Opinion
Civil Action 23-7325
03-14-2024
KEVIN WILSON v. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
SECTION “G” (4)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAREN WELLS ROBY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct hearings, including an evidentiary hearing if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), an evidentiary hearing is held only when the petitioner shows that either the claim relies on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable or a factual basis that could not have been previously discovered by the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have convicted the petitioner.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner Kevin Wilson (“Wilson”) is a convicted inmate incarcerated in the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center in Cottonport, Louisiana. On November 28, 2018, Wilson was charged in Orleans Parish by Bill of Information with simple burglary. Wilson initially entered a plea of not guilty.
ECF No. 3.
ECF No. 7-1, at 37, Bill of Information, 11/28/18. The state court records are electronically filed at ECF No. 7.
Id. at 1, Docket Entry, 12/3/18.
Because there was no trial or appeal, the record is sparse on the facts underlying Wilson's charges and arrest. According to state court pleadings filed by the prosecution, at 9:10 p.m. on September 30, 2018, New Orleans police responded to a 911 call at the Casa Borrega restaurant at 1719 Oretha Castle Haley Blvd. The owner of the restaurant, Hugo Montero, lived in the upper floor of the building and reported that he heard noises coming from his restaurant downstairs. Soon after the call, Wilson walked into Montero's bedroom. When Montero confronted him, Wilson fled and Montero, now armed with a pry bar, followed Wilson downstairs. Montero saw Wilson holding Mrs. Montero's purse and multiple electronic tablets belonging to the restaurant. Montero ordered Wilson to drop the items, and Wilson did so before escaping on foot. During the incident, Wilson also drank a bottle of alcohol that belonged to the restaurant.
Id. at 45, ¶I, State's La. S.Ct. Writ Application, 2019-KK-1422, 9/5/19.
About 20 minutes after leaving the scene, Wilson, who matched the physical description provided by Montero and smelled of alcohol, was apprehended in the 1900 block of Josephine Street, about .2 miles away from the restaurant and brought to the scene. Montero identified Wilson as the burglar. Surveillance footage from inside the restaurant depicted the burglar as a man matching Wilson's physical attributes.
On November 5, 2019, Wilson entered a plea of guilty to simple burglary and was sentenced by the state trial court to serve 12 years in prison. At the same hearing, the State filed a multiple offender bill charging Wilson as a second felony offender. Wilson immediately pleaded guilty to the multiple bill, and the state trial court revoked the prior sentence and resentenced Wilson to serve 12 years in prison at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.
Id. at 7, Plea and Sentencing Minutes, 11/5/19; id. at 214, Felony Waiver of Constitutional Rights Plea of Guilty Form, 11/5/19.
Id. at 35, Multiple Bill (not dated). In its Louisiana Supreme Court writ application referenced above, the State also provided the facts from the prior felony in support of the multiple offender bill charging Wilson as a second offender. On April 9, 2013, shortly after 10:00 p.m., police were attired in plain clothes when they observed Wilson and another man enter a jewelry store at 631 Bourbon Street. Wilson removed a handful of jewelry off the wall while his associate served as a lookout. Wilson and his associate walked out of the store without paying, and Wilson handed his accomplice some of the jewelry as they walked down the street. The two men were apprehended while in possession of the jewelry. Wilson was formally charged with illegal possession of stolen things and theft in an amount less than $500. Wilson pleaded guilty as charged on July 11, 2013 and received a sentence of 30 days imprisonment. Id. at 45, ¶II.
Id. at 7-8, Plea and Sentencing Minutes, 11/5/19; id. at 213, Waiver of Constitutional Rights Plea of Guilty Multiple Offender, 11/5/19.
Wilson's conviction and sentence became final thirty (30) days later, on December 5, 2019, because he did not seek reconsideration of the sentence or move for leave to appeal. La. Code Crim. P. art. 914; Butler v. Cain, 533 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] conviction becomes final when the time for seeking further direct review in the state court expires.”) (quoting Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003)).
Louisiana law requires a criminal defendant to move for leave to appeal within thirty (30) days of the order or judgment being appealed or a ruling on a timely motion to reconsider a sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 914 (as amended La. Acts 2003, No. 949, § 1). Failure to move timely for appeal under Art. 914 rendered the conviction and sentence final at the expiration of that period. State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336, 338 (La. 1985).
More than seven months later, on July 10, 2020, Wilson submitted an application for postconviction relief to the state trial court alleging several claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and for recommending a guilty plea when the bill of information did not charge all of the elements of simple burglary; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him of the possibility of an insanity defense related to alcohol abuse; and (3) the court accepted the guilty plea after appointment of a sanity commission but before a sanity hearing. for counsel's failure to object and request a curative jury instruction.
