Opinion
C. A. 3:22-CV-04542-MGL-MGB
09-26-2023
Darius Wilson, PLAINTIFF, v. Richland County Sheriff Dept, DEFENDANT.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Darius Wilson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, originally filed this case in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on November 16, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) On December 16, 2022, Defendant Richland County Sheriff Department removed this case to federal court. (Id.) Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. No. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from events that occurred during a traffic stop on March 22, 2020. Appearing to reference an incident report from a “Deputy Gibson” concerning the traffic stop,the Complaint states Plaintiff was allegedly stopped by Gibson because: (1) Plaintiff “display[ed] suspicious behavior”; (2) his “tag came back expired”; and (3) his “vehicle matched the description of a vehicle that evaded law enforcement within the last 72 hours.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges Gibson's report contains several factual inaccuracies. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges, verbatim, that he “was detained illegally for alleged being combative and suspicious behavior.” (Id.)
There is no incident report attached to the Complaint or otherwise available in the record.
According to Plaintiff, Deputy Gibson called his supervisor, “Corporal Blanding,” after detaining Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Blanding refused to identify himself to Plaintiff. (Id.) Appearing to reference video footage, Plaintiff gives a timestamp and states, “you can see that they take the cuffs off of me but I'm still told that I'm detained by both Sgt Furgaland Cpl Blanding. But while detained they told me to go back to my vehicle where they know I have a weapon.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges Gibson “wrote [Plaintiff] a ticket for speeding when he doesn't even know the speed limit.” (Id.)
This referenced video footage is not in the record.
There is no other mention of “Sgt Furgal” in the Complaint.
The Complaint states, “I would like to file a civil suit against Richland County Sheriff Department for the amount of $15,500 for [this] encounter.” (Id. at 3.) It then bullet points the following under the heading, “Reasons”: “racial profiling; police misconduct; improper training of officers; officer perjury; 18 U.S.C. § 242 Depriving rights under the color of law; falsifying documentation; illegal detention; violation of my 4th amendment right; threatening of false arrest.” (Id.) Plaintiff states he is “suing for considerable stress, emotional stress, and mental anguish caused by this interaction.” (Id. at 5.)
As noted above, Plaintiff originally filed this case in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on November 16, 2022-the Complaint named only Richland County Sheriff Department as a defendant. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On December 16, 2022, Defendant Richland County Sheriff Department removed this case to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) On December 27, 2022, this Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to respond to the Court's interrogatories pursuant to Local Civil Rule 26.01 (D.S.C.) within 21 days of the issuance of the Order. (Dkt. No. 11.) When this Order was returned as undeliverable, the Court re-mailed the Order to Plaintiff along with a change of address form. (Dkt. Nos. 14; 15.) That re-mailing was again returned as undeliverable, on February 13, 2023. (Dkt. No. 16.) Notably, after that date, no other mailings from the Court to Plaintiff have been returned as undeliverable. Plaintiff has not changed his address during this case, so it is unclear why certain mailings were returned as undeliverable.
On June 26, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Dkt. No. 18.) On June 27, 2023, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 19.) Plaintiff filed a response on August 11, 2023 (Dkt. No. 23), to which Defendant filed a reply on August 28, 2023 (Dkt. No. 28). Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on September 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 29.) Defendant's Motion is ripe and ready for the Court's review.
STANDARD
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(c) motions “dispose of cases in which there is no substantive dispute that warrants the litigants and the court proceeding further.” See Lewis v. Excel Mech., LLC, 2:13-cv-281-PMD, 2013 WL 4585873, at * 1 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2013) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1368 (3d ed. 2010)). Courts follow “a fairly restrictive standard” in deciding Rule 12(c) motions, as “hasty or imprudent use of this summary procedure by the courts violates the policy in favor of ensuring to each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim or defense.” See Fitzhenry v. Indep. Order of Foresters, No. 2:14-cv-3690-DCN, 2015 WL 3711287 (D.S.C. June 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002). Rule 12(b)(6) permits the dismissal of an action if the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Such a motion tests the “legal sufficiency” of the complaint pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of the claim, or the applicability of defenses.” See Doe 202a v. Cannon, No. 2:16-CV-00530-RMG, 2018 WL 317818, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2018) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the sole question before the court is simply whether the plaintiff's complaint alleges a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Doe 202a, 2018 WL 317818, at *1 (noting that the court's inquiry is limited to whether the allegations constitute a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief as required under Rule 8). Although the requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability requirement at this stage, the complaint must show more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that while Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues this case should be dismissed because: (1) Defendant is not a state actor that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the applicable statute of limitations bars any state law claims; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's Order instructing him to answer the Court's local interrogatories. (Dkt. No. 18-1.) Plaintiff opposes the dismissal of his claims. (Dkt. Nos. 23; 29.) Plaintiff has attached to his sur-reply an order issued in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, dated November 28, 2022. (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 1-3.) Plaintiff asserts this order shows his state law claims should not be dismissed based on the applicable statute of limitations because he “previously filed a valid suit prior to the two years limitation, but it was dismissed due to me withholding my discovery and being considered facially insufficient.” (Dkt. No. 29 at 1.)
