Summary
referring to forgery as an affirmative defense
Summary of this case from PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Goyette Mechanical Co.Opinion
No. 10-00-00303-CV.
Opinion delivered and filed March 31, 2004.
Appeal from the 87th District Court Freestone County, Texas, Trial Court # 95-320B.
Reversed and remanded.
Andy McSwain, Waco for appellant/relator.
James V. Fulcher, Law Office of James V. Fulcher; Teague and Steven A. Neal; Fairfield for appellee/respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a trespass to try title action involving three sets of parties claiming ownership of two adjoining tracts of land as heirs and devisees of Rufus Abram or his brother Pink Abram or as successors in interest to their heirs and devisees. The dispute involves a will purportedly executed by Rufus and two partition agreements purportedly executed by Rufus and Pink, all of which Appellants allege are forgeries. A jury refused to find that the documents were forged. The jury also refused to find that Appellants had established title by adverse possession.
Appellants present six issues in which they contend: (1) the court erred by refusing to allow them to amend their pleadings at trial; (2) the submission of a question on the partition agreements was not supported by Appellees' pleadings; (3) the court's instruction regarding prima facie evidence was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence; (4) the jury's refusal to find that Appellants had established title by adverse possession is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; (5) the court erred by limiting the testimony of Appellants' handwriting expert; and (6) the court's award of attorney's fees against some of the Appellants is not supported by the pleadings or by statute.
BACKGROUND
The parties' dispute involves adjoining 40- and 65-acre tracts of land which Rufus Abram and his brother Pink jointly owned. A county road runs through these two tracts. Appellees claim that Rufus, Pink, and Pink's wife Eva executed two partition agreements in the early 1900's by which they divided the land so that Rufus owned the acreage to the north of the road and Pink owned the acreage to the south. The present dispute involves the 75.667 acres lying to the north of the county road.
In the early stages of the litigation, the parties also contested ownership of a nearby 37.5-acre tract. At trial however, the parties stipulated that this tract is owned by the heirs of Rufus Abram or their assigns. The jury verdict and the judgment are consistent with the parties' stipulation.
Several of the documents and pleadings involved in this case refer to Rufus Abram as "Ruffus" Abram. We refer to him as "Rufus" throughout this opinion, except where the spelling of his name is pertinent to a particular issue.
The first partition agreement is undated and establishes the county road as the dividing line between their respective portions of the 40-acre tract. The second agreement is dated June 6, 1916 and purports to be a redrawn partition agreement which sets the road as the dividing line and establishes that Rufus owns that portion of the land on the Pile Branch (northerly) side of the road and Pink owns the portion on the Pile Spring (southerly) side of the road. According to Appellees, the partition agreement conveys to Pink's daughter, Appellant Lillian Abram Alford, a life estate in Rufus's portion of the partitioned acreage, and conveys the remainder interest to Rufus and his wife Artie at Lillian's death.
Because the separate partition documents do not appear to be inconsistent and because the 1916 document purports to be redrawn (i.e., "wrote over"), we refer to these documents collectively hereinafter as the "partition agreement."
Several of the documents and pleadings involved in this case refer to Artie Senter Abram as "Ardie Senter," "Ardie Senters," or "Oddie Centers." We refer to her as "Artie" throughout this opinion, except where the spelling of her name is pertinent to a particular issue.
Appellees claim ownership of the disputed acreage under the remainder interest created by the partition agreement and under a will allegedly executed by Rufus in 1949 and probated in 1958. According to the will, Rufus bequeathed his interest in the disputed acreage to five of his children, J.B., Harriett, Mattie, William, and Pete. They allege in the alternative that they established title by adverse possession.
In the will, Rufus bequeathed a different 20-acre tract to Mandred Abram, a child from another marriage. He bequeathed to his children J.B., Harriett, Mattie, William, and Pete "[a]ll other real property" that he owned.
