Opinion
CIVIL 2:20-cv-3567-BHH-MGB
07-13-2021
Mohammad Nathaniel Wilson, Plaintiff, v. Berkeley County, City of Hanahan Police Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been removed from the Court of Common Pleas, Berkeley County, South Carolina. Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, and violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7, 11.) Plaintiff also appears to bring claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander under state law. (Id. at 11.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 29.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial matters are assigned to the United States Magistrate Judge.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff's alleged unlawful arrest. Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 14, 2018, he was arrested after calling “the police in a domestic violence situation.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that at that time, he was living with a woman and her child, and he believed the child was being abused by her mother. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he called the police because he “just wanted to help the child and prevent any more . . . argument between me and the child's mother over me encouraging the child it was ok to call for help.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that when the police arrived, they arrested Plaintiff for “breach of peace” and this charge was then “upgraded to unlawful conduct towards a child.” (Id. at 5-7.) Plaintiff alleges that he was incorrectly named as the child's legal custodian. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff alleges that “SGT E Lanphere” was wearing a body cam during the course of his arrest, and she “can be seen in footage disregarding the child's own admission and the evidence they clearly knew the mother was lying.” (Id. at 5-7.) According to Plaintiff, SGE E Lanphere “was improperly trained by Berkeley County” in conducting arrests. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he spent 367 days in jail “although the charges [were] dismissed.” (Id. at 5.) He further alleges that he was improperly denied bail and held without a preliminary hearing. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions “constitute malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel and slander, ” apparently under South Carolina law. (Id. at 11.) He also alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights, and the undersigned liberally construes the Complaint to allege claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, and denial of due process under § 1983. (Id. at 9.)
On September 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas, Berkeley County, South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendants removed this case to federal court on October 9, 2020. On April 19, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 29.) On April 20, 2021, this Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 30.) On May 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed an untitled document that includes support for the allegations in his Complaint. (Dkt. No. 32.) On June 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed another untitled document supporting the allegations in his Complaint. (Dkt. No. 36.) That same day, the Court issued an Order advising Plaintiff that it would construe the May 12 and June 17 filings as Plaintiff's response to the dispositive motion, and extended Plaintiff's response deadline to June 30, 2021 in an abundance of caution. Plaintiff has not filed any other responses to Defendants' Motion. The Motion is ripe and ready for review.
Both filings from Plaintiff were signed under penalty of perjury and have been construed as declarations.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have moved for the dismissal of this action pursuant to Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They submit several exhibits in support of their Motion, which the undersigned considers, below. “When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260- 61 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original). Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because, inter alia, Defendants had probable cause to make a valid arrest on Plaintiff and therefore Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation. (Dkt. No. 29.)
A.§ 1983 Claims
As discussed above, the undersigned liberally construes Plaintiff's Complaint to allege § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, and denial of due process. Before considering the merits of these claims, the undersigned first summarizes the relevant evidence in the record.
1.Evidence
a. Incident Report and Bail Proceeding
Defendants have submitted the incident report completed by Sgt Ellen Lanphere. (Dkt. No. 29-4 at 6.) The report states under “incident type, ” “unlawful conduct towards a child.” (Id.) The narrative portion of the report states,
On August 14, 2018, I was dispatched to 5827 Sledge Street, Apartment I, in reference to a domestic dispute. Upon arrival, I saw a black male coming out of an apartment, and said that he and his girlfriend were involved in an argument.
I identified the male as Muhammed [sic] N. Wilson, and his girlfriend as Bernadette Owens. Wilson said that he and his girlfriend were arguing because they are “dealing with stuff, ” but would not go into detail. Wilson mentioned something about masturbating, and then I heard Owens yelling from inside of the residence.
I walked to apartment I, and met with Owens. Owens stated that this morning, she and her juvenile daughter [redacted] (9 years old), were sleeping in the bed together, when Wilson came into the bed, layed [sic] next to her, and started to masturbate. Owens stated that the bed started shaking, and she woke up when her daughter was yelling at her. Owens then said that Wilson ejaculated on her, between her buttocks.
The juvenile [redacted] stated that she felt the bed shaking, and heard Wilson masturbating. [Redacted] said that she had to cover her ears with her hands because Wilson was saying things like “OH YEAH, THAT FEELS GOOD, ” and she could hear the sounds of his penis while he was masturbating. [Redacted] said that she woke her mother up and that is when her mother saw that Wilson was underneath of the bed sheets. [Redacted] stated that she did not see Wilson's penis.
Wilson was arrested, and put in handcuffs behind his back. The handcuffs were double-locked and checked for proper fit. Officer Ward searched Wilson and placed him in the backseat of his patrol vehicle (unit # 255). Wilson was transported back to the Hanahan police department for booking.
Wilson is being charged with Unlawful conduct towards a child (warrant #2018A0920300279). Judge Revelise signed the warrant, and Wilson was served with his copy of the warrant. A victim's sheet was completed, as well as a general sessions packet.
Cpl. Scott had his body camera activated during the incident (#17), as well as Officer Ward (#18). My body camera was not working properly at the time, but while I was interviewing the mother and child, I had Cpl. Scott's camera activated on my vest (#17).(Id. at 6, 8.)
