Opinion
NO. 01-18-01145-CV
08-01-2019
DWAYNE RAYSHAUN WILSON, Appellant v. EMPIRE TOWING LLC AND ATC AUTO STORAGE LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1117336
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Dwayne Rayshaun Wilson, challenges the trial court's judgment in his case against appellees, Empire Towing LLC ("Empire Towing") and ATC Auto Storage LLC ("ATC"), for improper towing. He presents the following three issues for our review: (1) "Can a property conveyed to a private foreign trust[] be possessed by a U.S. person who[] has no lawful or legal claim or right to such property?"; (2) "Can a U.S. person under verbal contract with another U.S. person use private trust property . . . as collateral to settle a contract not entered to by the trust or the trustee [where] no evidence exist[s] evidencing the trust or the trustee to be accommodating parties?"; and (3) "Did the trial court err in its [judgment] concerning the right of possession concerning a 2010 Toyota Camry LE towed without consent or knowledge of the owner?"
See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.001-.505 ("Texas Towing and Booting Act").
We affirm.
Background
On August 10, 2018, Wilson's 2010 Toyota Camry was towed, without his consent, following Wilson's arrest. The Houston Police Department ("HPD") officer presiding over his arrest authorized Empire Towing to tow Wilson's car to ATC for storage.
Wilson requested a hearing in justice court, pursuant to section 2308.452 of the Texas Occupations Code, to determine whether probable cause existed for the removal of his car. After a hearing, the justice court found that probable cause existed for the towing of Wilson's car.
See id. § 2308.452.
Wilson timely appealed the justice court's probable cause ruling to county court, where his case was tried without a jury. Wilson testified that his car was towed without his consent. He did not dispute that he owned the car and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination when the trial court asked him to admit or deny whether he had been arrested at the time that his car was towed.
The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that Wilson's car was towed without his consent at the direction and authorization of the HPD. The trial court further determined:
[HPD] did have probable cause to remove the vehicle without the consent of the owner under Municipal Code of Ordinances 45-202(a)(6) and Texas State Transportation Code 545.305(a)(8). Both of these statutes give a peace officer express authority to tow [his car] pursuant to its driver being arrested for an alleged offense that requires the officer to take the driver into custody. There is no dispute from petitioner regarding the fact that he was indeed arrested and taken into custody on August 10, 2018, and at the time he was driving the 2010 Camry that the officer subsequently had towed.The trial court further found that "vehicle tow and storage fees remain[ed] unpaid and uncollected" at the time of trial.
Having determined that the removal and storage of Wilson's car was made with probable cause, the trial court ordered that Wilson to pay "for all costs of the removal and storage" of his car.
Probable Cause Finding
In his first, second, and third issues, Wilson purports to challenge the trial court's probable cause ruling and its order that he pay "all costs of the removal and storage" of his car.
Law-enforcement initiated vehicle tows, also known as "non-consent tows," are authorized by Texas Transportation Code section 545.305. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.305(a)(8) ("A peace officer . . . may remove or require the operator or person in charge of a vehicle to move a vehicle from a highway if the vehicle . . . is operated by a person an officer arrests for an alleged offense and the officer is required by law to take the person into custody."). Chapter 2308 of the Texas Occupations Code establishes a procedure by which a person may challenge the towing of his car. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2308.452. Specifically, it provides that "[t]he owner or operator of a vehicle that has been removed and placed in a vehicle storage facility . . . without the consent of the owner . . . of the vehicle is entitled to a hearing on whether probable cause existed for the removal and placement." Id.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant's brief "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). "This is not done by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations." Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see also Barham v. Turner Constr. Co. of Tex., 803 S.W.2d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) (appellant bears burden of discussing his assertions of error). The failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite appropriate authority waives a complaint on appeal. Marin Real Estate Ptrs. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211-12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("[A]lthough we construe pro se pleadings and briefs liberally, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.") (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978)).
In his "Statement of Issues" section of his brief, Wilson lists the following three "[i]ssues": (1) "Can a property conveyed to a private foreign trust[] be possessed by a U.S. person who[] has no lawful or legal claim or right to such property?"; (2) "Can a U.S. person under verbal contract with another U.S. person use private trust property to be used as collateral to settle a contract not entered to by the trust or the trustee, and no evidence exist evidencing the trust or the trustee to be accommodating parties?"; and (3) "Did the trial court err in its [judgment] concerning the right of possession concerning a 2010 Toyota Camry LE towed without consent or knowledge of the owner?" Wilson's brief does not provide this Court with any appropriate argument, analysis, discussion, or support for his purported "[i]ssues" on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Richardson v. Marsack, No. 05-18-00087-CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing," requiring "appellants to state concisely their complaints, to provide succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their complaints have merit in law and fact, to cite legal authority that is applicable to their complaints, and to cite appropriate references in the record."); Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854 ("We have no duty to brief appellant's issue for [him]. Failure to cite to applicable authority or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal."); see also Mansfield State Bank, 573 S.W.2d at 184-85 ("Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules . . . ."); Hopes-Fontenot v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., No. 01-12-00286-CV, 2013 WL 4399218, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (pro se litigant must properly present his case on appeal; we "may not make allowances or apply different standards for litigants appearing without . . . counsel").
We further note that Wilson's assertions in the "Argument" section of his brief do not correspond to the three questions that he has designated as his "[i]ssues" on appeal. See Hooks v. Brenham Hous. Auth., No. 01-17-00602-CV, 2018 WL 6061307, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding appellant waived complaints on appeal where assertions in "Argument" section of brief "d[id] not correspond to the two questions that he ha[d] designated as his issues on appeal" (internal quotations omitted)); M.D. Mark, Inc. v. PIHI P'ship, No. 01-98-00724-CV, 2001 WL 619604, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (complaints not properly before appellate court where argument section did not correspond "to the three points of error listed").
Accordingly, we hold that Wilson has waived his first, second, and third issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Julie Countiss
Justice Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Landau, and Countiss.