Opinion
C/A No. 0:15-4755-MGL-PJG
03-21-2017
Dustin Robert Williamson, Plaintiff, v. Brian Sterling, and/or Jane or John Doe, SCDC; Deloris Charlton, Administrator, Barnwell County Detention Center; Ed Carroll, Sheriff; individually and in their official capacities; David Miller, Deputy Solicitor; and Jack Hamock, Solicitor; in their individual capacities, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Dustin Robert Williamson, a self-represented prisoner, filed this civil rights matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on separate motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants. (ECF Nos. 79, 80, 81.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motions (ECF No. 110), and the defendants filed replies (ECF Nos. 117, 119, 126). Plaintiff also filed a motion for an injunction, (ECF No. 77), Defendants Carroll, Charlton, and Sterling filed responses, (ECF Nos. 88, 91), and Plaintiff filed a reply, (ECF No. 93). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motions should be granted and Plaintiff's motion for an injunction be denied.
Plaintiff also filed a sur-reply. (ECF No. 125.) The court observes that the Local Rules make no provision for sur-reply memoranda and Plaintiff did not seek leave of the court to file a sur-reply. Accordingly, the sur-reply was not considered in the court's recommendation. However, consideration of the sur-reply would not have changed the court's recommendation.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed, or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Williamson was arrested on August 12, 2013 and detained at the Barnwell County Detention Center pursuant to arrest warrants for several violent crimes.
The following events all took place on November 22, 2013. Williamson handed a sealed envelope to a detention center officer that was addressed to Defendant Sheriff Ed Carroll. Sheriff Carroll was not in his office at the time the letter was delivered to him, so he instructed his Chief Deputy to open the letter. The Chief Deputy discovered that the letter from Williamson included threats to kill a law enforcement officer and a state circuit court judge. The State Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") sent an agent to interview Williamson about the threats. In a recorded interview with the SLED agent, Williamson reiterated his threat to kill law enforcement officers and court personnel. As Williamson was being led back to his cell following the interview, he attempted to strike the SLED agent and succeeded in striking a detention center officer.
Later that same day, during a series of telephone conversations between the Second Circuit Solicitor's Office, SLED, and the Barnwell County Sheriff's Office, it was determined that Williamson should be placed in "safekeeper" status in the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") pending his criminal trial. South Carolina's "safekeeper" statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-3-80, allows local detention facilities to request that detainees be held in SCDC facilities, pursuant to the Governor's approval. Williamson was immediately transferred to the Aiken County Detention Center pending the State's approval of Williamson's safekeeper status. The Barnwell County Chief Deputy Sheriff drafted an affidavit requesting SCDC take custody of Williamson pursuant to the safekeeper statute based on Williamson's "extremely violent and uncontrollable behavior while confined in the Barnwell County Jail." (Defs. Carroll & Charlton's Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 79-3 at 3.) Defendant Solicitor David Miller drafted a proposed order that was signed by a circuit court judge that found Williamson should be moved to SCDC and held in "safekeeper" status. SCDC received the application for a safekeeping order that day, reviewed the information, and recommended to the Governor that Williamson qualified for transfer to SCDC as a safekeeper. On the same day, then-Governor Haley issued a Safekeeper Order and Williamson's attorney was notified.
On November 25, 2013, Williamson was transferred to SCDC's Maximum Security Unit at the Kirkland Correctional Institution. Safekeeping orders are valid for ninety days, and Williamson's order has been renewed regularly since he was first transferred to SCDC. On August 27, 2015, Williamson was transferred to the Restrictive Housing Unit in SCDC's Lee Correctional Institution, and he continues to be held in SCDC custody pursuant to renewals of the safekeeping order while he awaits trial. Williamson filed this action on November 23, 2015.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Individual Capacity Claims
1. Plaintiff's Claims Pursuant to the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In his Amended Complaint, Williamson alleges that during his detention in SCDC he has been unable to receive discovery materials, has had no meaningful access to a law library, has had limited contact with his attorney, and has had his legal mail opened and read. The court construes these allegations as claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants violated the Constitution by opening and inspecting Williamson's mail, and interfering with his access to counsel, discovery materials, and the law library. However, the court finds Williamson has failed to plausibly allege that the defendants named in the Amended Complaint are personally involved in the operation of the prison at which he is being held. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.' ") (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). The law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government official in his or her individual capacity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court finds Williamson's First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendment claims against the defendants should be dismissed.
2. Plaintiff's Claims Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
Williamson also asserts that the defendants violated, and continue to violate, his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by detaining him in SCDC facilities pursuant to a safekeeping order as punishment for his threats and violent actions, and without notice or a hearing to contest his transfer from the Barnwell County Detention Center. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, governs cases in which pretrial detainees allege constitutional violations. Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987). However, the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). While a detainee may not be punished prior to the adjudication of guilt, he may be subjected to "the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979). To establish impermissible punishment, "a detainee must show either 1) an 'expressed intent' to punish or 2) a lack of a reasonable relationship 'to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.' " Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Here, Williamson argues his confinement in SCDC's Maximum Security Unit at the Kirkland Correctional Institution, where he was formerly detained, and Restrictive Housing Unit in SCDC's Lee Correctional Institution, where he is currently detained, amounts to impermissible punishment that is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. But Williamson's conclusory argument is conclusively rebutted by evidence submitted by the defendants that Williamson's transfer to SCDC facilities was based on managerial and operational concerns of the detention center officials resulting from Williamson's violent behavior, and not on an intent to punish him. (Defs. Hammack & Miller's Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 79-3 at 3-4; Sterling Aff. ¶ 13, ECF No. 82 at 5.) Williamson has provided no evidence of an "express intent to punish" by the defendants, and the defendants' assertion that Williamson's transfer was necessary for security purposes provides an unrefuted nonpunitive government objective that precludes a reasonable inference of punitive intent. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 991.
