Opinion
No. 31540
Decided December 1, 1948.
Unemployment compensation — Individual may not serve waiting period or receive benefits — Section 1345-6 d, General Code — Claimant voluntarily quit work without just cause — Error to allow claim and suspend benefits.
1. Under the provisions of Section 1345-6 d, General Code, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual voluntarily quit his work without just cause.
2. Under such circumstances it is error to allow such claim and suspend the benefits.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas county.
This controversy involves a claim for "benefits" under the Unemployment Compensation Act of this state.
Under the present tortuous statutory procedure this claim was considered first by the administrator of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation of Ohio. The claim was denied for the reason that the claimant "voluntarily quit last liable employment without just cause" in violation of the provisions of Section 1345-6 d (9), General Code.
This decision was affirmed by the referee.
Then a majority of the board of review reversed the decision although concurring in the finding that the claimant had voluntarily quit his work without just cause. The board held the claim valid and suspended the claimant's benefit rights "as of the beginning of the benefit year, October 14, 1945, until such time as he obtains subsequent employment and has had earnings equal to at least four times his weekly benefit amount."
Next, an appeal was perfected to the Court of Common Pleas which reversed the decision of the board of review.
Then, on an appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed.
And, finally, on the allowance of a motion to certify the record, the case is in this court for a fifth review and its sixth stage.
Messrs. Ritter Boesel, for appellee Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.
Mr. Hugh S. Jenkins, attorney general, Mr. John M. Woy and Mr. Roland B. Lee, for appellant.
The operative facts in this case are simple and not in dispute.
The claimant was an employee of the Willys-Overland Motors, [Inc., in the city of Toledo, Ohio. However, due to a neurotic condition, he obtained a leave of absence and went to Alpina, Michigan, where he was employed as a bartender from August 28, 1945, to October 11, 1945. On the latter date he voluntarily quit that work and returned to Toledo where he was unable to find further employment. He then filed this claim October 22, 1945.
The sole question of law here presented is whether "benefits" may be allowed and paid to a claimant who has voluntarily quit his work without just cause.
The answer to this question is found in the decisive, unambiguous language of Section 1345-6 d (121 Ohio Laws, 717), which then read in part as follows:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual:
* * * * *
"(9) voluntarily quit his work without just cause. Disqualification under this subsection shall continue for the full period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his work voluntarily without just cause and until such individual has become re-employed and has earnings equal to at least four times his weekly benefit amount." (Italics supplied.)
Restated and reduced to its lowest terms, the inescapable language of the General Assembly makes it clear that any individual who voluntarily quits his work without just cause shall neither serve a waiting period nor be paid benefits for that unemployment.
As the minority member of the board of review pertinently observed:
"The majority, by suspending benefit rights, which rights include the right to serve waiting period and the right to draw monetary benefits, concedes that claimant has nothing to presently claim on this so-called 'valid claim' and cannot serve a waiting period or be paid benefits until he has secured subsequent employment and has earned therein four times his weekly benefit amount and then becomes unemployed and is otherwise eligible. The claimant being under disqualification by virtue of his voluntary quit without just cause, has nothing to claim and having nothing to claim, the claim should be disallowed."
In the first paragraph of the syllabus in the somewhat analogous case of Farloo v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 145 Ohio St. 263, 61 N.E.2d 313, this court unanimously held:
"1. Under the provisions of Section 1345-6, General Code, no invididual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds such individual quit work voluntarily because of marital obligations."
In his opinion in that case Judge Matthias made the following pertinent comment on page 267:
"However, a clear exception to the above stated general provision was made by the specific provision of part 'd' of Section 1345-6, General Code, as then in effect, which is in part as follows:
" 'd. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the administrator finds that such individual: * * *
" '(7) quit work voluntarily to marry or because of marital obligations.'
"By amendment effective September 28, 1943 (120 Ohio Laws, 682), the word 'voluntarily' was eliminated from this subsection. Other amendments were made to the act, but are immaterial here.
"The right of the claimant to participate in this fund rests upon and must be determined by this latter section. Its language is clear and unambiguous. In express and specific terms it absolutely prohibits and precludes the payment of unemployment benefits to one who 'quit work' voluntarily to marry or because of marital obligations. This provision constitutes a clear exception to parts 'b' and 'c' under which unemployment benefits are payable to one quitting his work without just cause in connection with such work.
"This exception seems to apply even in cases where the availability of the employee for other employment is clearly established. Under the clear and express terms of the statute a person who has so quit work cannot establish availability. * * *"
Similarly in the instant case this court is of the view that the administrator, the referee, the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that the claim should be disallowed, and that the board of review was in error in holding that the claim should be allowed and the benefits suspended.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN, SOHNGEN and STEWART, JJ., concur.
TURNER, J., not participating.