Opinion
No. CV07 4001786 S
October 25, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The petitioner, Christopher Williams, alleges in his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed on November 24, 2009, a myriad of claims in ten separate counts. Nevertheless, central to all counts is the petitioner's allegation that he was convicted by a jury of eleven jurors and one "non-juror." The respondent's return denies the petitioner's material allegations, in particular, that the petitioner is not duly convicted by a jury of twelve, as well as that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. The return also raises affirmative defenses such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, abuse of the writ and procedural default, to the claims in counts 1-7 and 9, and that the claim in count 8 should be dismissed because it has been previously raised in a prior habeas corpus petition. The petitioner filed a reply responsive to these affirmative defenses.
On June 4, 2010, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition. The grounds for dismissal are that: "(1) the petitioner's claims that the trial court violated Connecticut General Statutes § 54-82h(c) are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective has already been litigated and denied in his previous habeas proceeding; and (3) the petitioner's constitutional claims fail to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted." Motion to Dismiss, p. 1. The parties appeared before this court on June 8, 2010, for a trial on the merits.
The only evidence proffered at trial by the petitioner was a copy of the December 23, 1991 transcript, after which the petitioner rested. Counsel for the respondent thereafter made an oral motion for a directed verdict. Counsel for both parties at greater length presented oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, as well as responded to additional bases for dismissal raised by the court. The court permitted the parties to file additional submissions with the court. The petitioner filed a written objection to the motion to dismiss on July 12, 2010; the respondent filed a memorandum of law on July 21, 2010.
A motion for a directed verdict presented to a habeas court is treated as a motion for dismissal for failure to make out a prima facie case under Practice Book § 15-8. See Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, CT Page 20556 121 Conn.App. 295, 299 n. 2, 995 A.2d 641, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 920, 996 A.2d 1192 (2010). The court notes that the memorandum filed by the respondent on July 21, 2010, is captioned "Respondent's Memorandum of law in support of its motion to dismiss pursuant to P.B. § 15-8."
For the reasons stated more fully below, judgment of dismissal shall enter.
DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 23-29 in relevant part states that: "The judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respondent, dismiss the petition, or any count thereof if it determines that: . . . (2) the petition or a count thereof, fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted; . . . (5) any other legally sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition exists."
The respondent additionally relies on Practice Book § 15-8 as a basis for dismissal. Section 15-8 states that: "If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made."
The following facts, as summarized in the petitioner's direct appeal, and procedural history are relevant and necessary to the court's further discussion. "The [petitioner] . . . was convicted after a jury trial of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, . . . attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59(a)(1), . . . and criminal possession of a pistol in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217(a) . . . The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total term of fifty years imprisonment. The [petitioner] appeal[ed] from the judgment of conviction to [the Supreme Court] pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3) . . . The principal issue raised by the [petitioner on direct appeal was] whether, after the jury had begun to deliberate, the trial court improperly permitted an alternate juror to replace an excused juror in violation of General Statutes § 54-82h(c)." State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 237-38, 645 A.2d 999 (1994).
At the time of the petitioner's trial, "General Statutes § 54-82h(c) provide[d]: `Alternate jurors shall attend at all times upon trial of the cause. They shall be seated when the case is on trial with or near the jurors constituting the regular panel, with equal opportunity to see and hear all matters adduced in the trial of the case. If, at any time, any juror shall, for any reason, become unable to further perform his duty, the court may excuse him and, if any juror is so excused or dies, the court may order that an alternate juror who is designated by lot to be drawn by the clerk shall become a part of the regular panel and the trial shall then proceed as though such juror had been a member of the regular panel from the time when it was begun. A juror who has been selected to serve as an alternate shall not be segregated from the regular panel except when the case is given to the regular panel for deliberation at which time he shall be dismissed from further service on said case.' (Emphasis added.)" State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 238 n. 5, 645 A.2d 999 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 487, 757 A.2d 578 (2000) (en banc).
"At the end of the evidence and final arguments, the trial court charged the jury, concluding its instructions at approximately 4:15 p.m. on Friday, December 20, 1991. The jury retired to deliberate sometime between 4:15 p.m. and 4:32 p.m. Shortly thereafter, the court dismissed the alternate juror, Richard Marks, with instructions not to discuss the case with anyone.
