Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-02-001 WCC
Submitted: June 25, 2002
Decided: September 30, 2002
On Darlene Willis' Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Denied.
Darlene K. Willis, Pro se Appellant.
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire, Attorney for Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Fran Durbin, Pro Se Appellee.
ORDER
This 30th day of September, 2002, after consideration of the appeal of Darlene K. Willis ("Appellant") from the January 9, 2002 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") rejecting her application for benefits, the Appellant's brief and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
1. The Appellant was employed by Remax Sunvest, under Fran Durbin ("employer"), as a real estate agent's assistant from June 8, 1999, until June 22, 2001. The Appellant subsequently filed for unemployment benefits. In its October 23, 2001 decision, the Claims Deputy from the Department of Labor disqualified the Appellant finding that she had "voluntarily resigned her position for personal reasons." The Claims Deputy determined that the Appellant voluntarily quit without good cause and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
Delaware Department of Labor's Claims Deputy's Decision of October 23, 2001 at 2.
Claims Deputy's Decision at 2. This rejection of benefits was based on the statutory mandate that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment compensation] benefits: (1) [f]or the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount." DEL. CODE ANN. tit 19, § 3315(1) (Supp. 2000).
2. The Appellant then appealed that decision to an Appeals Referee. The Referee conducted a hearing on November 19, 2001, where both Appellant and her employer, appearing unrepresented, testified. The Referee found that the Appellant worked for her employer at home preparing real estate solicitations and was given a computer and a fax machine to perform her work. The Appellant was last paid on June 12, 2001 and asserted that she was laid off because of a lack of work by her employer. It also appears that the Appellant had given the employer a letter from her doctor in April of 2001 indicating that she was not able to work any longer, due to physical problems but still continued to work after that date. The Appeals Referee found that the Appellant did not voluntarily resign her position but rather was laid off due to a lack of work. Notwithstanding this, in light of the testimony that Appellant was medically unable to work after April, the Appeals Referee held that the Appellant remained disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits "until such time as she can affirmatively establish by new medical evidence that she is again able and available for work within the meaning of Title 19 Del. C. § 3315(1) of the Delaware Code."
Although the disability certificate indicates that she was prevented from working from March 5, 2001, until March 16, 2001, and was able to return to work on March 19, 2001, the testimony was unclear as to her ability to actively continue to work at the time her employment ended.
Appeals Referee's Decision at 3.
Appeals Referee's Decision at 3.
3. Thereafter, the Appellant appealed the Referee's decision to the Board.
The Board adopted the findings of the Referee and found the claims to be without merit and denied the request to hold a further hearing. Consequently, the Appellant, pro se, appealed the Board's decision to this Court. No response was filed from either the Board or the Appellant's employer.
4. The function of this Court on review of an Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this Court's role is to determine whether the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board's findings.
General Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960); Attix v. Voshell, 579 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1989).
Boughton v. Div. of Unemployment Ins. of the Dep't of Labor, 300 A.2d 25, 26-27 (Del.Super.Ct. 1972); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (Del.Super.Ct. 1979).
Oceanport Ind., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super.Ct. 1986).
Trotman v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr., Inc., 2000 WL 33109616, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.) (quoting Messina v. Future Ford Sales, Inc., 1997 WL 358571 (Del.Super.Ct.).
5. The Court finds this appeal to be unusual and surprising since the Referee's decision adopted by the Board supports the argument made by the Appellant that her employment was terminated due to a lack of work by the employer. While such a finding would normally justify the awarding of unemployment compensation benefits, in this case the evidence also supported a finding that the Appellant suffered from depression which would prevent her from being employed. In spite of the Referee's best efforts to develop a reasonable record, the employer and employee were both unrepresented and clearly lacked an understanding of their obligations in presenting evidence sufficient to support their position or the legal consequences of their rambling comments during the hearing. Simply put, the Appellant barely established that she did not quit, but that is only part of the equation.
The statute provides that an individual shall be disqualified from benefits when the individual is medically unable to work, but this disqualification will terminate "when the individual becomes able to work and available for work as determined by a doctor's certificate and meets all other requirements under this title." The Appellant did not provide this documentation to the Referee or the Board, and as such the Court cannot find their decision to be legally inadequate. If the Appellant would exert as much energy into medically establishing that she is physically able to work, is available to work and is actively seeking employment, as she does in trying to prove that the Board was wrong, she would probably already be receiving benefits.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3315(8) (1995).
6. The Court finds the Board's decision in this matter to be factually and legally supported by the evidence presented. The Board's decision is therefore AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.