Opinion
8:22-cv-04265-CMC-JDA
12-28-2023
Jahmell Williams, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Ms. Wright, Ms. Hendrix, Warden Ms. James, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 52.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on November 18, 2022, asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1.] On May 5, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 52.] The same day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 53.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on the docket on June 12, 2023. [Doc. 61.] The motion is ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on November 18, 2022. [Doc. 1-1 at 2 (envelope, marked as received by the prison mail room on November 18, 2022).]
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. [Doc. 1 at 4, 7.] He contends that, on April 11, 2022, at Kershaw Correctional Institution, he requested access to the law library via the kiosk. [Id. at 7.] His request was denied, and on April 22, he filed a grievance due to the “legal hind[]rance that extended past the 30 day court deadline that began 3/28/22.” [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hendrix told him, two days before the deadline, that he had “exceeded the time frame to file a grievance on the legal hind[]rance.” [Id. at 7-8.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends the “prison legal assistance program has hindered [his] efforts to pursue a 30 day court deadline to a second PCR in their avoiding [his] grievance to the 3rd request for legal assistance by denying instead the 1st request for legal assistance due to [his] allegedly exceeding the time frame for it.” [Id. at 8.] He also challenges a prison law library policy and asserts that there were no “tablets issued to inmates in their transfer from Lieber to Kershaw.” [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of $1 million for the violation of his constitutional rights and being “barred by the Court from arguing [his] defense to the Court deadline case in this matter.” [Id.]
A PCR action is one for post-conviction relief.
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff was given access to the law library and, even if he was hindered, the legal claim he was pursuing was frivolous; that Defendants James and Hendrix are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing their direct involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct; and that Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for any claims made against them in their official capacities. [Doc. 52.] The Court addresses these arguments.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has brought his claims against Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. [Doc. 1 at 4-5.] Defendants argue that, in their official capacities, they are not “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983 and they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. [Doc. 52 at 9-10.] The Court agrees.
“Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Thus, an official acting in his official capacity is not a “person” under § 1983. Id.
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity.” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. As a result, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
Access to Courts
Prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful and effective access to courts to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 355 (1996). However, they have no “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Id. at 351. To prevail on an access to courts claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an “actual injury” hindering his ability to bring legal challenges. O'Dell v. Netherland, 112 F.3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Showing that “an institution's library is inadequate or that access to that library is restricted” will not suffice. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1385 (4th Cir. 1993). Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “a nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or . . . impeded.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 (footnote omitted).
Here, Plaintiff is unable to show a nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated or impeded. On March 20, 2007, Plaintiff pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in the Florence County Court of General Sessions. State v. Williams, No. H845401, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “H845401”) (last visited Dec. 22, 2023). Plaintiff filed a first PCR action on October 17, 2007, which was dismissed on January 28, 2009. Williams v. State, No. 2007-CP-21-01843, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PI Search.aspx (search by case number “2007CP2101843”) (last visited Dec. 22, 2023). Plaintiff filed a second PCR action-the one at issue in this case-on September 30, 2021, which was dismissed on July 5, 2022. Williams v. State, No. 2021-CP-21-02126, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “2021CP2102126”) (last visited Dec. 22, 2023). In his second PCR action, he asserted that he had discovered new evidence that there was no chain of custody report or ballistic report at the time of his guilty plea and that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a timely notice of appeal. [Doc. 52-2 at 8-10, 13.] On January 20, 2022, the judge in the second PCR action signed a conditional order of dismissal, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to a hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence and that his allegation that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to timely file a notice of appeal was successive. [Doc. 52-4.] The conditional order of dismissal provided that Plaintiff had 20 days from the date it was served to show why it should not become final. [Id.] On March 28, 2022, the judge in the second PCR action signed a final order of dismissal, concluding that the second PCR action was successive to Plaintiff's prior PCR action and barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of newly discovered evidence. Williams v. State, No. 2021-CP-21-02126, Final Order of Dismissal (filed July 5, 2022; signed Mar. 28, 2022) (last visited Dec. 22, 2023).
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's state-court records. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the contents of court records.'”).
Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint in this case, Plaintiff seems to be asserting that his inability to access the law library beginning on April 11, 2022, impeded his ability to file an appeal in his second PCR action. See id. (final order of dismissal, signed on March 28, 2022, and advising Plaintiff that “he must file and serve a notice of appeal within thirty days of the service of [the final order of dismissal] to secure appellate review”); [Doc. 1 at 7 (stating that “the legal [hindrance] extended past the 30 day court deadline that began 3/28/22”)]. However, the record establishes that Plaintiff was allowed access to the law library on April 6, 2022, during his 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal. [Doc. 52-9 (Kershaw Correctional Institution Law Library Sign In Sheet, dated April 6, 2022); see also Doc. 52-8 (Plaintiff's grievance, acknowledging he attended the law library on April 6, 2022).] Because Plaintiff has no “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance,” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, his denial of access to the law library on a particular day is not enough to establish a denial of access to courts claim. Instead, as stated, he must show that his access to the courts was impeded because of his inability to attend the law library. Yet, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his April 6th visit to the law library was insufficient to enable him to file and serve a notice of appeal within the 30-day deadline. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show that his second PCR action had any merit, as it was successive and Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of newly discovered evidence. See Collins v. Padula, No. 2:12-3112-DCN-BHH, 2014 WL 1319103, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2014) (concluding that a plaintiff failed to establish an actual injury to a nonfrivolous case where the PCR action was a successive petition barred by the statute of limitations), Report and Recommendation adopted in relevant part by 2014 WL 1318978 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2014), aff'd, 582 Fed.Appx. 258 (4th Cir. 2014); Wise v. Moore, No. 6:12-2091-RMG-KFM, 2013 WL 1703778, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2013) (“The plaintiff has failed to show that this appeal in his third PCR had any merit as his petition was successive and barred by the statute of limitations.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1718192 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2013). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Defendants appear to believe that Plaintiff contends his inability to access the law library during this time impeded his ability to respond to the conditional order of dismissal. [Doc. 52 at 6.] As noted, it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, but looking at the statecourt record along with the Complaint, the Court believes it is the ability to appeal his second PCR action that Plaintiff contends was impeded. Nonetheless, Plaintiff's denial of access to courts claim fails for the same reasons either way.
The Court notes that nothing in the record establishes when the final order of dismissal was served on Plaintiff, and the final order of dismissal states that it is the service date that triggers the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal.
The Court notes that the PCR court cited Hayden v. State, 299 S.E.2d 854, 855 (S.C. 1983), as the test for obtaining a new trial based on after-discovered evidence after a conviction. [Doc. 52-4 at 4]; Williams v. State, No. 2021-CP-21-02126, Final Order of Dismissal (filed July 5, 2022; signed Mar. 28, 2022) (last visited Dec. 22, 2023). However, in Jamison v. State, 765 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 2014), the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that “the traditional, five-factor newly discovered evidence test [applied in Hayden] is not the proper test for analyzing whether a PCR applicant is entitled to relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea.” Id. at 129. Instead,
when a PCR applicant seeks relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea, relief is appropriate only where the applicant presents evidence showing that (1) the newly discovered evidence was discovered after the entry of the plea and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered prior to the entry of the plea; and (2) the newly discovered evidence is of such a weight and quality that, under the facts and circumstances of that particular case, the “interest of justice” requires the applicant's guilty plea to be vacated. In other words, a PCR applicant may successfully disavow his or her guilty plea only where the interests of justice outweigh the waiver and solemn admission of guilt encompassed in a plea of guilty and the compelling interests in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions. In so holding, we caution that it will be the rare case indeed where the interests of justice will require that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea be vacated through post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, for an unconditional guilty plea involving an admission of guilt and a waiver of trial and all defenses will generally preclude any subsequent challenge to factual guilt.Id. at 130. Here, Plaintiff cannot meet this standard to show that the interests of justice require that his guilty plea be vacated. As noted, in his second PCR action, Plaintiff asserted that he had discovered new evidence that there was no chain of custody report or ballistic report at the time of his guilty plea. [Doc. 52-2 at 10.] However, “[a] defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case.” Jamison, 765 S.E.2d at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants also argue that James and Hendrix are subject to dismissal because Plaintiff does not allege facts showing their direct involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. [Doc. 52 at 7-9.] The Court declines to recommend that summary judgment be granted for that reason. In his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that Hendrix's failure to inform him that he had five days to respond to a grievance further delayed his access to the law library past his deadline and that James delayed distributing tablets when Plaintiff arrived at Kershaw. [Docs. 61 at 4-5; 61-2.]
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 52] be GRANTED.
In his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to add a Fifth Amendment due process claim, and he asks for discovery regarding the timing of tablet distribution. [Doc. 61 at 1, 5.] As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not filed a motion to amend the Complaint. Additionally, at the time Plaintiff requested to amend his Complaint, he was entitled to amend “only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Although the text of Rule 15(a)(2) requires that the Court “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), “a district court may deny leave to amend if the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile,” United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 461 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he futility analysis under Rule 15(a) necessarily requires a preliminary assessment of the allegations of the proposed amendment in light of the substantive law on which the additional claims are based.” Kramer v. Omnicare ESC, LLC, 307 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D.S.C. 2015). Here, Plaintiff has not attached a proposed amended complaint. Additionally, allowing Plaintiff to amend his Complaint at this procedural posture would be prejudicial to Defendants, whose motion for summary judgment was already pending when Plaintiff first sought to amend his Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his Complaint. Nor should he be allowed discovery related to the timing of tablet distribution at this procedural posture given the Court's analysis of his denial of access to courts claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.