Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate, Super. Ct. No. RIC10015202, John Vineyard, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Newmeyer & Dillion, Joseph A. Ferrentino and Christopher Connelly for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Kinkle, Rodiger and Spriggs and Wesley D. Hellerud for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
RICHLI, Acting P.J.
INTRODUCTION
In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, the opposition filed by real parties in interest, and petitioners’ reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
DISCUSSION
In our view, the arbitration agreement, as a whole, is not unenforceable. Clearly, there was no element of “surprise” as plaintiffs concede they were aware of the provisions. Nor are we persuaded that plaintiffs’ earnest desire to buy a particular house created unfair coercion such as would render the provisions unenforceable. We further note that if the assertion that it would most commonly be the buyer who would be “bound” by the clause were enough to invalidate an arbitration clause, such clauses would be almost always voidable in the consumer context. We do not believe that such a result is consistent with legislative policy. Finally, we are not persuaded that the possibility of inconsistent results (if the minors’ claims are not in fact arbitrable) justifies denial of arbitration in this case under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c).
However, we also find that the agreement clearly, and properly, provides that questions concerning the scope of the arbitration are for the arbitrator to determine. (See Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1413.) Accordingly, the trial court erred in deciding that the personal injury claims were not arbitrable, and all issues relating to the scope of the agreement and the claims that are arbitrable are reserved to the arbitrator.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part and denied in part.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order denying petitioners’ request to compel arbitration, and to enter a new order directing the parties to arbitrate the scope of the agreement and further proceed as required by law. In all other respects, the petition is denied.
Petitioners to recover their costs.
Petitioners are directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.
We concur: MILLER, J., CODRINGTON, J.