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Wilson v. Dewitt

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Aug 8, 2006
No. 05-04-00666-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2006)

Opinion

No. 05-04-00666-CV

Opinion Filed August 8, 2006.

On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-11121-G.

Affirm.

Before Justices MOSELEY, RICHTER, and LANG-MIERS.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Burnice Wilson, a prison inmate, sued his criminal attorney Lisa Dewitt and CBS Stations Group of Texas L.P. alleging wrongful disclosure of certain medical test results. Wilson filed the suit pro se and as an indigent pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which governs indigent inmate litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. Chap. 14 (Vernon 2002). Concluding Wilson failed to comply with Chapter 14's requirement that an indigent inmate file an "affidavit relating to previous filings" as well as a certified copy of the inmate's trust account statement, the trial judge dismissed Wilson's suit without prejudice. Wilson filed a motion to reinstate arguing the missing documents had in fact been filed, but the motion was overruled by operation of law without a hearing being set or held. Wilson now complains in three issues that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit and in failing to set a hearing on his motion to reinstate. In an additional issue, Wilson complains the court docket sheet incorrectly reflects his case was dismissed with prejudice. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

In his first and fourth issues, Wilson asserts the court erred in dismissing his suit. Specifically, in his first issue, Wilson asserts the court erred in dismissing the suit because the failure to satisfy the filing requirements is not an "allowable basis" for dismissal. Additionally, Wilson argues that he in fact filed the documents the court found he had not. In his fourth issue, Wilson asserts the court erred in dismissing his suit after limitations had expired.

We review a trial court's dismissal of an indigent inmate's suit under an abuse of discretion standard and will reverse only if we conclude the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). In making this determination, we bear in mind that a trial court cannot abuse its discretion if it reaches the right result even for the wrong reasons. Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141-42 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).

Chapter 14 of the civil practice and remedies code was enacted to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits filed in Texas by prison inmates. See Clark v. J.W. Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Bell v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). To that end, section 14.003 allows a trial court to dismiss a suit filed under chapter 14 if it finds that

(1) the allegation of poverty in the affidavit or unsworn declaration is false;

(2) the claim is frivolous or malicious; or

(3) the inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by this chapter that the inmate knew was false.

Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a).

To enable the court to determine whether an inmate is indeed indigent, section 14.006 requires the inmate to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement. Id. § 14.006(f); Hughes v. Massey, 65 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.). And, to enable the court to determine whether the suit is frivolous or malicious-arising from the same operative facts as a previous claim filed by the same inmate, section 14.004 requires the inmate to file an affidavit or declaration "relating to previous filings." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004; Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Hickman, 35 S.W.3d at 123-24. In this affidavit, the inmate must identify each suit, other than a suit under the Texas Family Code, he has previously filed pro se and must describe each of those suits by

(a) stating the operative facts for which relief was sought,

(b) listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought,

(c) identifying each party named in the suit, and

(d) stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, and the date it was dismissed.

Id. § 14.004(a)(2),(b). Because the filing of the affidavit and trust account statement enables the court to determine whether an indigent inmate's suit should be dismissed, courts have consistently held that the failure to file the affidavit with the required information or the inmate trust account statement can result in dismissal without notice or hearing and even prior to service. Id. § 14.003(a); Gowan v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 99 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).

In arguing his first issue that the court's basis for dismissing the suit — the failure to file the affidavit "relating to previous filings" and certified copy of his inmate trust account statement — is not an "allowable basis" for dismissal, Wilson relies on section 14.003. Because the failure to satisfy the filing requirements is not one of the three enumerated grounds for dismissal in section 14.003, Wilson maintains the court's dismissal order must be reversed. As stated, however, a trial court may dismiss an indigent inmate's suit for failure to file the required documents. Hall v. Treon, 39 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.); Williams v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Wilson's complaint to the contrary is without merit.

Having concluded the court could dismiss the suit for failure to satisfy the filing requirements, we now turn to Wilson's other argument in his first issue that he had in fact filed the documents in spite of the court's finding to the contrary. In making this argument, Wilson correctly notes that these documents are contained in the original clerk's record, behind the cover letter accompanying his original petition. This cover letter lists six documents Wilson is filing, including the affidavit and trust account statement. The cover letter is file-stamped by the district clerk as are two other documents listed in the cover letter. These file-stamped documents bear the style of the case. The documents that are not file-stamped, including the affidavit and trust account statement, do not bear the style of the case and could, upon a cursory review, be easily mistaken for part of the documents that are file-stamped.