"After Marks had departed, at the [petitioner's] request, the trial court brought the jury back into the courtroom to clarify an instruction. The jury deliberated until 5 p.m., at which time the jurors were excused for the weekend.
"That evening at approximately 8:05 p.m., one of the members of the jury, Tyrone Dent, was approached by Anthony Dawson. Dawson told Dent that he was the [petitioner's] cousin, whereupon Dent said: `Well, I'm a juror and I can't talk about the case,' and then terminated the discussion. Dent initially believed that Dawson had attempted to bribe him. Dent told certain members of his family of the incident, and one of Dent's siblings reported the incident to the state's attorney. The state subsequently informed the trial court of the incident.
"On Monday morning, December 23, 1991, the trial court ordered Dent separated from the remaining jury members. The trial court then instructed the remaining eleven jurors not to deliberate until further notice. After questioning Dent as to his ability to remain fair and impartial, the trial court, with the agreement of the parties, determined that Dent was no longer qualified to act as a juror and excused him.
"The [petitioner] did not agree to continued deliberations by a jury of eleven as provided for in Practice Book § 841. . . . After extensive discussion, the trial court heard argument as to whether it could substitute a discharged alternate juror after deliberations had begun. The [petitioner] objected to the substitution of an alternate juror for Dent.
Now Practice Book § 42-3.
"The trial court, however, summoned Marks, the alternate juror who had been dismissed the previous Friday, and interviewed him in an attempt to determine whether he was still qualified to sit as a juror. The trial court questioned Marks at length as to whether he had heard anything about the case over the weekend, and whether he had spoken to anyone about the case.Marks stated that he had not spoken to anyone concerning the case and had not heard anything about the case, except an offhanded comment from a neighbor who had told him that the attorney for the [petitioner] was `one of the best defense attorneys in New Haven.' After this questioning, the court sent Marks into the voir dire room and brought the remaining eleven jurors into the courtroom. The court then questioned those jurors as to whether they would be able to begin deliberations anew. Having satisfied itself that the jury would be able to recommence deliberations, the trial court proceeded to provide additional cautionary instructions to the jury.
"The trial court then questioned the jurors as to whether they could comply with its instructions. Specifically, the court asked `if there is anyone on the jury who feels that they could not erase, so to speak, from your minds whatever was said during the course of the deliberations and start anew with your deliberations, if there's anyone who feels they could not do that would you please raise your right hand.' The jurors indicated that they could and would comply with the trial court's additional instructions.
"In light of these inquiries, the trial court concluded that a mistrial . . . was not required because a reconstituted jury with the addition of the alternate juror could fairly adjudicate this case. The trial court noted for the record that the jury had, at that point deliberated for less than one-half hour. It further noted that all members of the jury had indicated they could recommence deliberations from the beginning and disregard what had taken place during their deliberations the previous Friday.
"The court then had Marks sworn as a member of the jury. The trial court then repeated the brief reinstruction that had been given to the jury after Marks had been excused. It also instructed the jury for a third time that they must begin deliberations anew, including choosing a foreperson, and also told the jurors that their prior request to hear testimony that had been made before Marks had joined the panel would be ignored.
"The reconstituted jury then retired to deliberate. Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts." (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 239-42.
The petitioner challenged the trial court's substitution of a discharged juror after the beginning of deliberations. The petitioner later claimed on appeal that the trial court's actions violated General Statutes § 54-82h(c), which he argued implemented the constitutional guarantee to a trial by jury under Conn. Const., art. I, § 19. The state conceded that the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of § 54-82h(c), but argued that any resultant error was harmless. Id., 242. The Supreme Court first conducted an analysis to determine whether the claimed error was of a constitutional magnitude to determine who bore the burden of proving that any error was harmless.
"In light of this concession, [the Supreme Court] assume[d], but [did] not decide, under the circumstances of this case, that the substitution of an alternate juror after jury deliberations had begun violated General Statutes § 54-82h(c)." State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 242 n. 10.
