Williamson v. Goord

Full title: STEVE WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff, -vs- GLENN S. GOORD, Commissioner, New York…

Court: United States District Court, W.D. New York

Date published: Apr 10, 2003

01-CV-6250 CJS (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003)

Opinion

01-CV-6250 CJS

April 10, 2003

Steve Williamson, pro se, Wallkill, New York, For plaintiff

Kelly McCarthy, Esq., Rochester, New York, for defendants

DECISION AND ORDER

CHARLES SIRAGUSA, District Judge

INTRODUCTION

This is an action in which the pro se plaintiff, a prison inmate, is suing the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections, in his official capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that the Department of Corrections is unconstitutionally withholding $7.02 in "lag pay" from his prison wages. Now before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment [#6]. For the reasons that follow, that application is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was convicted of murder and is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.¹ New York Corrections Law provides that all physically capable inmates may be required to work up to eight hours per day, excluding Sundays and public holidays, while incarcerated. N.Y. Corrections Law § 171 (McKinney 1987). The Corrections Law further provides that such inmates may receive compensation for work performed, and the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") pays inmates at various rates, depending upon the particular assignment. Corrections Law § 187(1); Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1996)("The rate of compensation ranges from sixty cents per day to two dollars per day, depending on the particular assignment."). This compensation is not paid directly to inmates. Rather, it is instead placed in a prison account. Pursuant to regulations adopted by the Commissioner of DOCS, prisoners' funds are then either disbursed for various approved purposes, or are retained until the inmate is discharged from prison. Correction Law § 189.

At issue in the instant lawsuit is DOCS Directive 2788, pursuant to which, "DOCS withholds 20% of an inmate's paycheck for fifteen (15) pay periods so that a total of three (3) weeks' pay is withheld. The `lagged' wages are to be paid to the inmate upon release from DOCS custody." McCarthy Aff. [#9], ¶ 2, Ex. A; see also, Directive 2788, § IV(B)(2)(a)("the lag amount is not added to the [inmate's] account balance until the inmate is released."). Plaintiff contends that a total of $7.20 is being withheld from him pursuant to Directive 2788.<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff maintains that, because he is sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, he will never be released from prison, and therefore, as to him, "the lag pay policy [is] unconstitutional because it is a `taking of property without due process of the law in violation of the due process clause," and is "an abuse of authority." PI. Mem. of Law [#13], p. 1; see also, Complaint [#1], p. 5 (Describing claims as follows: "Taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause and abuse of discretion."). He seeks "injunctive relief and money payment." Id.

2 In addition to the other reasons for granting defendant's motion discussed below, the Court believes that plaintiff's claim is de minimis in nature. See, Webster v. Chevalier, 834 F. Supp. 628, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (Finding an alleged due process violation, involving the withholding of $40 from a prison inmate's account, "to be of a de minimis nature.") (citation omitted).

Defendant has moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1996), in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DOCS lag pay policy did not violate the due process clause. Id. at 262 ("It is clear that New York has not created an entitlement in access to wages prior to release and therefore, there is no due process violation."). Plaintiff, however, contends that, unlike most prisoners, it is impossible, or at least very unlikely, that he will ever be released from prison:

[T]hat plaintiff is serving a sentence of LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE, clearly speaks for itself, which means that there is no possibility for release. As noted in defendant's Memorandum, at some point in the future, plaintiff could be released from prison for the variety of reasons, including medical furlough or reversal or modification of his sentence on appeal, at which time the withheld wages would be returned to him. [sic] The defendant facts in his memorandum is based on possibilities rather than reality.

Pl. Aff. [#10], p. 2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff contends that, because he will likely never receive the $7.20 that is being withheld, the Allen v. Cuomo decision is inapplicable to the instant case. PI. Aff. [#10], p. 2 (" Allen v. Cuomo is a totally different issue than the issue plaintiff raised, also the policy is different."). According to him, DOCS "should have a special provision for plaintiff and other inmates who [are] serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole." PI. Aff. [#10], ¶ 3.

The Court has thoroughly considered the parties' submissions and the entire record in this action.³

3 When plaintiff commenced the subject action, he indicated that he had filed a similar action in New York State court. See, Complaint [#1], pp. 2-3. Subsequently, that action was dismissed on the merits. See, Williamson v. Goord, 285 A.D.2d 979, 730 N.Y.S.2d (4th Dept. 2001), leave to appeal denied, 97 N.Y.2d 601, 735 N.Y.S.2d 490 (2001). In their submissions to this Court, neither party has addressed that decision.

