Furthermore, "[i]n light of a district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters, an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 is entitled to substantial deference." Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). B. Imposition of costs against the employees under Rule 54(d)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, attorney fees may be awarded "to a prevailing defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dept., 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."

While "formal notice detailing the penalties" is not required, KCI or the court had to provide notice that sanctions were being sought against the individual attorneys and not just the firm. Banner, 99 F. App'x at 37; see also Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 822-23 (6th Cir. 2000). For example, a show cause order from a district court is one mechanism that gives an individual "specific notice of the sanctioning authority being considered and the conduct alleged to be sanctionable."

In this Circuit, there is no requirement that a full evidentiary hearing be held before imposing sanctions - what is required is that an attorney receive fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations against them. KCI USA, Inc. v. Healthcare Essentials, Inc., 797 Fed. Appx. 1002, 1007 (6th Cir. Ohio 2020)(citing Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. Ohio 2000)); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 491-92 (6th Cir. Ohio 2001). In KCI, the Sixth Circuit held that "'[w]hile formal notice detailing the penalties' is not required, KCI or the court had to provide notice that sanctions were being sought against the individual attorneys and not just the firm."

Courts may award prevailing defendant attorney fees under § 1988 if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Wilson-Simmons v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994)). A suit is not "frivolous" or "without foundation," however, merely "because the plaintiff ultimately does not prevail.

Indeed, a prevailing defendant should only recover attorney's fees if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Cristiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) and applying Christianburg to the fee provisions of § 1988); accord N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 596; Dubuc, 312 F.3d at 754; Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547; Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000); Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994). In considering a prevailing defendant's application for attorney's fees, district court's must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation."

In the second of the two appeals before this court, Junior challenges the district court's award of attorney fees to defendants Perry, Rose, and Deering. "We review a district court's award of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on an abuse of discretion standard." Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000). "In light of a `district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters,' an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 is entitled to substantial deference."

Id. "In light of a district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters, an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 is entitled to substantial deference." See Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000). B. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc., 525 B.R. 338, 366 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 652 Fed.Appx. 330 (6th Cir. 2016)(“[An] award of sanctions under § 1927 is appropriate ‘when an attorney has engaged in some sort of conduct that, from an objective standpoint, ‘falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party.' ... [or] when an attorney knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous claims....'”)(quoting Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). “Section 1927 sanctions may be imposed without a finding that the lawyer subjectively knew that his conduct was inappropriate.”

The Court acknowledges that in Wolfe, the Sixth Circuit cited a case in which an attorney's fee award was upheld based on the plaintiff's failure to set forth a prima facie case of racial discrimination or retaliation. 412 F.3d at 719-20 (citing Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Department, 207 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2000). In that case, unlike here, the plaintiff was represented by counsel, whom the district court also sanctioned.