The trial court's finding they had not been filed when they appeared to have been filed, however, does not mandate reversal of the court's dismissal order. As stated, our review of the trial court's order focuses on the result and not the trial court's reasoning, and the result here is nonetheless right for the reasons stated below. See Hawthorne, 917 S.W.2d at 931; Luxenburg, 835 S.W.2d at 141-42.

In his affidavit, Wilson states he has previously filed a pro se suit against the Dallas Police Department in federal district court, lists the case name and cause number, and states that no "final order" has been rendered. He also states that "the claim upon which relief was sought was the violation of [his] U.S. Constitutional Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy, specifically the unauthorized disclosure of [his] personal and private information." He did not, however, as Dewitt and CBS point out, state the actual operative facts-what personal information was disclosed, when and how it was disclosed, and by whom. Without this information the trial court could not determine whether the suit at hand arose from the same facts as the federal suit and was thus frivolous or malicious. Wilson's failure to file an affidavit with the required information provides a proper basis for dismissal. See, e.g., Wilson v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 107 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003, no pet.) (no abuse of discretion in dismissing indigent inmate suit where inmate failed to disclose facts involved in previously filed suits); Gowan, 99 S.W.3d at 322 (no abuse of discretion in dismissing indigent inmate suit where inmate failed to disclose whether he had previously sued defendants). We resolve his first issue against him.

We also resolve against him his fourth issue in which he argues the court erred in dismissing his suit "after the two-year limitation period had expired." In making this argument, Wilson maintains he has a "unique fact type situation" and notes that courts have long-recognized "strict confidentiality" with respect to his medical condition. However, he provides no authority or analysis in support of his argument that his "unique fact type situation" and the importance of "strict confidentiality" renders dismissal of his suit after the expiration of the limitations period improper. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Moreover, we note that Wilson filed this suit twenty-three months after the alleged wrongful disclosure. Wilson makes no mention of this in his argument and provides no explanation for the delay. Wilson cannot now complain about the court's dismissal date when he failed to file his suit earlier. Wilson's claim is without merit. In his third issue, Wilson argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing on his motion to reinstate. As stated, following the order of dismissal, Wilson filed a motion to reinstate arguing the documents the court found had not been filed had in fact been filed, but the motion was overruled by operation of law without a hearing and without a hearing being set. Wilson's motion was filed pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a, which provides that a case which has been dismissed for want of prosecution may be reinstated upon a finding that the failure to prosecute was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. See Tex. R. Civ. Proc. 165a. Under rule 165a, the trial court must set a hearing and the failure to set a hearing requires reversal. Id.; Reed v. City of Dallas, 774 S.W.2d 384, 384 (Tex. App-Dallas 1989, writ denied). Based on this rule, Wilson argues that the court's failure here to set a hearing on his motion was an abuse of discretion. Wilson's reliance on rule 165a, however, is misplaced. Wilson's case was not dismissed for want of prosecution. Rather, it was dismissed pursuant to section 14.003 of the civil practice and remedies code. Rule 165a has no bearing on Wilson's case. See Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (concluding rule 165a did not apply to suit dismissed pursuant to section 13.001 of the civil practices and remedies code which governs non-inmate indigent litigation). We resolve Wilson's third issue against him.

Wilson also argues, in the alternative, that because of his "unique fact type situation" the limitation period should be four years. Again, however, Wilson provides no authority in support for his contention, see Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h), and even notes in making this argument that courts have held that the limitations period in cases like his to be two years.

In his second issue, Wilson complains about the court's docket sheet which incorrectly reflects the suit was dismissed "with prejudice." Wilson maintains this entry "operates to prejudice his rights," apparently believing that docket sheet entries are of legal significance. However, docket sheet entries are made only for the convenience of the court clerk and are not controlling in a case. See In Re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. 2005) (citing Hamilton v. Empire Gas Fuel Co., 110 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex.Com.App. 1937) (docket entries cannot substitute court judgments and orders entered of record; neither can they serve to change or enlarge judgments and orders)); Rush v. Barrios, 56 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Signed orders and judgments are the controlling document, and our authority to correct errors is limited to judgments and orders. See Tex.R.App.P. 43.2. We resolve Wilson's second issue against him.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.


Summaries of

Wilson v. Dewitt

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Aug 8, 2006
No. 05-04-00666-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2006)
Case details for

Wilson v. Dewitt

Case Details

Full title:BURNICE WILSON, Appellant, v. LISA DEWITT AND CBS STATIONS GROUP OF TEXAS…

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Aug 8, 2006

Citations

No. 05-04-00666-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 2006)