Appellants contend that the 1949 will and the partition agreement are forgeries. Some of Appellants (the "Abram heirs") claim ownership of Rufus's undivided one-half interest by intestate succession from Edward "Pomp" Abram, whom Rufus allegedly adopted. The remainder of Appellants (the "Alford heirs") claim ownership of Pink's undivided one-half interest by conveyance from Lillian Abram Alford, Pink's sole heir. Alternatively, Appellants claim ownership of the disputed acreage by adverse possession.
The jury found that J.B., Harriett, Mattie, William, and Pete were Rufus's children. The jury refused to find that Edward "Pomp" Abram was Rufus's child. The jury refused to find that the partition agreement and the 1949 will were forgeries. The jury also refused to find that Appellants had established title by adverse possession.
The court rendered judgment awarding Appellees the 75.667 acres which lie to the north of the county road. The judgment does not make reference to the life estate which Appellees at a minimum concede Lillian Abram Alford has in the disputed acreage.
FACTUAL INSUFFICIENCY
Appellants contend in their fourth issue that the jury's refusal to find that they had established title to the property by adverse possession is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
When a party contends that an adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence, not just the evidence which supports the finding. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Hatch v. Williams, 110 S.W.3d 516, 522 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.). We will set aside the finding "only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust." Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 242; accord Hatch, 110 S.W.3d at 522.
Under Appellees' theory of the case, Lillian is only a life tenant under the partition agreement. If she is only a life tenant, then the deed she made to her children conveyed only her own life estate, subject to the remainder interest held by Appellees. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 273, 224 S.W.2d 471, 475 (1949); Zambrano v. Olivas, 490 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App. — El Paso 1973, no writ).
Because a life tenant has an exclusive right to possession of the premises for the duration of the tenant's life, the holder of a life estate (and any successors in interest) cannot generally claim adverse possession as against the holder of the remainder interest until the death of the life tenant. See Est. of McWhorter v. Wooten, 622 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. 1981); Strong, 148 Tex. at 273, 224 S.W.2d at 475. However, a life tenant can perfect a limitations title to the premises by giving notice of repudiation of the remainder interest. See Wells v. Hilburn, 129 Tex. 11, 17, 98 S.W.2d 177, 180 (1936); Jones v. Bilderback, 290 S.W.2d 580, 584-85 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1956, no writ).
If Appellants are correct that the will and/or partition agreement are forged, then the parties are cotenants and notice of repudiation is still required. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 756 (Tex. 2003); Thedford v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 3 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied).
"[A] co-tenant [or life tenant] may not adversely possess against another co-tenant unless it clearly appears he has repudiated the title of his co-tenant [or remainderman] and is holding adversely to it." King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 756 (emphasis added). Stated another way, "[n]otice of repudiation must be clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable." Thedford, 3 S.W.3d at 612; Sebesta v. Daniels, 812 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Appellants did not contend at trial or on appeal that they gave notice of repudiation. The record contains no evidence that they did. Therefore, the jury's adverse finding on Appellants' adverse possession claims is not "so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust." Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 242; accord Hatch, 110 S.W.3d at 522. Accordingly, we overrule Appellants' fourth issue.
AMENDED PLEADINGS
Appellants argue in their first issue that the court erred by refusing to permit them to amend their pleadings to allege that all the signatures on the partition agreement were forged and to assert the statute of frauds as a defense to the enforceability of the partition agreement.
On the third day of trial and after the trial court had admitted the partition agreement in evidence, Appellants specially excepted to Appellees' pleadings on the basis that the allegations with regard to the partition agreement were too vague. Appellants also requested permission to amend their pleadings to include allegations that the partition agreement was forged and did not satisfy the statute of frauds. The court overruled the special exceptions but permitted the trial amendment, though only as to the forgery allegation. When Appellants called their forgery expert to testify however, the court restricted the trial amendment to an allegation that only Rufus's signature was forged.
