Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 151870
SCOTLAND, P.J.
Lewis J. Westlake appeals from the trial court’s denial of his request to vacate an injunction directing him to stay away from Henry W. Willms and from ranch property owned by Willms.
Because the injunction expired by its own terms in June 2007, we shall dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
The 2004 Injunction; case No. 151870
In June 2004, Willms filed a petition against Westlake, seeking an injunction against civil harassment (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) and requesting an order that Westlake be directed to stay at least 200 yards away from property known as Dry Creek Ranch.
The petition states “[Willms] was Lender and [Westlake] Borrower with respect to real property. [Westlake] lost the property to [Willms] through foreclosure and is now trespassing and harassing persons attempting to clean-up the property[.]” It identifies acts of alleged harassment by Westlake: “April 19, 2004: [¶] Jim Westlake put notice on equipment, ‘we were stealing his equipment.’ Case #: 04-13994 [¶] May 8, 2004: [¶] Jim Westlake and Tom Forrester ‘had conversation.’ Jim took three passes at Tom with his Suburban, hitting Tom each time with the automobile. The Sheriff was called. Case #: 04-15583 [¶] May 22, 2004: [¶] Jim Westlake followed Tom Forrester from Cottonwood, CA to Orland, CA in his car and cut a fence on an orchard across from Tom’s office. After 30 minutes[,] Tom and Jim had words. [¶] All of the above-described acts were committed upon Plaintiff’s real property . . . collectively known as ‘Dry Creek Ranch.’”
Willms also sought a temporary restraining order on the ground that he “has an agreement with persons to remove garbage and debris from the real property described above and [Westlake]’s actions threatening and physically accosting such persons is meant to terminate those efforts and any further efforts to clean up the real property. [¶] If [Westlake] is not restrained from entering onto the real property described above, it may result in physical injury to one of [Willms’s] guests and invitees that access the property.”
In support of his request for a temporary order, Willms averred: “I am the owner of real property known as ‘Dry Creek Ranch’ located in the County of Shasta . . . . At this time [Westlake] has trespassed and continues to trespass on my real property, as described in the accompanying papers. During these incidents of trespass[, Westlake] has harassed and physically threatened and continues to harass and physically threaten my invitees and employees, specifically Tom Forrester, that I have contracted with to remove large scrap metal, trash, junk and debris as well as other persons that have visited the property. Based on the conduct of [Westlake], a Temporary Restraining Order which will keep [Westlake] removed from the real property a distance of 200 yards, otherwise myself and my invitees are and will continue to be in immediate physical danger from his conduct and irreparable harm may occur if [Westlake]’s conduct is allowed to continue.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that Westlake stay 100 yards from both Willms and Dry Creek Ranch.
Following a hearing, at which Westlake did not appear, the court ordered that the injunction “be made permanent” and remain in effect for three years, expiring on June 28, 2007.
It also ordered that Westlake refrain from harassing, following, or threatening any persons coming to or from Dry Creek Ranch.
Westlake’s Forcible Detainer Action; case No. 153276
Westlake did not seek reconsideration or review of the injunction. Instead, he and his wife (collectively, Westlake) filed a separate civil action in December 2004 against Willms and others, seeking damages “arising from forcible entry, forcible detainer, and trespass” (Shasta County Superior Court case No. 153276; hereafter referred to as the forcible detainer action). In his complaint, Westlake acknowledged that Willms had purchased the Dry Creek Ranch property in a trustee’s sale in 2001, but alleged that at the time of the restraining order, Westlake was leasing the Dry Creek Ranch property from Willms to store equipment and other personal property. According to Westlake’s complaint, Willms and others (including Willms’s employee Tom Forrester) effectively ousted Westlake from the property in spite of the existing lease agreement and took possession of the property in March 2004 without bringing an unlawful detainer action or otherwise seeking a court determination of their right to possession of the property. Thereafter, Willms ordered his associates to deny Westlake access to the property and, since then, Willms has excluded Westlake from the property.
Westlake attached to his complaint a copy of the lease agreement he alleged existed between the parties at the time of Willms’s anti-harassment petition.
In August 2006, the court issued a “Ruling on Bifurcated Issues,” which purports to compare “issues” pled in Westlake’s forcible detainer action with the “issue” pled in the civil harassment injunction proceeding (case No. 151870). The ruling states “an issue pled” in the injunction proceeding was Willms’s right to exclusive possession of the subject, and identifies one issue in Westlake’s forcible detainer action as “the absence of the exclusive right of possession” by Willms.
The court then concluded that the issue of whether Willms is entitled to “exclusive possession” of Dry Creek Ranch was “determined in Case No. 151870” because, by virtue of granting Willms’s petition to enjoin Westlake from coming on the Dry Creek Ranch property, the judge in case No. 151870 “necessarily found that [Willms] had the exclusive right to possession of the subject property when it issued its order for an injunction on July 8, 2004 ‘. . . that [Westlake] must stay at least . . . 100 yards . . . from . . .’ the subject property.” Thus, the court concluded, Westlake is “collaterally estopped from litigating the causes of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer and the issue of possession in the remaining causes of action. The court determines that [the Westlakes] were trespassers on the subject property from April 19, 2004 to date.”
Although the heading of the order containing this ruling correctly identifies the case number of Westlake’s action as 153276, the order elsewhere misidentifies the case number as 152276.
Westlake purported to appeal from the Ruling on Bifurcated Issues, but this court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonappealable order. (Westlake v. Willms (Dec. 20, 2007, C057552) [app. dism. by order].)