ECF No. 7-3, at 20, Application for Post-Conviction Relief, dated 7/10/20; id. at 26, Memorandum in Support, dated 7/10/20.
On July 29, 2020, the state trial court denied the application as meritless. On September 24, 2020, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied Wilson's related writ application without stated reasons.
Id. at 13, Trial Court Judgment, 7/29/20.
Id. at 1, 4th Cir. Order, 2020-K-0464, 9/24/20; id. at 19, Trial Court Order, 8/19/20 (setting writ return date for September 19, 2020); id. at 2, 4th Cir. Writ Application, 2020-K-0464, 9/17/20 (dated 9/8/20).
On October 20, 2020, Wilson submitted a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court which was later allotted by the Court as Writ No. 2021-KH-0131. On March 16, 2021, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wilson's writ application finding that he failed to meet his burden of proof under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.2.
ECF No. 7-6, at 3, La. S.Ct. Writ Application, 2021-KH-0131, dated 10/20/20. It is unclear from the record where the document was before it was filed in 2021 and not specific filing date appears in the state court record.
State v. Wilson, 312 So.3d 1088 (La. 2021); ECF No. 7-6, at 2, La. S.Ct. Order, 2021-KH-0131, 3/16/21.
More than two years and seven months later, on October 23, 2023, Wilson submitted a Uniform Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence alleging that his sentence was illegal because the bill of information did not include the name of the victim or all elements of the offense charged.On October 31, 2023, the state trial court denied the motion as meritless and noting that Wilson had already exhausted his avenues of post-conviction collateral review.
ECF No. 7-4, at 13, 14, Uniform Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, dated 10/23/23; see also id. at 17, Memorandum in Support, 10/23/23.
Id. at 9-10, Trial Court Order, 10/31/23.
On December 14, 2023, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit granted Wilson's related writ application and denied relief. The Court resolved that, based on the nature of his arguments, Wilson's motion was a second application for post-conviction relief which was successive under La. Code Crim. Proc. art 930.4 and otherwise untimely under La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 930.8.Wilson did not seek review of this ruling, which he would have had to do within 30 days of its issuance as required by La. Sup. Ct. Rule X§5.
State v. Wilson, No. 2023-K-0762, 2023 WL 8641929, at *2 (La.App. 4th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023); ECF No. 7-4 at 1-5, 4th Cir. Order, 2023-K-0762, 12/14/23.
Id. at 4.
II. Federal Petition
On January 8, 2024, after correction of certain deficiencies, the clerk of this Court filed Wilson's federal petition for habeas corpus relief in which he asserts no claims and instead vaguely refers the Court to his state court pleadings and his first federal habeas petition, Civ. Action 20-3111“G” (4), in which he also asserted no claims and voluntarily dismissed on March 8, 2021.Affording his handwritten and often incoherent writings a broad construction, the Court agrees with the State that Wilson is challenging the sufficiency of the bill of information to support his conviction and sentence, just as he did in his 2023 state court motion to correct his sentence. In that proceeding, as summarized above, he argued that his conviction and sentence were invalid because the name of the victim and all elements of the crime charged were not included in the bill of information.
Because the case was dismissed without prejudice on his voluntary motion, ultimately granted on February 28, 2022, this second petition is not considered a prohibited successive petition.
ECF No. 5, State's Response in Opposition, 2/5/24.
See ECF No. 3, at 7 (referencing his state court pleading filed “Oct 20, 2023' and the bill of information not clearly identifying the victim); id. at 12, ¶13, ¶15 (referencing the illegal sentence and short form indictment challenged at the Louisiana Fourth Circuit); id. at 15 (arguing that the victim's name was not stated in the bill of information and his conviction cannot stand, sentence is illegal, and his conviction and sentence should be annulled).
In a “supplemental brief” dated February 1, 2024, and received by the Court February 5, 2024, Wilson, under a broad reading, argues that, despite the timing of his challenges in the state or federal courts, there is no time limit that prevents him from challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the state court to preside over his criminal case when the indictment (or bill of information) was insufficient to charge the offense.
Wilson makes clear his intent to have this pleading filed as a supplemental brief and declared that it “is not a reply memorandum.” ECF No. 8, at 1. Wilson has not exhausted a claim challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the state trial court.
Id.
The State filed a response in opposition to Wilson's petition arguing that his federal petition was not timely filed and state court review of his claims was not fully exhausted. Wilson did not file a response to the State's opposition although he was given an opportunity to do so.