"`Where the claimed error is one of constitutional magnitude the state must prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 413, 631 A.2d 238 (1993). If the claimed impropriety is not constitutional in nature, however, the [petitioner] bears the burden of proving the harmfulness of the error before a new trial will be granted. Id. The threshold question, therefore, is whether the court's departure from the literal language of § 54-82h(c) violates the [petitioner's] constitutional rights. The [petitioner] argue[d] that § 54-82h(c) implements the Connecticut constitution's guarantee that `[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.' Conn. Const., art. I, § 19. When charged with a serious crime, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial. Conn. Const., art. I, § 8." (Footnote renumbered.) State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 242-43.
"The [petitioner] argue[d] that harmless error analysis is inapplicable because General Statutes § 54-82h(c) implements the state constitution. In support of this claim, the [petitioner] relie[d] on State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 585, 500 A.2d 539 (1985) (harmless error may be inconsistent with statute's unconditional language). [The Supreme Court] disagree[d].
"It is well settled that, ordinarily, even if a claim of constitutional error is presented, harmless error analysis is applicable. `An erroneous instruction, even of constitutional dimension, is harmless if, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, there is no possibility that the jury was misled.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Yurch, 229 Conn. 516, 522, 641 A.2d 1387 (1994). Thus, even if a violation of § 54-82h(c) implicated the Connecticut or United States constitution, the [petitioner's] requested rule of per se reversal for violation of this statute is without merit." State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 243 n. 11.
The Supreme Court concluded ". . . that a violation of § 54-82h(c) does not implicate the [petitioner's] constitutional rights, [and] places the burden of proving the harmfulness of the substitution of the alternate juror on the defendant. State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn. 43, 49, 501 A.2d 752 (1985); State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 465, 438 A.2d 712 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 2024, 68 L.Ed.2d 329 (1981). The [petitioner] ha[d] not demonstrated any harm flowing from the substitution of the alternate juror.
"The trial court's actions in connection with the substitution of the alternate juror were sufficient to prevent prejudice and to protect the integrity and fairness of the trial . . .
"The record indicate[d] that an experienced trial court judge had taken painstaking efforts to minimize any potential prejudice to the [petitioner] resulting from the substitution of the alternate juror. It determined that no prejudice had been sustained and that the [petitioner] had received a fair trial. The [petitioner] provide[d] the Supreme Court] with no persuasive reason to disturb the trial court's conclusion, and [the court] decline[d] to do so . . ." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 244-45.
Several years later, the Supreme Court was confronted with another case in which a discharged alternate juror was recalled and substituted for a juror after deliberations had commenced. State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 757 A.2d 578 (2000) (en banc; two justices dissenting). The majority in Murray ". . . conclude[d] that, pursuant to § 54-82h(c), alternate jurors must be dismissed when the case is submitted for deliberation to the jury, and therefore, they cannot be substituted for regular jurors thereafter." Id., at pg. 484. The Supreme Court ". . . also concluded that harmless error analysis is inappropriate for such an impropriety . . ."; id.; and ". . . expressly overruled that portion of Williams that endorsed a harmless error analysis." Id., at pg. 487.
While the trial judge in Williams had dismissed the alternate juror who later was summoned back, State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 239-40, it appears from the Supreme Court's decision that the trial court in Murray sent the alternate jurors home without dismissing them. State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 484 n. 6, 757 A.2d 578 (2000) ("When the alternate jurors and the regular jurors were first sworn, the trial court stated that, although it was its practice to send the alternates home when the deliberations started, it does not dismiss the alternates at that time").
Particularly noteworthy is the timing of the Murray court's decision to overrule that aspect of Williams pertaining to the substitution of a juror with an alternate juror after deliberations have commenced. In 2000, shortly before Murray was decided, the legislature enacted Public Act § 00-116, which amended subsection (c) of § 54-82h. The amendment, which took effect on October 1, 2000, added language permitting the substitution of an alternate juror for a juror after deliberations had begun. Stated somewhat differently, the amendment to § 54-82h(c) embodies the legislature's expression that the trial court in Williams properly resolved the juror substitution issue. The Murray court looked to this change as supporting its conclusion that § 54-82h(c), prior to its amendment by P.A. § 00-116, ". . . requires the dismissal of alternates upon submission of the case to the jury, and prohibits the mid-deliberation substitution of alternates." State v. Murray, supra, 254 Conn. 493.