However, while Williamson has provided no evidence to support his claim that he was subjected to impermissible punishment as a pretrial detainee, that does not end the court's inquiry. Williamson also argues he was deprived of his right to due process because he was not provided notice of his transfer pursuant to the safekeeping order or a hearing to contest the transfer and his continued detention in SCDC facilities.
Whether a pretrial detainee who is transferred into more restrictive housing for administrative purposes, as opposed to disciplinary or punitive purposes, is owed any level of process under the Fourteenth Amendment is not a settled question in this circuit. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Third Circuits have found that a minimal degree of process is owed to pretrial detainees in such situations. See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Prison officials must provide detainees who are transferred into more restrictive housing for administrative purposes only an explanation of the reason for their transfer as well as an opportunity to respond. . . . This informal nonadversary review is satisfied when an inmate receives some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.") (quotations and citations omitted); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir. 2001). The Stevenson and Benjamin Courts both found that the due process protections afforded to convicted prisoners placed in administrative segregation pending the completion of a misconduct investigation as outlined in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), should be applied to pretrial detainees because the protections due to sentenced inmates provide the minimum standard for what pretrial detainees are due. Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 69; Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 188-89.
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found that no process is required when a pretrial detainee is placed in segregation for managerial reasons, including to protect jail staff from his violent propensities. Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less. But no process is required if he is placed in segregation not as punishment but for managerial reasons.") (internal citations omitted). The court found that a hearing would not be practicable in such situations "because managerial decisions do not have the character of rulings applying legal standards to facts, the kind of rulings for which adjudicative hearings are designed." Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. In Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2016), the court stated that for safety or security reasons, a jail may take immediate preventative action to segregate a detainee after a fight or disruption, and prisons and jails may place inmates charged with disciplinary infractions in administrative segregation pending their disciplinary hearings, allowing both prison officials and inmates time to investigate and prepare for those hearings. Id. at 255. However, the Dilworth Court noted that the permissibility of segregation of detainees is predicated on the existence of a hearing to impose discipline, which would ultimately provide the detainee with the process he is owed. Id.
Based on the foregoing, no clear precedent exists that would guide the court in analyzing whether the defendants provided Williamson with constitutionally adequate process when he was transferred into SCDC custody. Therefore, assuming without deciding that Williamson was owed some degree of process when he was transferred to an SCDC facility and that the defendants would be the officials who were required to provide Williamson that process, the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on Williamson's § 1983 claim.
Qualified immunity shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects police officers and public officials from claims of constitutional violations 'for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions.' " Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 661 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id. at 235, 242.
In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). "If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case—that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted—then the law affords immunity from suit." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
[a] Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, "[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear" that every "reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (first alteration added). In analyzing this prong, a court in this district generally must look only to case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the South Carolina Supreme Court. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). The "salient question" " 'is whether the state of the law' at the time of an incident provided 'fair warning' to the defendants 'that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.' " Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
As explained above, even assuming the defendants would be the officials responsible for providing Williamson some degree of process before he was transferred to an SCDC facility, no clearly established precedent exists that would have put the defendants on notice that their actions violated Williamson's right to due process. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. The circuit split between the Second and Third Circuits and the Seventh Circuit, and the lack of guidance from the Fourth Circuit, is not sufficient to provide the defendants with fair warning that their conduct, or lack thereof, was unconstitutional. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866. Accordingly, the court finds the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity as to Williamson's claim that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, even if Williamson could show any of the defendants owed him such process and failed to provide it to him.
The defendants all argue that they would not be the officials responsible for providing Williamson with some degree of process for his transfer to an SCDC facility. Because the court finds they are entitled to qualified immunity, the court need not answer this question at this time.
C. Official Capacity Claims
Williamson also asks the court to order Defendant Sterling to transfer him back to the Barnwell County Detention Center while he awaits trial, based on the constitutional violations he alleged in his Amended Complaint. While Williamson couches this claim as one seeking injunctive relief, such an action by the court would actually require the issuance of a writ of mandamus. See generally U.S. ex. rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The common-law writ of mandamus is . . . characterized by its authorization to command performance of a specified official act or duty."). However, the court lacks jurisdiction to issue such relief against state officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (granting district courts jurisdiction over any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff); see also Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg Cty., 411 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1969) (stating that the authority of federal courts to issue extraordinary writs derives from the "all writs statute," 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which exists for the sole purpose of protecting the respective jurisdictions of those courts). Accordingly, the court finds that Williamson's motion should be denied.
D. Other Claims/Relief
To the extent Williamson is attempting to assert any other claims, his Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-68 (2009).
CONCLUSION
The court recommends the defendants' motions for summary judgment be granted, (ECF Nos. 79, 80, 81), and Williamson's motion for an injunction be denied. (ECF No.77.)
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE March 21, 2017
Columbia, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' " Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).