Opinion
C.A. No. 16-196 Erie
04-06-2017
KHAYRI WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. SGT. TANNER, et al., Defendants
District Judge Rothstein
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [ECF No. 14] be granted and that this case be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Khayri Williams, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Forest"), initiated this civil rights action on August 2, 2016, by filing a pro se complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following named Defendants, all of whom were corrections officers at SCI-Forest at the time Plaintiff's complaint was filed: Sgt. Tanner ("Tanner"), C.O. Jamison ("Jamison"), and C.O. Berry ("Berry").
In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution by failing to protect him from being assaulted by a fellow inmate. As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
On December 5, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [ECF No. 14], arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claims against them. [ECF No. 14]. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion on January 4, 2017 [ECF No. 17]. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
B. Standards of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). A Plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing 5 C.Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 19, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Third Circuit subsequently expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
2. Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) ("petition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997) (overruled on other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. Discussion
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them must be dismissed because he failed to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("PLRA"), which provides:
no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prisons, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.Id.
It is not a plaintiff's burden to affirmatively plead exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) ("...failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints"). Instead, the failure to exhaust must be asserted and proven by the defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).
The requirement that an inmate exhaust administrative remedies applies to all inmate suits regarding prison life, including those that involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347 (3d Cir. 2002) (for history of exhaustion requirement). Administrative exhaustion must be completed prior to the filing of an action. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all the available remedies. Grimsley v. Rodriquez, 113 F.3d 1246 (Table), 1997 WL 2356136 (Unpublished Opinion) (10th Cir. May 8, 1997). The exhaustion requirement is not a technicality, rather it is federal law which federal district courts are required to follow. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (by using language "no action shall be brought," Congress has "clearly required exhaustion").
Importantly, a plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies does not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) ("...[W]e agree with the clear majority of courts that §1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that failure to comply with the section would deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.").
There is no "futility" exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement. Banks v. Roberts, 2007 WL 3096585, at * 1 (3d Cir.) citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 71 ("[Plaintiff's] argument fails under this Court's bright line rule that 'completely precludes a futility exception to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement.'"). See also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) ("Indeed, as we held in Booth, a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought-monetary damages-cannot be granted by the administrative process.").
The PLRA also requires "proper exhaustion," meaning that a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules of that grievance system. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 87-91 (2006) ("Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules ..."). Importantly, the exhaustion requirement may not be satisfied "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective ... appeal." Id. at 83; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (utilizing a procedural default analysis to reach the same conclusion) ("Based on our earlier discussion of the PLRA's legislative history, [...] Congress seems to have had three interrelated objectives relevant to our inquiry here: (1) to return control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to encourage development of an administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the inmate grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.").
a. The Administrative Process Available to State Inmates
So then, no analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative process available to state inmates. "Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to 'properly exhaust.' The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
The DC-ADM 804 grievance system, available to state prisoners, consists of three separate stages. First, the prisoner is required to timely submit a written grievance for review by the facility manager or the regional grievance coordinator within fifteen days of the incident, who responds in writing within ten business days. Second, the inmate must timely submit a written appeal to intermediate review within ten working days, and again the inmate receives a written response within ten working days. Finally, the inmate must submit a timely appeal to the Central Office Review Committee within fifteen working days, and the inmate will receive a final determination in writing within thirty days. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997), aff'd. 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
b. Analysis
Here, Defendants point out that Plaintiff admits in his complaint that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any of his claims against them. Indeed, in his complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that there is a grievance procedure available at SCI-Forest, yet admits that he did not file any grievance regarding the claims in this case (See ECF No. 4, Complaint, at Section V.A and B).
While a plaintiff is not required to specifically plead exhaustion in the complaint, Jones, 549 U.S. at 216, an open admission in the complaint that he has failed to exhaust the administrative remedy process has been held to provide sufficient grounds for dismissal of the unexhausted claims. See, Lockett v. DeRose, 355 Fed. Appx. 582 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal of complaint where plaintiff admitted in the complaint that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit); Snyder v. Harris, 406 Fed. Appx. 313 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claims where plaintiff admitted in his amended complaint that he did not complete the grievance process with regard to such claims before filing suit); Washington v. Unknown C/O, 2013 WL 170173, at * 4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2013) (upholding sua sponte dismissal of complaint when failure to exhaust the prison grievance procedure was apparent from the face of the complaint). This is particularly true where, as here, Plaintiff had the opportunity to oppose Defendants' motion to dismiss and failed to raise any grounds upon which the Court might excuse his failure to exhaust his claims in this case. See Shafer v. Suloga, 2014 WL 2041865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2014) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff admitted in complaint that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and, when "[g]iven the opportunity to oppose [defendant's] motion, or possibly explain why he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, or clarify what exhaustion efforts (if any) he attempted ..., [plaintiff] failed to do so").
Although the Third Circuit has held that interference with an inmate's attempts at exhaustion may impact the administrative remedy process in such a way as to make it essentially unavailable, Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003), it is apparent that no such circumstances are present here because Plaintiff explains that he "didn't know [he] had to grievance [sic] the officers failed to protect [him]." (ECF No. 4, Complaint, at Section V.D). --------
Thus, in light of Plaintiff's open admission in his complaint that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to any of the claims raised in this case, Defendants' motion should be granted and this case should be dismissed. III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [ECF No. 14] be granted and that this case be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: April 6, 2017 cc: The Honorable Barbara Rothstein
United States District Judge