Appellees contend that Appellants waived the right to complain about this issue because they did not object to the admission of the partition agreement in evidence. We disagree. Because the issue of whether the partition agreement was forged was one for the jury to resolve, the agreement necessarily had to be admitted in evidence. Moreover, the failure of a document to satisfy the statute of frauds does not render that document inadmissible. Rather, it renders the document unenforceable. See Tex. Builders v. Keller, 928 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. 1996); Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Ginther v. Taub, 570 S.W.2d 516, 525 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"A court may not refuse a trial amendment unless (1) the opposing party presents evidence of surprise or prejudice, or (2) the amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face." State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994); Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ); accord Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, 16 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). In the latter instance, the decision to grant or deny the amendment lies within the discretion of the trial court. State Bar of Tex., 874 S.W.2d at 658; Stephenson, 16 S.W.3d at 839. Thus, that decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
To determine whether a court has abused its discretion by denying a requested trial amendment asserting a new cause of action or defense, we consider whether: (1) the requested amendment would reshape the nature of the trial itself; (2) the requested amendment asserts a matter which the opposing party could not have anticipated in light of the development of the case up to the time of the request; and (3) the opposing party's presentation of its case would be detrimentally affected by the amendment. Stephenson, 16 S.W.3d at 839; Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied); accord Allegheny Cas. Co. v. State, 52 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
Because forgery and the statute of frauds are affirmative defenses, we must determine whether the court abused its discretion by denying the requested amendment. State Bar of Tex., 874 S.W.2d at 658; Stephenson, 16 S.W.3d at 839. At trial, the heart of the dispute largely revolved around the validity of the 1949 will and the partition agreement. Thus, permitting Appellants to contend that the partition agreement was invalid due to forgery and to challenge the enforceability of the partition agreement under the statute of frauds would not significantly reshape the nature of the trial. See Stephenson, 16 S.W.3d at 839-40; Weynand, 990 S.W.2d at 847. Appellees could reasonably have anticipated that forgery would be raised as an affirmative defense because these handwritten documents were brought to light less than fifty days before trial. Similarly, Appellees could reasonably have anticipated that the statute of frauds would be raised as an affirmative defense because the documents do not contain a standard legal description of the property in question. See Stephenson, 16 S.W.3d at 840; Weynand, 990 S.W.2d at 847.
With respect to the forgery allegation, permitting the trial amendment regarding the validity of Eva's and Pink's signatures on the partition agreement would not have detrimentally affected Appellees' presentation of the case because they already were having to respond to Appellants' contention that Rufus's signature thereon was forged. With respect to the statute of frauds, permitting the trial amendment would not have detrimentally affected Appellees' presentation of their case because they had already presented a surveyor's testimony who explained the landmarks referenced in the partition agreements and their relation to the property in question. See W. Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 266 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 659 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by denying Appellants' requested trial amendment. This error requires reversal if it: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting its case to this Court. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); In re J.B., 93 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).
As set out in Appellants' fifth issue, the trial court refused to permit Appellants' forgery expert to testify about the validity of Eva's and Pink's signatures on the partition agreement. The validity of the partition agreement depends in large part on the validity of the signatures of each of the parties to the agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that this error prevented Appellants from properly presenting their case. See J.B., 93 S.W.3d at 616-17. Therefore, we sustain Appellants' first issue.
Some question exists regarding whether the trial court limited the scope of the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction or because of the ruling on the trial amendment. However, appellees contend, and the record confirms that the expert's testimony was limited because of the ruling on the trial amendment.
Although this conclusion requires reversal of the judgment, we also address one further issue likely to arise on the retrial of this cause. See Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. TreviZo, 941 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. 1997); J.B., 93 S.W.3d at 617.
JURY CHARGE
Appellants claim in their third issue that the court abused its discretion by submitting a definition and instruction in the charge regarding prima facie evidence. Appellees respond that Appellants' failed to properly preserve this issue for review and that the definition and instruction at issue are correct statements of the law.
The definitions and instructions in question are as follows:
Definition No. 13:
"PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE" as used in the law does not mean conclusive evidence. It is such evidence as is sufficient in law to constitute proof of a fact unless and until it is overcome, rebutted, or contradicted by other evidence.
