Opinion
8:22-cv-01658-JFA-BM
05-21-2024
Colin Williams, Plaintiff, v. Daniel Stonebreaker, Jr.; Lee Brown; Lieutenant Hicks; Sergeant Purnell; SCDC; Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Bristow Marchant United States Magistrate Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 43. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C.
Plaintiff, while represented by counsel, filed this action on March 22, 2022, in the Marlboro County Court of Common Pleas asserting Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1-1. The action was removed to this Court on May 25, 2022. ECF No. 1. Defendants Stonebreaker and the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) filed an Answer to the Complaint that same day. ECF No. 4. Defendants Brown, Hicks, and Purnell filed an Answer to the Complaint on June 21, 2022. ECF No. 18.
By Order dated November 10, 2023, the Court granted a motion to withdraw as attorney filed by Plaintiff's counsel. ECF No. 51. As such, Plaintiff is now proceeding pro se in this matter. The Court entered an Order dated November 13, 2023, advising Plaintiff of his responsibilities and the Court's rules and procedures for pro se litigants. ECF No. 54.
On October 23, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 43. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court entered an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (the “Roseboro Order”), advising him of the importance of the motion and of the need for him to file an adequate response by the deadline. ECF No. 55. Plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to respond adequately, Defendants' motion may be granted, thereby ending this case. Id. After multiple extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2024. ECF No. 77. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-8.
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. ECF No. 1-1. The events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred at the Evans Correctional Institution (“Evans”) while Plaintiff was in inmate in the custody of SCDC. Id. at 2-4 ¶¶ 1, 10, 16. Defendant Stonebreaker was the Warden at Evans; Defendant Brown was a correctional officer; Defendant Hicks was a correctional lieutenant; and Defendant Purnell was a correctional sergeant. Id. at 3 ¶ 11.
Plaintiff was released from custody in April 2024 and is no longer incarcerated. See ECF No. 80.
According to Plaintiff, after his arrival at Evans in October 2018, Plaintiff began to receive threats from other inmates, including his roommate, Torrance Carter (“Carter”). Id. at 4 ¶ 20. Plaintiff reported these threats to correctional officers, telling them he was afraid that he would suffer death or serious bodily injury if he was not moved away from these inmates, including Carter. Id. Over the next several months, Plaintiff made multiple requests to be move away from the inmates that were threatening him and be placed in protective custody. Id. at 5 ¶ 21. However, Defendants denied these requests and refused to move Plaintiff to protective custody. Id.
On March 24, 2019, Carter stabbed Plaintiff multiple times in his leg, chest, and abdomen while Plaintiff was sleeping in his cell. Id. at 5 ¶ 22. Defendant Brown was on duty at the time of the attack and failed to properly supervise inmates, including Carter and Plaintiff. Id. at 5 ¶ 23. After the attack, medical staff at Evans photographed Plaintiff's injuries before transporting him to a hospital where he received treatment for his injuries. Id. at 6 ¶ 24. For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he suffered both mental and physical injuries, including multiple stab wounds. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 24-25.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts a single cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution. Id. at 6-10 ¶¶ 30-38. For his relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare Defendants' practices to be unlawful and that the Court award compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 10.
APPLICABLE LAW
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
The sole claim in this action is asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the nonmovant, they must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to the action that they bear the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
The Parties' Arguments
As noted, Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against them. ECF No. 43. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the following grounds. ECF No. 43-1. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this suit. Id. at 4-8. Next, Defendants contend that SCDC and the individual Defendants, to the extent they are sued in their official capacity as employees of SCDC, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 8-11. Defendants also argue that expert testimony is required for a claim of negligent failure to protect but Plaintiff “offers no expert opinion on the complex operation of [Evans].” Id. at 11-13. Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not shown Defendants' deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 13-18. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for supervisory liability. Id. at 18-20.
Plaintiff's response in opposition fails to specifically address any of Defendants' arguments. ECF No. 77. Instead, Plaintiff explains that he is proceeding pro se and notes that he was stabbed by his roommate three times in March 2019. Id. at 1. Plaintiff explains that Defendant Brown was supervising the dorm and called for backup after he was stabbed. Id. He states that he went to medical where two nurses glued his wounds back together and took pictures. Id. Plaintiff explains he experienced a lot of pain and, as a result, believes he is entitled to compensation. Id. Plaintiff argues that he believes he can prevail on his claim if he proceeds to a trial. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that Carter admitted that he stabbed Plaintiff “because he was trying to get out of the dorm because other inmates wanted to stab him due to some gang stuff.” Id. He contends that there is a lot of gang activity at Evans. Id.