ECF No. 5.
III. General Standards of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies to Wilson's petition, which is deemed filed in this Court under the mailbox rule on December 11, 2023. The threshold questions on habeas review under the amended statute are whether the petition is timely and whether the claim raised by the petitioner was adjudicated on the merits in state court; i.e., the petitioner must have exhausted state court remedies and must not be in “procedural default” on a claim. Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)).
The AEDPA comprehensively revised federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and applied to habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). The AEDPA, signed into law that date, does not specify an effective date for its non-capital habeas corpus amendments. Absent legislative intent to the contrary, statutes are effective at the moment they are signed into law. United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1505 n.11 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a “mailbox rule” applies to pleadings, including habeas corpus petitions filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, submitted to federal courts by prisoners acting pro se. Under this rule, the date when prison officials receive the pleading from the inmate for delivery to the court is considered the time of filing for limitations purposes. Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1999); Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1998); Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). Wilson signed his initial deficient petition on December 11, 2023. ECF No. 1, at 1 (deficient petition). This is the earliest date appearing in the record on which he could have submitted his pleadings to prison officials for mailing to a court.
The record supports the State's argument that Wilson did not exhaust state court review of his claims since he did not carry his challenge through to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the State also asserts and the record shows that Wilson's federal petition was not timely filed under the AEDPA. The limitation defense is dispositive of the case. Thus, for the following reasons, Wilson's petition should be dismissed as time-barred.
IV. Statute of Limitations
The AEDPA codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides certain triggering events for the statute of limitations, including § 2244(d)(1)(A) which requires a petitioner to bring his § 2254 claim within one year of the date the state court conviction became final. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176-80 (2001). As calculated above, Wilson's conviction and sentence were final on December 5, 2019, when he did not appeal or challenge his sentence. Under the literal terms of the AEDPA, Wilson had one year from that date, or until Monday, December 7, 2020, to file a timely federal application for habeas corpus relief which he did not do. Under the applicable mailbox rule, Wilson filed this federal petition on December 11, 2023, more than three years after the AEDPA filing deadline expired. Wilson's federal petition must be dismissed as untimely, unless the one-year grace period was interrupted or otherwise tolled in either of the two ways recognized in the applicable law in a sufficient manner to render his petition timely.
The statute of limitations provision of the AEDPA at § 2244(d) also provides other trigger dates which do not apply here:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of
A. the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
B. the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State actions;
C. the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
D. the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The filing period ended Saturday, December 5, 2020, causing the final day to fall to the next business day, Monday, December 7, 2020. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(a)(1)(C); see also La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 13.
A. Statutory Tolling
Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In order for a state post-conviction application to be considered “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2), the applicant must have complied with all of the State's procedural requirements, such as timeliness and place of filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413-14 (2005); Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 306-08 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2000)); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 196 F.3d 1259 (5th Cir. 1999). For purposes of the AEDPA, a timeliness calculation in Louisiana requires the application of the prison mailbox rule to state court pleadings. Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 2006). The Court has applied this rule in presenting the procedural history recited above.
A matter is “pending” for § 2244(d)(2) purposes “as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance.'” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002); Williams, 217 F.3d at 310 (quoting Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1999)) (finding that a matter is “pending” for Section 2244(d)(2) purposes until further appellate review is unavailable under Louisiana's procedures.); see also Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
A “pertinent judgment or claim” requires that the state filings for which tolling is sought must have challenged the same conviction being challenged in the federal habeas corpus petition and must have addressed the same substantive claims now being raised in the federal habeas corpus petition. Godfrey v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 681, 687-88 (5th Cir. 2005).
The phrase “other collateral review” in the statute refers to state court proceedings challenging the pertinent judgment subsequently challenged in the federal habeas petition. Dillworth v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that a state habeas petition challenging a prior conviction in one county was other collateral review even though filed as a challenge to a second conviction in a different county); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Carey, 536 U.S. at 214 (finding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is “other collateral review”).
In Wilson's case, the AEDPA filing period began to run on December 6, 2019, the day after his conviction was final. The period ran without interruption for 217 days, until July 10, 2020, when Wilson filed his first state court post-conviction application. The AEDPA one-year filing period was suspended during the pendency of Wilson's state court proceedings through March 16, 2021, when the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ application.