ANALYSIS

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See, Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). "[T]he movant must make a prima facie showing that the standard for obtaining summary judgment has been satisfied." 11 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 56.11[1][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). "In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant may satisfy this burden by pointing to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Gummo v. Village of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1996) ( citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1190(1996).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). To do this, the non-moving party must present evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Summary judgment is appropriate only where, "after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993). The parties may only carry their respective burdens by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The underlying facts contained in affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

To pursue an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993). A court should read a pro se litigant's papers liberally, interpreting them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). However, when alleging a violation of a civil rights statute, even a pro se litigant must make "specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987).

As discussed earlier, in Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DOCS lag pay policy does not violate the due process clause. In opposition to the summary judgment motion, plaintiff contends that Allen v. Cuomo is inapplicable, because he "will `never1 be released from prison." Complaint [#1], p. 5. Plaintiff contends, therefore, that the Commissioner is not merely holding plaintiff's lag pay in trust, but is instead taking his pay without due process. Defendant's counsel asserts that "plaintiff could be released from prison for a variety of reasons, including medical furlough or reversal or modification of his sentence on appeal, at which time the withheld wages would be returned to him." Def. Statement of Facts [#8], ¶ 5. Defendant, though, has provided no evidentiary proof in admissible form, such as an affidavit from a DOCS official, to support that assertion.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that pursuant to Allen v. Cuomo, plaintiff's due process claim must be dismissed. In Allen, the Second Circuit found that New York prisoners have an entitlement to their earnings, pursuant to "Section 187 of N.Y. Correct. Law, which provides for the payment of wages based on work performed, and DOC's longstanding policy of paying inmates for their labor." Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d at 261. However, the court held that inmates have no right to prompt payment of wages:

N.Y. Correct. Law § 187 gives DOCS broad discretion in establishing a system for compensation. Subsection 187(3) explicitly allows the option of holding inmate earnings in trust until release. Subsection 189(1) provides that an inmate may withdraw from his prison account only upon approval by the commissioner. DOCS' past practice of paying wages biweekly does not create an entitlement to that timing. A constitutional entitlement cannot be created merely because a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege has been granted generously in the past. Without statutory or contractual authority, there is no property interest in prompt payment. It is clear that New York has not created an entitlement in access to wages prior to release and therefore, there is no due process violation.

Id. at 261-62 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Commissioner's broad discretion in this regard extends even to situations where it is unlikely that an inmate will ever be released. See, Cowart v. Coombe, 247 A.D.2d 729, 669 N.Y.S.2d 87 (3rd Dept. 1998), leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 803 (1998). In Cowart, an inmate serving an aggregate sentence of 80 ½ years to life raised essentially the same argument that plaintiff is raising here, i.e., "that because it is unlikely that he will ever be released on parole, the withholding of his earned compensation is irrational." Id. at 729. The Appellate Division, Third Department, rejected that argument:

The Commissioner of Correctional Services is vested with broad administrative and discretionary authority over inmates' access to wages during imprisonment and is free to hold such earnings in trust until an inmate's release. This court will not interfere with the exercise of such authority absent a showing of a statutory violation or an abuse of discretion. Finding that neither has been demonstrated here . . . petitioner's argument with respect to the lag pay policy must fail.

Id. at 730 ( citing Alien v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d at 257; other citations omitted). In Rochon v. Louisiana State Penitentiary Inmate Account, 880 F.2d 845, (5th Cir. 1989), certdenied, 493 U.S. 1029 (1990), the Fifth Circuit rejected a similar due process claim by an inmate serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The Court in Rochon noted that, under Louisiana law, "no prisoner has a state-created right to withdraw funds from his savings account prior to his discharge or parole for any use other than those enumerated in [the statute]." Id. at 846. The court then stated:

Those restrictions apply with equal force to all inmates. The statutory scheme does not classify prisoners based on the length of their sentences. Nor does it provide any different treatment for prisoners serving life sentences. The fact that [plaintiff] is in a state of confinement that denies him a contingent benefit that might be available to other prisoners who are subject to release does not deprive him of equal protection of the laws. Since the distinction is not invidious, and is reasonably related to a legitimate state objective, [plaintiff] has suffered no taking of his property.

Id. at 846. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional violation.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's motion for summary judgment [#6] is granted, and this action is dismissed. The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

So Ordered.