The Court will now evaluate the grounds raised in Defendants' motion.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. ECF No. 43-1 at 4-8. The Court agrees.
Applicable Law
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PRLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of all available administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.'” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (citation omitted). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 90 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
Analysis
To support their argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendants have submitted affidavits from various SCDC employees (including Felecia McKie, SCDC's Agency Inmate Grievance Coordinator/Branch Chief of Inmate Grievance Branch) and Plaintiff's grievances filed during his incarceration within SCDC. ECF No. 43-2. Having reviewed the evidence submitted by Defendants, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies and therefore recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of SCDC's three-step grievance process.ECF No. 43-1 at 7. Additionally, Defendants have submitted a copy of SCDC's Inmate Grievance System Policy, GA-01.12, ECF No. 43-2 at 11-26, and McKie has provided a detailed explanation of that policy in her affidavit, Id. at 1-7 ¶¶ 4-18.
In addition to the materials Defendants attached to their motion, the undersigned takes judicial notice of other cases that have detailed the grievance procedure. See Smyth v. Stirling, No. 0:21-cv-00649-RBH, 2022 WL 3367759, at *3 n.6 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2022) (collecting cases); Singleton v. Stirling, No. 9-21-cv-03820-RMG-MHC, 2023 WL 4163262, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 4161176 (D.S.C. June 23, 2023).
Based on a review of the documents noted above, the SCDC three-step grievance process can be summarized as follows. First, an inmate must submit a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”) in an effort to resolve the grievance informally. Second, if informal resolution fails, the inmate must file a Step 1 Grievance Form (10-5), setting forth the issue grieved. Third, inmates may then appeal an SCDC decision as to the Step 1 Grievance by filing a Step 2 Grievance Form (10-5A). SCDC's response to a Step 2 Grievance is considered the final agency decision on the issue.
In her affidavit, McKie explains that Plaintiff entered SCDC in February 2014 and was assigned to seven different SCDC institutions during his incarceration. ECF No. 43-2 at 8 ¶ 19. Plaintiff signed seven separate orientation forms at each facility acknowledging he had been instructed about the use of the mandatory Inmate Grievance System. Id. Plaintiff's signed acknowledgment forms are attached to McKie's affidavit. Id. at 33-40. McKie notes that Plaintiff had filed at least fourteen Step 1 Grievances and over four hundred kiosk requests during his incarceration. Id. at 8 ¶ 21. Plaintiff's Grievances and kisok entries are attached to McKie's affidavit. Id. at 41-541. McKie states in her affidavit that Plaintiff failed to file a Step 1 grievance related to the stabbing incident and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 9 ¶ 24. McKie explains:
Based on my review, [Plaintiff] has failed to use and/or follow the available opportunities to have his concerns addressed through SCDC Inmate Grievance System. [Plaintiff] has not followed and/or used all the options available to him to have his concern addressed through SCDC Inmate Grievance System regarding the matters that he raised in his lawsuit prior to bringing a lawsuit on the claims alleged.
No grievances regarding any security concerns were filed by [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] filed no grievances regarding the issues of this case in 2019. Nor was a grievance filed by [Plaintiff] in April 2019, thus [Plaintiff] failed to file a grievance regarding the alleged March 24, 2019, alleged assault within the proper time frame pursuant to the Grievance Policy.Id. at 9-10 ¶¶ 27-28.
Plaintiff has not provided any argument in response to Defendants' motion or McKie's affidavit. Plaintiff's Complaint contains no allegations concerning exhaustion. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies or rebutting Defendants' evidence. Based on the record before the Court, it is apparent that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, because it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Although this basis alone is sufficient to grant Defendants' motion, the Court will briefly address certain of Defendants' other arguments.
The Court need not address every argument raised by Defendants as the grounds discussed herein are sufficient to grant summary judgment.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants also contend that SCDC and the individual Defendants, to the extent they are sued in their official capacities as employees of SCDC, are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 43-1 at 8-11. Plaintiff makes no argument in response.