The Supreme Court's decision in State v. Murray, supra, was released on September 5, 2000.
" Public Act 00-116 reflects the legislature's understanding that, as originally enacted, § 52-84h(c) does not allow for the mid-deliberation substitution of jurors. The deliberate substitution of the word `may' for the word `shall' in relation to the dismissal of alternates once deliberations have begun, coupled with the express authorization of substituting alternates after the case is submitted to the regular panel for deliberations, confirms that until P.A. 00-116 takes effect, § 54-82h(c) requires that, upon submission of the case to the jury, the trial court must dismiss the alternate jurors, stripping it of the authority to recall them should a regular juror be excused thereafter." Id., 494.
After the amendment through P.A. 00-116, S. 6, General Statutes § 54-82h(c) states in relevant part that: ". . . If the alternate juror becomes a member of the regular panel after deliberations began the jury shall be instructed by the court that deliberations by the jury shall begin anew. A juror who has been selected to serve as an alternate shall not be segregated from the regular panel except when the case is given to the regular panel for deliberations at which time such alternate juror may be dismissed from further service on said case or may remain in service under the direction of the court."
The Supreme Court went on note that it had ". . . held in Williams . . . that a violation of § 54-82h(c) was subject to harmless error analysis, and that, because the improper substitution of an alternate juror did not implicate the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury, the defendant bore the burden of demonstrating the harmfulness of that substitution . . . In Williams, [the court] did not examine the contours of § 54-82h(c), but, rather, assumed, without deciding, that the mid-deliberation substitution of an alternate violated the statute.
"In [ Murray, the court] resolved the question left open by Williams, concluding that General Statutes § 54-82h (c) did not permit the mid-deliberation substitution of an alternate. The rationale undergirding that conclusion inform[ed its] assessment of whether to continue to review violations of § 52-84h(c) for harmless error. Specifically, having determined that an alternate, discharged from service when the case was submitted for deliberation to the jury, lost her status as a juror, it necessarily follows that the former alternate was no longer qualified to participate in the remainder of the proceedings. In light of the narrow question before [the court] in Williams, [the court] did not have occasion to address the legal status of a former alternate, and therefore, the conclusion that [the court] drew therein did not take account of that factor. [The Supreme Court was] constrained to conclude that the inclusion of a nonjuror among the ultimate arbiters of innocence or guilt necessarily amounts to a `[defect] in the structure of the trial mechanism' that defies harmless error review . . .
"The harmless error doctrine is essential to preserve the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial . . . In contrast, the [United States] Supreme Court has noted that there is a very limited class of cases involving error that is structural, that is to say, error that transcends the criminal process . . . Structural [error] cases defy analysis by harmless error standards because the entire conduct of the trial, from beginning to end, is obviously affected . . . These cases contain a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself . . . Such errors infect the entire trial process . . . and necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair . . . Put another way, these errors deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." (Internal citations and quotation marks.) State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 733-34, 859 A.2d 898 (2004) (structural error warranting automatic reversal when trial court deprived defendant's constitutional right to be present at a critical stage in the prosecution). See also, State v. Brown, 279 Conn. 493, 504-11, 903 A.2d 169 (2006) (harmless error test applied to deprivation of counsel at a probable cause hearing claim); State v. Latour, 276 Conn. 399, 410-12, 886 A.2d 404 (2005) (harmless error test applied to claim of improperly seated juror, when such juror was an alternate who never participated in the deliberative process); State v. Morales, 121 Conn.App. 767, 770-73, 996 A.2d 1206 (2010) (harmless error test applied to claim court ordered defendant to file a pro se motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the appointment of substitute counsel).