Instruction No. 21:
You are instructed that any statement of facts concerning the family history, genealogy, marital status, for [sic] the identity of the heirs of a decedent shall be received in a proceeding to declare heirship or in a suit involving title to real or personal property, as PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE of the facts there in [sic] stated, if the statement is contained in either an affidavit or any other instrument legally executed and acknowledged or sworn to before, and certified by, an officer authorized to take the acknowledgments or oaths as applicable, or any judgment of a court of record, and if the affidavit or instrument has been of record for five years or more in the deed records of any county in this state in which such real or personal property is located at the time the suit is instituted on [sic] in the deed records of any county of this state in which the decedent had his domicile or fixed place of residence at the time of his death.
Appellants did not object to Definition No. 13. Thus, they failed to preserve their complaint concerning this definition for our review. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 274; Religious of Sacred Heart of Tex. v. City of Houston, 836 S.W.2d 606, 613-14 (Tex. 1992); In re A.A.B., 110 S.W.3d 553, 557 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.). With regard to the instruction, Appellants objected that "the determination of prima facie evidence is a matter for the Court. Not for the jury." Their objection preserved their complaint regarding the instruction for our review. Id.
The Austin Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in Texas AM U. v. Chambers. 31 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied). That case involved a claim under the whistleblower statute. Consistent with section 554.004 of the Government Code, the trial court instructed the jury, "If the termination of, or adverse personnel action against, a public employee occurs within 90 days after the date on which the employee reports a violation of law, the termination or adverse personnel action is presumed, subject to rebuttal, to be because the employee made the report." Id. at 783; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
The Austin Court set out the following discussion regarding the instruction:
A presumption "may not properly be the subject of an instruction to the jury." Its inclusion is improper because the sole effect of a presumption is to fix the burden of producing evidence. A presumption is nothing more than a rule for the guidance of the trial judge in locating the burden of production at a particular time. . . .
. . . .
. . . Because Texas AM produced evidence to rebut the presumption of the Whistleblower Act, the presumption should have disappeared entirely. Instead of vanishing, however, the statutory presumption appeared verbatim in the jury charge.
Tex. AM, 31 S.W.3d at 783-85 (citations omitted).
As Appellees correctly argue, the instruction is substantially correct insofar as it states the law regarding prima facie evidence in this type of case. Cf. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 52(a) (Vernon 2003). However, this does not necessarily mean that the instruction should have been included in the charge. See Acord v. Gen. Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984); Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 965 S.W.2d 656, 663-64 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Maddox v. Denka Chem. Corp., 930 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
The instruction at issue here, like the instruction in Texas AM, informed the jury of the parties' respective burdens of production. This was a matter for the trial court's consideration, not the jury's. Accordingly, we conclude that the inclusion of this instruction in the charge was error. See Tex. AM, 31 S.W.3d at 785; accord Acord, 669 S.W.2d at 116; Bean, 965 S.W.2d at 663-64; Maddox, 930 S.W.2d at 671-72. Because we have already found error requiring reversal, we need not determine whether this error was harmful.
We need not address the remainder of Appellants' claims. We reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because I find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant a trial amendment, I would affirm the judgment.
The majority indicates that the appellees should have anticipated that the appellant would raise two affirmative defenses, statute of frauds and forgery, to the partition agreements and will. The appellants learned of the partition agreement sufficiently in advance of trial, 50 days according to the majority opinion, to have considered and pled these defenses as a matter of right if they so chose. They did not.
Appellants had ample time prior to trial to raise the defenses. It would seem obvious that even if the Appellee should have anticipated the defenses because the issue was raised 50 days before trial, based upon the requirement that affirmative defenses must be pled and these were not, the appellees would justifiably be surprised if then called upon to counter these defenses when no attempt was made to amend the pleadings until well after trial had commenced. It seems we are holding that if the opposing party could have anticipated the defense, there is no need to plead it. This seems backwards to me.
The appellants had the time to plead these defenses before trial. They did not. They proceeded to trial, apparently prepared to present evidence in support of these defenses, rather than ask for a continuance to allow for additional discovery or for time to amend their pleadings.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the trial amendments to add these defenses. I would affirm the judgment. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.