To the extent Plaintiff brings this suit against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983, the Court agrees that the individual Defendants-and SCDC-are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment from Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; see also Rivera v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-2539-JMC-JDA, 2018 WL 7825496, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2018) (“SCDC is a department of the State of South Carolina that has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for money damages brought in this Court.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 642916 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2019). And that protection extends to SCDC employees. Johnson v. Stirling, No. 9:18-cv-3028-RMG, 2021 WL 1232658, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2021). As a result, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against SCDC and the individual Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983, the undersigned recommends that such claims be dismissed because they are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
No Evidence of Deliberate Indifference
Next, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the record contains no evidence of deliberate indifference. ECF No. 83-1 at 13-16. The Court agrees. The crux of Plaintiff's claim against Defendants appears to be one for failure to protect. Specifically, the allegations in the Complaint appear to allege that Defendants failed to take appropriate action to protect Plaintiff from serious bodily injury, despite his purported pleas for help, resulting in Plaintiff being stabbed by his roommate.
Defendants have attached to their motion the affidavit of William Smith who is a Healthcare Administrator at Evans. ECF No. 43-4. Smith states that “[m]edical records do not support [Plaintiff's] claimed injuries” and “contain no reference to any incident occurring on or around March 24, 2019, or contemporaneous medical treatment for such an alleged assault.” Id. at 2 ¶¶ 9-10. He further states that, contrary to Plaintiff's claim that he was stabbed multiple times in his leg, shoulder, and abdomen, “[t]here are no medical encounters/medical notes/medical entries that [Plaintiff] was seen by medical staff on or around March 24, 2019”; “[t]here is no documentation supporting [Plaintiff's] claims of being transported to a hospital to be treated for any injuries during the month of March 2019”; “[t]here are no contemporaneous medical records supporting [Plaintiff's] claim that medical staff photographed his injuries/stab wounds”; and “there is no documentation [showing that Plaintiff] was provided medical treatment or transported out for medical treatment during the month of March 2019.” Id. at 2 ¶¶ 11-14. Defendants' motion and brief in support contain no reference to Smith's affidavit or explain what impact this information has on the matters now before the Court.
The Complaint makes cursory reference to violations of Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth, “and other Amendments” to the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1-1 at 7 ¶ 35. However, the Complaint fails to explain how any of these rights were violated. The undersigned finds that the Complaint alleges facts only to support a claim under the Eighth Amendment and does not address claims under any other Amendment as any such claim is unsupported by the allegations in the Complaint and the summary judgment record.
Applicable Law
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Officials must take “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). In other words, “[t]he government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Nonetheless, “[t]he burden is on the prisoner to demonstrate that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment, and that burden is a heavy one.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408-09 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Not every “injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Instead, the Supreme Court has outlined two requirements for an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. First, “a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). In other words, the denial of the prisoner's constitutional rights must be “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 825; see also Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014) (“a prisoner must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Id., which means the official either purposefully caused the harm or acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (observing that “deliberate indifference” requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury). A prison official is not liable if he or she “knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844; see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that a prison official was not liable, because he did not actually draw the inference that the inmate was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm). A showing of mere negligence does not qualify as deliberate indifference. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
A prison official's subjective actual knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence, for example, that the “substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known' about it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated that the subjective knowledge component is nuanced. See Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that the district court failed to appreciate nuances with respect to this component). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the “‘actual knowledge' standard required to find prison officials deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious injury may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 129. “Prison officials may not simply bury their heads in the sand and thereby skirt liability.” Id. “Rather, they may be held accountable when a risk is so obvious that it had to have been known.” Id. Therefore, “‘even under this subjective standard, a prison official cannot hide behind an excuse that he was unaware of a risk, no matter how obvious.'” Id. at 133 (quoting Brice v. Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019) (“[A]n obvious risk of harm justifies an inference that a prison official subjectively disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.” (quoting Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir. 2011)).
In short, direct evidence of actual knowledge is not required. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The question is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to his future health . . . and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id. at 843.
