Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-12-2958
04-08-2013
TANYA L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This Title VII employment discrimination case is before the Court on Defendant Target Corporation's ("Target") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action [Doc. # 18] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Motion is ripe for consideration. The Court has carefully reviewed the arguments and applicable law and concludes Target's Partial Motion to Dismiss should be granted. A. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should presume they are true, even if doubtful, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted, Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Harrington, 563 F.3d at 147). However, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions, to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997). B. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff Tanya L. Williams' ("Williams) raises a "pattern and practice" discrimination claim, alleging that Defendant had a pattern and practice of treating Black pharmacists in her District differently than White pharmacists. See First Amended Complaint [Doc. # 13], at 4-5. "A pattern or practice case is not a separate and free-standing cause of action . . . but is really 'merely another method by which disparate treatment can be shown.'" Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1219 (5th Cir. 1995)). A pattern or practice discrimination claim may not be brought in a private lawsuit that is not a class action. See Roy v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 115 F. App'x 198, 201 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (holding that a "'pattern and practice of discrimination' claim . . . is inapplicable to [an] individual claim of racial discrimination" (citing Celestine, 266 F.3d at 355-56)); Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs' pattern or practice claims fail in light of Celestine); Richmond v. Coastal Bend Coll. Dist., 883 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (Head, J.) ("In the Fifth Circuit, the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available in private, non-class action lawsuits." (citing Frank, 347 F.3d 136)); Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., No. Civ.A. H-01-4319, Civ.A. H-01-4323, 2004 WL 3690215, *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2004) (Rosenthal, J.) ("The pattern and practice method of proving discrimination is almost exclusively used in class actions, leaving individual plaintiffs confined to the McDonnell Douglas framework." (citing Celestine, 266 F.3d at 354)). Williams raises her "pattern and practice" discrimination claim individually and does not seek to certify a class action. See First Amended Complaint, at 1-5. Accordingly, her "pattern and practice" claim is dismissed. C. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Target Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action [Doc. # 18] is GRANTED. Plaintiff Tanya L. Williams' "pattern and practice" discrimination claim is DISMISSED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas this 8th day of April, 2013.
______________________
Nancy F. Atlas
United States District Judge