The record includes an arrest warrant charging Plaintiff with unlawful conduct towards a child. (Dkt. No. 29-5 at 31.) The record also shows that a bail proceeding was held on August 14, 2018, wherein Plaintiff was charged with “Children/Legal Custodian, unlawful neglect of child or helpless person.” (Dkt. No. 29-5 at 30.) Plaintiff was committed to the Berkeley County Detention Center, with a bond of $75,000. (Id. at 29.) A Court Order dated July 2, 2019 shows that Plaintiff's bond was reduced to $25,000 dollars. (Id. at 28.) The record shows Plaintiff was released from custody on August 15, 2019, and his charges were also “released.” (Id. at 4-6.)
b. Body Camera Footage
Defendants have submitted footage from the body cameras the officers wore during Plaintiff's arrest. (Dkt. No. 29-3.) The footage of Office Wes Scott shows an officer interviewing Plaintiff at the scene of the arrest. Plaintiff tells the officer he was masturbating. Ms. Owens is then seen telling the officers that Plaintiff was masturbating next to her child. An officer then interviews the child, and she confirms the account of the incident as recorded in the incident report. The officers then arrest Plaintiff.
2.Analysis
a. Claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment
As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. “Claims of false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution ‘are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment.'” Goode v. Town of Kingstree, No. 4:13-cv-3158-MGL, 2015 WL 5008755, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2015) (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001)); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261-62 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 2000). “An essential element of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution is the lack of probable cause to arrest.” Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Abbeville, 366 S.C. 662, 665, 623 S.E.2d 656, 658 (S.C. App. 2005)). “The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
A police officer determines whether probable cause exists based on the “totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1988)). “For probable cause to exist, there need only be enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.” Id. at 367-68 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963)). “Two factors govern the determination of probable cause in any situation: ‘the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.'” Id. at 368 (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)). To show an absence of probable cause, Plaintiff must allege a set of facts that made it unjustifiable for a reasonable officer to conclude that he was violating the underlying offense. Id.
Moreover, the officer's “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” McCoy v. City of Columbia, 929 F.Supp.2d 541, 556 (D.S.C. 2013) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)); see Jackson v. City of Abbeville, 366 S.C. 662, 669, 623 S.E.2d 656, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting that, in South Carolina, “it is permissible to rely on an uncharged offense to establish probable cause”). “An arrest is valid if ‘based on the facts known to the officer, objective probable cause exist[s] as to any crime.'” Engwer v. Sims, No. 3:06-cv-2271-CMC, 2007 WL 1864064, at *3 (D.S.C. June 26, 2007) (quoting United States v. McNeill, 484 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also Jaealy v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] claim for false arrest turns only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a defendant, and that it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect to each individual charge, or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.”); Stavis v. Reynolds, No. 2:09-cv-2272-DCN-RSC, 2010 WL 1294113, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2010) (where a false arrest is alleged, courts should “focus on the validity of the arrest, and not on the validity of each charge”), aff'd, 2010 WL 1257344 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2010).
Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's warrantless arrest did not amount to a constitutional violation because there was probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed the offense of unlawful conduct towards a child. Plaintiff admitted to the arresting officers that he had been masturbating, and Ms. Owens and her daughter also claimed that Plaintiff had masturbated in front of a child. (Dkt. No. 29-3; 29-4 at 6-8.) Because there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution be dismissed.
b. Due Process Violation
Plaintiff also appears to assert a due process violation under § 1983 because he “was held without a preliminary hearing.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.) The undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff does not show that he has been deprived of a federal right as required to state a cause of action pursuant to § 1983. As another court in this district has stated,
Although the South Carolina rule refers to a “preliminary hearing, ” see S.C.R. CRIM. P. 2, “[t]he purpose of the preliminary hearing is to establish that probable cause exists to continue the criminal process.” State v. Cunningham, 275 S.C. 189, 193, 268 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1980). The federal constitution does not create a right to a state preliminary hearing. The probable cause determination, as an initial step into the criminal justice process, may be made by a judicial officer without an adversary hearing. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Failure to follow state rules or procedures does not establish violation of a federal right. Plaintiff's § 1983 claim of constitutional violations related to failure to attend a preliminary hearing fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted.Wambach v. Wright, No. 1:10-cv-2912-HFF-SVH, 2011 WL 1597660, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 1595171 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2011); see also State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 365, 296 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1982) (“There no longer exists a State (nor has there ever existed a Federal) constitutional right to a preliminary hearing.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on a due process violation should be dismissed.
B. State Law Claims
As discussed above, the undersigned has liberally construed Plaintiff's Complaint to allege claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander under state law. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11.) With the dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, only these state law claims remain. Because there are no federal claims remaining, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. As noted by the Fourth Circuit, “once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an action, it maintains ‘wide discretion' to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction.” Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 553 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1988)). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) if . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3)-(4). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, a district court must consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7).
Here, the undersigned is unable to find that the parties would be inconvenienced or unfairly prejudiced by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, nor does the undersigned find there to be any underlying issues of federal policy involved in Plaintiff's state law claims. The comity factor and considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action. See, e, g., Missouri v. Spivey, No. 4:13-cv-01326-RMG, 2014 WL 4349151, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2014) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where summary judgment was granted on the plaintiff's federal claims); Johnson v. Ozmint, No. 9:08-cv-0431-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 252152, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2009) (dismissing federal claims and noting, “With respect to these remaining state law causes of action, when federal claims presented in a case which has been removed to federal court from state court are dismissed, the case should be remanded to state court for resolution of any remaining state law claims .....). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiffs state law claims be remanded to Berkeley County.
Given that these recommendations are dispositive of the case, the undersigned does not address the parties' remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, be GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 29.) Specifically, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff s federal claims and those claims should be dismissed with prejudice. The undersigned further recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims and remand those claims to Berkeley County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thoma s v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).