Westlake’s Motion to Vacate the Injunction
After his appeal from the Ruling on Bifurcated Issues in his forcible detainer action was dismissed, Westlake moved to vacate the harassment injunction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 533, arguing that (1) Willms’s petition for injunctive relief failed to meet the requirements of section 527.6, (2) the injunction was “based on false and totally inaccurate testimony,” and (3) Westlake’s claims in the forcible detainer action have been prejudiced by the improperly issued injunction. Westlake further argued the injunction is subject to attack at any time under section 473, subdivision (d); the court lacked jurisdiction to resolve what was essentially a real property dispute under the guise of a section 527.6 injunction to enjoin harassment; Willms lacked standing to bring the petition because he did not allege he had himself been harassed or threatened by Westlake; and because Willms’s petition sought no protection for himself, the injunction is void to the extent it purports to protect Willms.
Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: “In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.” (Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.)
In a declaration filed in support of his motion to vacate, Westlake averred he was aware of the restraining order, but relied on advice he received from the Shasta County District Attorney’s office that filing a civil action was his “only viable remedy for Willms’s wrongful self-help eviction of [Westlake and his] wife and the theft of personal property.”
Willms opposed the motion on the grounds that no invalidity appears on the face of the injunction and that Westlake’s challenge comes too late.
The trial court denied Westlake’s motion to vacate the 2004 civil harassment injunction, and he appeals.
DISCUSSION
Westlake contends the judgment must be reversed because the 2004 injunction is void. Willms retorts that the appeal is moot and should be dismissed.
An appellate court decides only actual controversies and, thus, will not render opinions on moot questions that cannot affect the matter on appeal. (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 226-227.) Accordingly, if an event occurs while an appeal is pending and the event makes it impossible for the appellate court, if it were to decide the case in favor of the appellant, to grant him any effectual relief, the appeal will be dismissed. (Ibid.; see also Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [“‘[A]lthough a case may originally present an existing controversy, if before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause, occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that essential character, it becomes a moot case or question which will not be considered by the court’”]; MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214 [if reversal of the judgment will have no practical effect, the appeal is moot].)
Here, the injunction that Westlake asks us to vacate already expired by its own terms on June 28, 2007. When, as here, relief granted by the trial court is temporal and expires before an appeal can be heard, the appeal is moot. (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.)
There are three discretionary exceptions to this rule when (1) the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, (2) there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or (3) when a material question remains for the court’s determination. (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 144.)
Westlake argues that the second exception applies here because “the legal effect of [the 2004 injunction] continues to haunt” him in the forcible detainer action by virtue of the trial court’s apparent finding that issues related to Westlake’s right to the possession of Dry Creek Ranch were determined in the injunction action.
The argument fails because, as a matter of law, the question of who can possess Dry Creek Ranch could not have been determined in the injunction proceeding. This is so because special proceedings authorized by section 527.6 do not invest a court with authority to “resolv[e] real property disputes.” (Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 810-811 [because a section 527.6 antiharassment injunction cannot be effective for more than three years, it cannot resolve a real property dispute].) Rather, section 527.6 invoked by Willms in his petition for an injunction against civil harassment “provides a quick and truncated procedure” which is offset by “the limited scope of the antiharassment orders which can legitimately follow.” (Id. at p. 811.)
Accordingly, section 527.6 cannot be used as a substitute for the purely statutory remedies of unlawful detainer and eviction. (Marquez-Luque v. Marquez (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1518-1519.)
For example, in Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, the executors of an estate filed a petition for an injunction under section 527.6 to enjoin their brother from harassing family members, and also asked that he be removed from their father’s home. (Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1515.) After hearing undisputed evidence that the brother (1) resided in the home for four years, (2) claimed ownership of the home under an agreement with his father, (3) was the devisee of a one-sixth interest in the home under the father’s will, (4) threatened to burn the home if he were to lose his claim to it, and (5) filed a declaratory relief action to determine his ownership, the trial court granted a permanent injunction that included an eviction order. (Id. at p. 1516.) On appeal, Marquez did not challenge the injunction to the extent that it enjoined his harassment; he contested only the eviction order. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded the special proceeding of section 527.6 did not give the trial court authority to evict the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1517, 1519.) In reaching this conclusion, Court of Appeal initially focused on the fact the conduct that was the subject of the eviction order did not constitute harassment under the statute because: “While defendant’s threatening conduct may have, and did, justify a personal injunction prohibiting the conduct itself, removal from the home was not a remedy authorized by the section. The limited nature of the statutory remedy aside, there was no evidence that Raymond’s mere presence in the home caused plaintiffs substantial emotional distress, or that his possession of the home was intended to harass or annoy plaintiffs.” (Id. at p. 1517.) The Court of Appeal further noted the special harassment proceeding was “limited in its scope to enjoining action constituting harassment.” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. The trial court in the injunction action could properly restrict Westlake’s conduct, including his presence on the Dry Creek Ranch, based on testimony that he harassed Willms’s employees or invitees. However, the trial court could not determine Westlake’s right to legal possession of the property. The record of the injunction proceeding does not show the trial court improperly attempted to adjudicate the parties’ respective property rights and, specifically, Westlake’s right to possession of the property.
For example, the petition contains no allegation of the existence of a lease agreement between the parties, and the injunction contains no language purporting to adjudicate property rights under any lease.
Thus, we do not agree with Westlake that the injunction, despite its having expired, allows for the recurrence of the controversy between the parties sufficient for us to overlook the fact that the injunction has expired. Thus, the appeal is moot because no appellate relief can be granted to Westlake.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
We concur: SIMS , J., ROBIE , J.