 (1930) (concluding that cause of action does not abate when party dies after the verdict because party is "entitled to a judgment" at the time of his death (quoting Fitzgerald v. Stewart , 53 Pa. 343, 346 (1866) )); Wilson v. Coop. Transit Co. , 126 W.Va. 943, 30 S.E.2d 749, 753 (1944) (negligence claim did not abate where the plaintiff died after verdict but before entry of judgment). ¶ 36 Undaunted, GTL contends that Casper was not entitled to a "final judgment" at the time of his death because the court had not yet computed attorney fees and prejudgment interest.