However, because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that they were unaware of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety. For example, they may show “that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id. at 844. In addition, prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, “even if the harm ultimately was not averted” because a prison official's duty is to ensure “reasonable safety.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)). This standard “incorporates due regard for prison officials' ‘unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.'” Id. (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)) (Kennedy, J.). Absent successful rebuttal, prison officials may be held liable for obvious risks they must have known. Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
The Parties' Arguments
Defendants argue that, prior to his alleged assault, Plaintiff “submitted several kiosk requests regarding ‘fear for his life' and SCDC staff responded to those requests.” ECF No. 43-1 at 15. SCDC staff asked Plaintiff to provide names of those threatening him, but Plaintiff failed to provide specific pertinent information as requested. Id. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Complaint “is replete with conclusory allegations, without citation to any specific testimony or evidence, about overcrowding and violence committed by inmates,” but that those conclusory allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not offered evidence to show that any of the named Defendants were deliberately indifferent. Id. at 16-17. Defendants have attached to their motion the affidavit of Defendant Stonebreaker who makes the following pertinent averments. ECF No. 43-3. Plaintiff was assigned to Evans for approximately two years prior to his alleged incident. Id. at 2 ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff's inmate records, Plaintiff submitted several kiosk requests regarding “fear for his life” in January and February of 2017, which were appropriately responded to. Id. at 2 ¶ 11. The Warden specifically asked Plaintiff to provide the names of those who had threatened him and the letters he had received. Id. However, Plaintiff did not provide the specific information that was requested. Id. Stonebreaker avers that “[o]ther than the everyday risk of violence, there were no indications that the prison environment was any more dangerous, especially to [Plaintiff], than normal.” Id. at 3 ¶ 14.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, simply reiterates the bare allegations of his Complaint and contends he is entitled to compensation for his injuries. ECF No. 77. Plaintiff has not provided any evidentiary support for his claims, nor has he presented any response to Defendants' arguments on this issue.
Analysis
Having considered the parties' arguments, the applicable law, and the evidence in the record, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to support a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment. First, as to the individual Defendants, Plaintiff makes no specific allegations in the Complaint and presents no evidence of deliberate indifference against Defendants Stonebreaker, Hicks, and Parnell. In the absence of specific factual allegations against these Defendants, they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hamm v. Scaturo, No. 9:16-cv-2960-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 3835809, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2017) (dismissing defendants that were “not named in any factual allegations evidencing any personal responsibility or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3741305 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2017). As to Defendant Brown, Plaintiff's only allegation against him is that he was on duty at the time of the alleged attack and failed to properly supervise the inmates. ECF No. 1-1 at 5 ¶ 23. Plaintiff has not supported that allegation with any evidentiary support. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, without evidentiary support, fail to create a question of fact in this case. As such, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his failure to protect claim as to any Defendant. Although “the Eighth Amendment protects a convicted inmate from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates resulting from the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to a specific known risk of such harm . . . complaints that do not allege deliberate indifference to a specific known risk of harm fail to state a claim under § 1983.” Simmons v. Zies, No. JKB-15-cv-1447, 2016 WL 1642947, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2016) (citation omitted) (noting the plaintiff's “claim that he is in danger is speculative at best”). The sole evidence in the record remotely supporting Plaintiff's claim that Defendants knew of a risk of harm to Plaintiff is his inmate records showing kiosk requests from January and February 2017 in which he complained that he was in fear of his life. See ECF No. 43-3 at 12-17. Prison officials responded, directing Plaintiff to provide additional information, including the specific threats he had received and the names of those making the threats. Id. However, Plaintiff did not provide that information. According to the records before the Court, Plaintiff made no other kiosk requests or otherwise advised prison authorities regarding any concern for his safety from early 2017 until he was allegedly stabbed in March 2019. As such, Plaintiff is unable to show that any Defendant knew of a risk of harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that risk. See Martin v. Weber, No. DLB-22-cv-922, 2024 WL 1329295, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2024) (granting summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to identify any evidence suggesting that the defendants knew about the risk of harm to the plaintiff); Neff v. Warden, No. RBD-07-cv-3103, 2008 WL 5460264, at *2 (D. Md. June 19, 2008) (“Taking [Plaintiff's] allegations of assault as true, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant knew there was a known risk of harm to Plaintiff which was deliberately ignored.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's failure to protect claim is subject to dismissal.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff's claim is one for negligent failure to protect, any such claim is without merit as negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Robinson v. McCall, No. 4:12-cv-3444-TLW-TER, 2013 WL 1990486, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2013), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 2009051 (D.S.C. May 13, 2013). “The Supreme Court has held that mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from another inmate is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Large v. Washington Cnty. Det. Ctr., 915 F.2d 1564 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)).
Supervisory Liability
Finally, Defendants argue that, assuming supervisory liability is at issue in this case, any such claim fails as a matter of law. ECF No. 43-1 at 18. The Court agrees.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable in their supervisory capacities, the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is inapplicable to § 1983 suits. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1977). A plaintiff must establish three elements to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to make the required showing here. As such, any supervisory liability claim is subject to dismissal as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.