"[The Supreme Court] realize[d] the burdens that are imposed on the trial courts when a juror suddenly becomes . . . disqualified from service during the deliberative process, especially where the trial has been lengthy and complex in nature. But however cumbersome the process may be, [the court did] not believe it is appropriate to substitute [its] judgment as to guilt or innocence for that of the jury, which [the court] must necessarily do in applying the harmless error analysis. It is impossible to say that the remaining [jurors] would be capable of disregarding their prior deliberations, even with an instruction to do so, and become receptive to the alternate's attempt to assert a view that might be non-conforming . . . The inability to assess the effect of this impropriety on the defendant's trial persuade[d the Supreme Court] that reversal must be automatic. To the extent that State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 242 held otherwise, it [was] overruled . . ." (Citations and footnote omitted.) State v. Murray, supra, 254 Conn. 497-99.
Admittedly, this raises the question of whether or not such substitution occurred in Williams.
The Murray court emphasized that it was ". . . not, however, overrul[ing] that part of State v. Williams, supra, 231 Conn. 243-44, wherein [it] concluded that `the mechanisms for providing for and dismissing alternate jurors, and the circumstances under which they may be substituted for regular jurors . . . does not implicate constitutional rights' and are thus for the legislature to decide. The idea of alternate jurors was unknown at common law and came into existence only as a creation of the legislature in 1939. See General Statutes (Cum. Sup. 1939) § 1406e. Accordingly, [the court] reject[ed] the state's contention that an interpretation of § 54-82h(c), requiring a mistrial when a juror has been dismissed during deliberations, is `constitutionally precarious' because it runs afoul of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers . . ." (Citation omitted.) State v. Murray, supra, 254 Conn. 487 n. 9.
Almost two years after the Supreme Court released its decision in Murray and about six years after the Williams decision itself was released, the petitioner again sought appellate intervention. On August 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion for permission to file a late motion for reconsideration, a motion for reconsideration, and a motion to recall and amend mandate. Both the motion for reconsideration and the motion to recall and amend mandate asked the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Williams in light of Murray. On October 23, 2002, the Supreme Court granted the motion for permission to file a late motion for reconsideration. In his motions the petitioner argued relying on Murray, that the petitioner was not convicted by a legally constituted jury and, therefore, deserved a new criminal jury. The motions for reconsideration and to recall and amend mandate were denied without any further elaboration.
See Amended Petition (November 24, 2009), pg. 4, paragraph #32, as admitted by the respondent's return.
See Amended Petition (November 24, 2009), pg. 1, paragraph #33, as admitted by the respondent's return. It is also apparent from the introductory paragraph in the motion for reconsideration itself that permission was separately sought to have the Supreme Court review its decision in Williams approximately six years after it was released.
Copies of these motions and the Supreme Court order were provided as appendices to the respondent's memorandum of law, filed July 21, 2010, in support of the motion to dismiss. See Practice Book § 23-36 (permitting any party to file any portion of the Supreme Court record as part of the record before the habeas court). The motions filed in the Supreme Court have identical attached appendices — two excerpts from the defendant's appellate briefs, as well as relevant excerpts from the Williams opinion and the entire Murray opinion by the Supreme Court. It is not apparent or evident from any of the pleadings in the instant matter or the documents provided to this court whether the state filed an objection to any of the motions filed in the Supreme Court.
Critical to all of the petitioner's claims in this petition is his allegation that he stands convicted by a jury of eleven jurors and one "non-juror." The instant petition clearly seeks the benefit of the Supreme Court decision in Murray, which overruled an aspect of the petitioner's own direct appeal. Both Williams and Murray, however, emphasize that the claimed impropriety or error is not of constitutional magnitude.
A quintessential tenet of habeas corpus jurisprudence is that ". . . the writ of habeas corpus, as a vehicle to challenge a criminal conviction, is reserved for convictions that violate fundamental fairness . . . In order to be successful, a habeas corpus petitioner must demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or other prejudice and not merely an error which might entitle him to relief on appeal . . . Thus, ordinarily a habeas corpus petitioner must establish some fundamental constitutional violation entitling him to relief . . ." (Emphasis added.) (Footnotes omitted; internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180, 190, 612 A.2d 1161 (1992). See also Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 419, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994). The "error" that occurred in the petitioner's criminal trial might have entitled him to relief on appeal, as evidenced by Murray, but, because it is not of constitutional dimension, it does not rise to the level of being a miscarriage of justice or other prejudice that warrants habeas corpus relief.
