Opinion
No. 35678.
October 9, 1944.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Ordinarily, verdict is sufficient in form if it expresses the intent of the jury so that the court can understand it.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
The test of validity of a verdict is whether it is an intelligent answer to the issues submitted to the jury.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
Verdict stating, "We the jury agree that the defendant is guilty as charged," was sufficient in form.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Lauderdale county, HON. JESSE H. GRAHAM, Judge.
J.V. Gipson and C.D. Shields, both of Meridian, for appellant.
The appellant respectfully insists that under the law appellant should not have been sentenced unless and until "found" guilty by the jury in keeping with the instructions of the court and that the verdict of the jury as returned stating, "We, the jury agree that the defendant is guilty as charged," is not a verdict finding the appellant guilty and is not sufficient in law and did not as a matter of law find, determine and adjudicate beyond every reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the appellant was guilty as charged and that the word "agree" should not have been accepted by the court in the place of or as a substitute for or as meaning the same thing or equal to or be recognized as the word "find" and that the verdict of the jury in criminal cases should be strictly construed in favor of the appellant and that nothing should be read into, engrafted upon or added to the verdict of the jury in order to make same self-sufficient or cause same to be construed to be self-sufficient or so as to supply or imply necessary words and that the trial court should have ordered the jury to again retire to consider their verdict and should not have accepted or received said verdict and discharged the jury and should not have entered the order of conviction based on said jury verdict, and should not have sentenced the appellant to three years in the State Penitentiary based thereon.
Sykes v. State, 92 Miss. 247, 45 So. 838:
Appellant contends that the appellant was insane when the alleged crime was committed and was insane when he was indicted, arrested, tried and sentenced and that he is still insane and that under the evidence the question of appellant's insanity is a question for the jury to hear and determine as a defense as a question of fact and was newly discovered evidence after appellant was sentenced and on appellant's showing on motion the court should have vacated and set aside verdict, conviction, order and sentence.
Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665; Bishop v. State, 96 Miss. 846, 52 So. 21; Hoye v. State, 169 Miss. 111, 152 So. 644; Waycaster v. State, 185 Miss. 25, 187 So. 205; Ervin v. State, 168 Miss. 145, 151 So. 177; Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, by R.O. Arrington, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Appellant contends that this verdict did not find the appellant guilty as a matter of law beyond every reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty and that the court erred in entering judgment upon this verdict for the reason that the word "agree" does not mean the same thing as the word "find." Or, stated differently, his reasoning seems to be that although the jury "agree" as to his guilt, this could not be returned as a verdict of the jury unless the word "find" was used. In answer to his contention, it is obvious that there never could be a verdict of the jury until they had agreed. There is nothing vague, indefinite or uncertain about the verdict in this case The record does not disclose any request by the appellant that the jury be instructed to retire to further consider and clear up this verdict. The court, therefore, committed no error in sentencing the appellant to the penitentiary thereon.
Lewis v. State, 173 Miss. 821, 163 So. 387.
The appellant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the ground that the appellant was insane at the time he was indicted, arrested, tried and sentenced, and that he is still insane, and that this was unknown to his attorneys at the time of his trial; that it has been learned since he was tried and convicted, and that as his attorneys were ignorant of this fact, it now constitutes newly discovered evidence and that the court erred in overruling the motion. The rule is that on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence or facts not known during the trial, the defendant and his attorneys must make affidavit or testify under oath that they were ignorant of such facts during the trial. This rule was not complied with in this case.
Blevins v. State, 169 Miss. 868, 154 So. 269; Hudson v. State, 185 Miss. 677, 188 So. 561.
Every expert witness introduced, or whose written report admitted in evidence, based upon a personal examination shown to have been taken in connection with a detailed personal history of the accused, maintains the opinion that the accused is and was a psychopathic delinquent with psychosis; that is, that he has the capacity or ability to distinguish right and wrong, but is deficient in inhibitory powers.
Eatman v. State, 169 Miss. 295, 299, 153 So. 381.
I submit that upon the showing made by the appellant the court committed no error in overruling the motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial.
Appellant argues three assignments, the first two of which are that the verdict was insufficient to support a judgment of guilty, and that the court erred in entering judgment on the verdict. The verdict of the jury was in the following words: "We the jury agree that the defendant is guilty as charged."
The general rule, as found in the texts, is that ordinarily the verdict is sufficient in form if it expresses the intent of the jury so that the court can understand it, 22 Eng. Pl. Pr., p. 891; or that the test of the validity of a verdict is whether or not it is an intelligible answer to the issues submitted to the jury, 64 C.J., p. 1067. In Benedict v. State, 14 Wis. 423, the verdict in a murder case was: "The jury after deliberation agree that the said Samuel S. Benedict is guilty." We quote, with approval, what the court said on page 428 of 14 Wis.:
"The verdict is sufficient in form. It cannot be that the law is so excessively exact in such matters that it makes a particular word so indispensable that another equally expressive cannot be used in its stead. The word `find' is more commonly used, but the word `agree,' where employed with reference to the verdict of a jury, particularly in criminal cases, means precisely the same thing. Both signify that the jury, upon consideration of the evidence, have determined that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. The word `agree' is almost invariably used when the jury are addressed upon the subject of their verdict. Mr Chitty says (1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 635), that when the jury have come to a unanimous determination with respect to their verdict and return to the box to deliver it, the clerk then calls them over by their names and asks them whether they agree on their verdict; and it certainly cannot be a bad answer, if they reply that they do agree, and state what that agreement is."
The third assignment has been examined and we are of the opinion that for either of two reasons it is not well taken. It would not serve any useful purpose to enter upon a discussion of them.
Affirmed.