The period began to run again on March 17, 2021, and did so for the remaining 148 without interruption through August 11, 2021, when it expired. Wilson had no state court collateral review proceedings pending during that time to have tolled the running of the one-year filing period. Wilson's first federal petition in Civ. Action 20-3111“G” (4), filed under the mailbox rule on November 12, 2020, also provided no tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-182 (prior federal petitions provide no statutory tolling under the terms of § 2244). Wilson's subsequent state court motion to correct his sentence was filed on October 23, 2023, which was well after expiration of the AEDPA one-year filing period. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (a filing made after the expiration of the AEDPA one-year filing period does not renew or extend the AEDPA filing period or provide a petitioner any tolling benefits); Higginbotham v. King, 592 Fed.Appx. 313, 314 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations.”).
Therefore, Wilson's federal petition, filed under the mailbox rule on December 11, 2023, was filed two years and four months after the AEDPA one-year filing period expired on August 11, 2021. Wilson's untimely federal petition should be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Equitable Tolling
The post-AEDPA jurisprudence also provides for equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period where rare or extraordinary circumstances may have prevented a diligent petitioner from timely pursuing federal habeas corpus. Pace, 544 U.S. at 419; Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1998). However, equitable tolling is warranted only in situations where the petitioner was actively misled or is prevented in some extraordinary circumstance outside of his control from asserting his rights. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19; see Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 2002); see Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 652-53 (2010) (finding that equitable tolling was warranted where attorney was more than negligent when he failed to satisfy professional standards of care by ignoring the client's requests to timely file a federal petition and in failing to communicate with the client over a period of years in spite of the client's letters); Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that equitable tolling was warranted where petitioner suffered a significant state-created delay when, for nearly one year, the state appeals court failed in its duty under Texas law to inform him that his state habeas petition had been denied, petitioner diligently pursued federal habeas relief, and he persistently inquired to the court.); United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that tolling was warranted when defendant was deceived by attorney into believing that a timely motion to vacate was filed); Coleman, 184 F.3d at 402 (quotation omitted) (“A garden variety claim of excusable neglect does not support equitable tolling.”); Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715 (finding that tolling is not justified during petitioner's seventeen-day stay in psychiatric ward, during which he was confined, medicated, separated from his glasses and thus rendered legally blind, and denied meaningful access to the courts); Cantu-Tzin, 162 F.3d at 300 (finding that State's alleged failure to appoint competent habeas counsel did not justify tolling); Davis, 158 F.3d at 808 n.2 (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling was warranted when federal district court three times extended the deadline to file habeas corpus petition beyond expiration of AEDPA grace period). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish entitlement to equitable tolling. Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002).
Wilson has not presented, and the record does not demonstrate, any basis for extending the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling provided for in the foregoing precedent. Wilson is not entitled to equitable tolling, and his petition should be dismissed as untimely filed.
Wilson also has failed to demonstrate any other excuse or exception to avoid the expiration of the one-year limitations period applicable in this case. For example, Wilson has not alleged, asserted, nor provided a credible showing of his actual, or factual, innocence based on newly discovered evidence in any manner to excuse this untimely filed federal habeas petition. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). No such claim or high-level of proof has been offered to this Court, nor has any such claim been established or exhausted in the state courts. In addition, the fact that Wilson's claims may involve alleged ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide an exception to his untimely federal filing under the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013). In Martinez, the Court held that a state court imposed “‘procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the [State's] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.'” Trevino, 569 U.S. at 417 (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17). The dismissal recommended in this Report is not based on a state court imposed bar to review of Wilson's claims. Instead, the recommendation here arises from Wilson's failure to meet the federal limitations deadline under the AEDPA. The decisions in Martinez and Trevino, and their progeny, do not address or provide an excuse for the untimely filing of a federal habeas petition. See Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 631 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Thus, we also hold that the reasoning of the Martinez rule does not apply to AEDPA's limitations period in § 2254 cases or any potential tolling of that period.”); Smith v. Rogers, No. 14-0482, 2014 WL 2972884, at * 1 (W.D. La. Jul. 2, 2014); Falls v. Cain, No. 13-5091, 2014 WL 2702380, at *3 (E.D. La. Jun. 13, 2014) (Order adopting Report). The decisions in Martinez and Trevino also do not constitute new rules of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral review to start a new one-year filing period under the AEDPA. See In re Paredes, 587 Fed.Appx. at 813; Adams v. Thaler. 679 F.3d 312, 322 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012). Thus, neither Martinez nor Trevino excuse the untimely filing of Wilson's federal petition. Wilson's federal petition deemed filed on December 11, 2023, was not timely filed within the AEDPA one-year filing period which expired on August 11, 2021. There is no statutory tolling, equitable tolling, or other exception applicable to or that would excuse Wilson's untimely filing. Wilson's petition was not timely filed and should be dismissed for that reason.
V. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Kevin Wilson's petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996).
Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended to extend the period to fourteen days.