Upon review, the referenced order dismisses a complaint Plaintiff filed in state court on February 22, 2022 against “Richland County Sheriff's Department; Sgt. Furgal; Cpl. Blanding; and Ofc. Gibson.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 1.) The state court dismissed the action without prejudice, finding that the “Complaint simply references conclusory-type allegations which fail to contain sufficient factual matter stating facially plausible claims.” (Id. at 2.) Notably, Plaintiff filed the complaint giving rise to this action in state court on November 16, 2022, approximately two weeks before the dismissal order was filed in Plaintiff's separate case on November 28, 2022. Even if this dismissal order were considered by the undersigned as a matter of public record, it does not ultimately affect any recommendations made herein.
See First Protective Ins. Co. v. Rike, 516 F.Supp.3d 513, 524 (E.D. N.C. 2021) (In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider matters of which a court may take judicial notice, such as public records.).
As discussed further below, Plaintiff's failure to plausibly allege any federal claims against Defendant in this civil action warrants dismissal of those claims. With no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
A. Federal Claims
Defendant argues that it cannot be sued under § 1983 because the Richland County Sheriff's Department is not a state actor. Plaintiff responds that he is suing Defendant “for the actions of their officers acting in their official capacity.” (Dkt. No. 23.) In his sur-reply, he states, that the Richland County Sheriff's Department “is the entity to be sued for the actions of three of their officers acting in their official capacity as deputy sheriffs.”(Dkt. No. 29.)
Plaintiff also refers to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FISA”) in support of his claims here. (Dkt. Nos. 23; 29.) However, FISA is inapplicable to the facts of this case and to the named defendant, which is a state agency.
To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Indeed, it is well-established that South Carolina's Sheriff's Departments do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See, e.g., Garcia v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:21-cv-1359-JMC-SVH, 2021 WL 1947303, at *2 (D.S.C. May 14, 2021) (“Groups of individuals in a building, such as a sheriff's department, do not qualify as a ‘person' who can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.”); see also Sheppard v. Orangeburg Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 5:20-cv-2362-MGL-SVH, 2020 WL 4756526, at *2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2020) (explaining that “inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds,” are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983), adopted by, 2020 WL 4754673 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2020). Accordingly, any such claims against the Richland County Sheriff's Department-the only Defendant named in this case-are subject to dismissal.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had named a state official in his Complaint, the Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against states and state agencies. See Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). Notably, Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacities. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. 2019). Consequently, officers within the Richland County Sheriff's Department-as arms of the state-would be immune from Plaintiff's damages claims in their official capacities. See, e.g., Capps v. Oconee Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 8:18-cv-1434-AMQ-KFM, 2018 WL 10035800, at *3 (D.S.C. June 22, 2018) (explaining that “Sheriff's Departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments” and a Sheriff's deputies are therefore “state employees” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity), adopted by, 2019 WL 3521740 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2019); Hamilton v. Hampton Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 9:13-cv-1929 DCN, 2013 WL 4538240, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2013) (same).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim of relief against the Richland County Police Department under § 1983. There is no basis to find Plaintiff has otherwise alleged any federal claims that would support subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. While the Complaint mentions “perjury” and a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, as “reasons” for bringing this case, a private citizen “has no constitutional, statutory, or common law right to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime.” Hoffman v. Smart-Gittings, No. 9:18-cv-1146-RMG-BM, 2019 WL 8759417, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2019); see also Green v. Sanchez, No. 2:21-cv-01376-RMG-MGB, 2021 WL 8971506, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2021) (“[A] private citizen cannot obtain criminal charges against defendants or initiate a criminal investigation through a civil action.”), adopted by, 2022 WL 2333855 (D.S.C. June 28, 2022). Further, Plaintiff expressly states that any claims against the individual officers involved in the encounter at issue would be brought in their official capacities, which is prohibited under the principles of sovereign immunity.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
With the dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Richland County Sheriff's Department, only Plaintiff's state law claims remain. Because Defendant voluntarily removed this case to federal court, it has waived immunity from suit in this Court with respect to the state law claims asserted against it under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act and it is therefore subject to suit in this Court for those claims. See, e.g., Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (“A State's voluntary appearance in federal court waives sovereign immunity for claims where a state has consented to suit in its own courts for such claims); Briggs v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 9:13-cv-1348-RMG, 2014 WL 1278173, at *21 (D.S.C. Mar. 27, 2014) (“If the recommendations set forth herein with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims are accepted, the only claims remaining in this lawsuit will be Plaintiff's state law claims being asserted against the State pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.”).
This voluntary removal has not waived Defendant's immunity to any § 1983 claims, however. See Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity to a Title I claim by removing case to federal court); Stewart v. North Carolina, 393 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that where a state retains its sovereign immunity from suit in state court, it does not lose that immunity by removing the case to federal court).
After careful review, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, “once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains ‘wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction.” Yashenko v. Harrah'sNC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action. See, e.g., Missouri v. Spivey, No. 4:13-cv-01326-RMG, 2014 WL 4349151, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where summary judgment was granted on the plaintiff's federal claims); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, “With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims ....”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's state law claims be remanded to Richland County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address Defendant's remaining arguments for dismissal. However, the undersigned notes it appears Plaintiff has still never received the Court's Order instructing him to answer the local interrogatories. This issue is moot in light of the undersigned's recommendations. However, if the District Judge declines to adopt the recommendations herein and this case proceeds, Plaintiff should be granted another opportunity to answer the Court's interrogatories pursuant to Local Civil Rule 26.01 (D.S.C.).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 18.) Specifically, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's federal claims be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and remand those claims to Richland County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).