The Connecticut Supreme Court ". . . has expanded the application of habeas corpus, describing it as `available as a remedy for a miscarriage of justice or other prejudice . . . [S]ee Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981) (review through a petition for habeas corpus the statutory right to appropriate jail credit). As [that] court [has] stated . . . the principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness . . . To mount a successful collateral attack on his conviction a prisoner must demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or other prejudice and not merely an error which might entitle him to relief on appeal . . . [I]n Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180, 191 n. 13, 612 A.2d 1161 (1992) . . . [the court] recognized that the great writ of liberty is not a remedy for constitutional violations exclusively, albeit most cases in which the remedy has been applied involve issues of fundamental fairness that implicate constitutional rights.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 840, 613 A.2d 818 (1992). `[Thus the] writ of habeas corpus, as it is employed in the twentieth century . . . does not focus solely upon a direct attack on the underlying judgment or upon release from confinement. See, e.g., Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984) (undue appellate delay); Arey v. Warden, 187 Conn. 324, 445 A.2d 916 (1982) (conditions of confinement); Roque v. Warden, 181 Conn. 85, 434 A.2d 348 (1980) ( first amendment issues); Negron v. Warden, 180 Conn. 153, 429 A.2d 841 (1980) (state's extradition practice); Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340, 307 A.2d 166 (1972) (custody and visitation disputes).' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lozada v. Warden, supra, 841-42. Nonetheless, despite this expansion of the writ beyond its initial objective of securing immediate release from illegal detention in order to invoke successfully the jurisdiction of the habeas court, a petitioner must allege `an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, [ 258 Conn. 804, 815, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002).]" (Citation omitted.) Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 241, 250-51, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007).
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme Court itself was given the opportunity to revisit and reconsider its decision in Williams after deciding Murray, but declined to do so. This habeas corpus court is bound by a higher court's rulings and decisions. See, e.g., Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 195, 676 A.2d 831 (1996) ("It is axiomatic that a trial court is bound by Supreme Court precedent . . . This principle is inherent in a hierarchical judicial system"). If the Supreme Court made some error in the analysis of Williams, it is the province of that court to revisit such error. Cf. Carpenter v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 834, 845 n. 8, 878 A2d 1088 (2005) ("A state habeas proceeding would not necessarily be futile [when an issue is not raised on appeal and outcome of the appeal not challenged because of ineffective assistance of counsel] because, if the petitioner established that the issue had not been litigated in the direct appeal and that [the Supreme Court's] decision was unconstitutional for reasons that [the Supreme Court] never considered, the proceeding ultimately could come before [the Supreme Court] and [it] could reverse [its own] decision"). Any relief granted by this court, premised on the allegations in the amended petition, would have the effect and direct consequence of overriding the Supreme Court's decision to not reconsider Williams in light of Murray.
The Supreme Court's decision to not reconsider Williams also is pertinent to any determination whether Murray applies retroactively. The respondent's memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss argues that the holding in Murray has no retroactive application. This court does not need to go into an analysis and discussion of whether Murray applies retroactively, as the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the petitioner's motion to reconsider. The petitioner's objection to the motion to dismiss argues that the denial of the motion to reconsider was not a full adjudication on the merits of that motion, and that a granting of the motion to reconsider is necessary to conclude that the Supreme Court decided the motion on the merits. The Supreme Court granted the petitioner's motion for permission to file a late motion for reconsideration, filed two years after Murray and six years after Williams, indicating its willingness to review the petitioner's arguments and not readily preclude such review by denying the motion for permission to file a late motion for reconsideration. Only after the petitioner fully briefed his argument to the court did it deny the motion for reconsideration.
Simply put, the Supreme Court did not when it had the opportunity to do so post- Murray, reconsider its decision in Williams that the petitioner was not entitled to a new jury trial. This lower court is bound by the Supreme Court's decisions and orders and, in light of the record, will not infer, as counsel for the petitioner does, that the Supreme Court's order denying the motion to reconsider was not premised on the merits.
Based upon the foregoing, judgment of dismissal shall enter in accordance with Practice Book § 23-29(2) and (5). Counsel for the petitioner shall file a judgment file with the clerk within thirty days of the date of this decision.