Opinion
NO. 01-17-00785-CV
07-17-2018
DWAYNE WILSON, Appellant v. STERLING SHIRE APARTMENTS, Appellee
On Appeal from Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1098747
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee, Sterling Shire Apartments, brought a forcible detainer action in justice court against appellant, Dwayne Wilson, seeking possession of the premises and payment of past due rent. Following a jury trial, the justice court rendered judgment in favor of Sterling Shire. On de novo review, the county court at law entered judgment in favor of Sterling Shire, awarding it possession of the property, past due rent, and attorney's fees. On appeal, Wilson asserts various counterclaims against the county court judge, Sterling Shire, and opposing counsel, and he argues that he was deprived of his right to due process of law. We affirm.
Background
Wilson and Sterling Shire Apartments entered into a one-year written apartment lease contract. Under the terms of the agreement, Wilson's monthly rent was $828.00, of which Wilson was required to pay $411.
The housing department paid $417 of Wilson's monthly rent.
Wilson failed to pay his rent for June and July 2017. On July 6, 2017, Sterling Shire hand delivered to Wilson a notice to vacate for non-payment of rent, allowing him three days to vacate the premises or, to avoid turning over possession, pay the past due rent in full. The notice advised Wilson that if he failed to vacate the premises within three days from the date of service of the notice, Sterling Shire would file a forcible detainer suit against him. Wilson failed to vacate the premises or pay his past due rent.
On August 1, 2017, Sterling Shire filed a forcible detainer action in a Harris County justice court. The justice court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of Sterling Shire on August 22, 2017. Wilson then filed a de novo appeal in county court at law. The court held a bench trial on October 10, 2017. At the conclusion of trial, the county court entered judgment awarding possession of the property to Sterling Shire, as well as $1,774 in past due rent and $800 in attorney's fees. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Wilson contends that the Honorable Roberta Lloyd, presiding judge of Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 4, (1) violated the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution; (2) denied him the right to petition for redress of grievances; and (3) threatened him with kidnapping and human trafficking, extortion, disrespect, intimidation, prejudice, and bias. He also asserts that Judge Lloyd, Sterling Shire, and Duke Amos, Sterling Shire's attorney, conspired against him and deprived him of his rights under color of law, and that Sterling Shire committed copyright infringement.
At the outset, we note than an "appellee" must be a party to the trial court's judgment and someone against whom the appellant raises issues or points of error in the appellant's brief. See Showbiz Multimedia, LLC v. Mountain States Mortg. Ctrs., Inc., 303 S.W.3d 769, 771 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Gray v. Allen, 41 S.W.3d 330, 331 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Although Wilson raises issues against them in his brief, neither Judge Lloyd nor Amos are parties to the final judgment in the underlying case. Therefore, Amos and Judge Lloyd are not "appellees" or otherwise parties to this appeal.
Furthermore, a suit for eviction or forcible detainer is a procedure to determine the right to immediate possession of real property where there was no unlawful entry. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(1) (West 2014); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.1; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Thus, the trial court must adjudicate the right to actual possession of the property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). "Except for a claim for rent, all other claims, including questions of title, validity of a foreclosure, counterclaims, and suits against third parties are not permitted." Byars v. Dilworth, No. 05-14-01405-CV, 2016 WL 235276, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e) ("Counterclaims and the joinder of suits against third parties are not permitted in eviction cases."). Accordingly, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is which party has the right to immediate possession of the property. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). Because this is an appeal of a forcible detainer action, Wilson's assertion of counterclaims unrelated to the issue of which party has the right to actual possession of the property are not permitted. See H.K. Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ("[A] judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination only of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in question."); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Furthermore, Wilson did not assert these counterclaims in his pleadings and cannot now assert them for the first time on appeal. See Hall v. Bean, 416 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
Wilson also argues that he was deprived of due process of law because he was denied an opportunity to be heard and present evidence at trial.
Although we are obliged to construe the rules of appellate procedure "reasonably, yet liberally," see Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 2004), Wilson has not presented argument or citations to the record that support his contention. See Morris, 360 S.W.3d at 35-36; Abdelnour v. Mid Nat'l Holdings, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring clear and concise argument for contentions made with appropriate citation to record). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with all applicable and mandatory rules of pleading and procedure. De Mino v. Sheridan, 176 S.W.3d 359, 369 n.17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). "To apply a different set of rules to pro se litigants would be to give them an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel." Morris, 360 S.W.3d at 36. Wilson has inadequately briefed this issue and, thus, waived it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
However, even if this issue were adequately briefed, we note that the reporter's record demonstrates that Wilson received notice and that a hearing was held. Due process requires, at a minimum, that before being deprived of a constitutionally protected interest, a person must be afforded reasonable notice and a hearing. See Univ. Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976)). The court provided Wilson with an opportunity to present his case. Wilson offered no evidence or called any witnesses to contest Sterling Shire's right to possession. The record demonstrates that Wilson was provided with notice and a hearing where he had an adequate opportunity to controvert Sterling Shire's evidence of its right to possession, and he failed to do so. Wilson's issues are overruled.
In light of our disposition, all pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Justices Bland, Lloyd, and Caughey.