Opinion
April 6, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Velsor, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as an exercise of discretion in the interest of justice, with costs, and the verdict is reinstated.
In the absence of indications that substantial justice has not been done, a successful litigant will be entitled to the benefits of a jury verdict in his or her favor (Nicastro v Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 133; cf., Koopersmith v General Motors Corp., 63 A.D.2d 1013, lv denied 46 N.Y.2d 705). Consequently, while a trial court has discretion under CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a verdict which is clearly the "product of confusion, or of inadequate deliberation or a compromise" (R R Wrecking Co. v City of New York, 53 A.D.2d 859, 860), such discretion should be exercised cautiously (Pache v Boehm, 60 A.D.2d 867, 868; see also, Micallef v Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 381).
In this trip and fall case, which was not complex either factually or legally, the trial court premised its decision to set aside the verdict in the interest of justice on a gratuitous, postverdict inquiry from the jury as to the position of a rope on the appellant's premises over which the plaintiff claims she tripped. The trial court inferred therefrom that the jury rendered its verdict "without fully assessing the applicable facts". We have examined the record carefully and find that if any confusion existed, it had no effect on the propriety of the judgment (cf., Micallef v Miehle Co., supra; Nicastro v Park, supra). Mangano, J.P., Rubin, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.