Opinion
Case Case No. 1:02-CV-135
May 10, 2002
OPINION
Plaintiff, Donald Williams, filed a claim pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant, the State of Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services Unemployment Agency, after he was denied unemployment benefits for six weeks. Defendant denied the unemployment benefits because Plaintiff lost his job due to absenteeism, which Plaintiff explains was caused by a period of incarceration. Plaintiff alleges that the denial of unemployment benefits subjected him to double jeopardy and violated his rights to due process and equal protection. Plaintiff seeks $2,450 in compensatory damages, $3,000,000 for emotional and mental stress damages, and $9,997,550 in punitive damages.
The agency is now known as the Bureau of Workers' and Unemployment Compensation.
Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the complaint, asserting that it is not a "person" subject to § 1983 liability and that, as a state agency, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court has concluded that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the issues presented.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on July 17, 2001, he filed for unemployment benefits with Defendant. On August 8, Defendant denied Plaintiff six weeks of benefits, totaling $1,800, because Plaintiff was fired from his job for absenteeism. According to Plaintiff, his absence from work was due to a period of incarceration.
Plaintiff also alleges that on November 5, 2001, he attempted to certify himself for his unemployment check by phone, but the phone certification system was out of service. Plaintiff explains that his typical practice was to call in and certify on Monday and receive his check on Wednesday. On this occasion, however, Plaintiff was unable to certify until Tuesday, causing a one-day delay in the receipt of his unemployment check. Plaintiff complains that this delay forced him to make an extra bus trip to the credit union to obtain cash and a separate bus trip to pick up his check on Thursday.
Standard for Dismissal
An action may be dismissed if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The moving party has the burden of proving that no claim exists. Although a complaint is to be liberally construed, it is still necessary that the complaint contain more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)). All factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed to be true, and reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party. 2A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.34[1][b] (3d ed. 1997). The Court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). Dismissal is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02 (1957)).
Discussion
The Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant is a Michigan state agency endowed with the "authority, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities" of the state as to its unemployment policies and programs. M.C.L. §§ 421.94-.95. As such, Defendant is an "arm of the state" and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Reese v. Mich., No. 99-1173, 2000 WL 1647923, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2000) (per curiam). See Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (citing Hall v. Med. Coll., 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1984)); Holbrook v. Tenn. Dep't of Employ. Sec., 602 F. Supp. 507, 509 (M.D.Tenn. 1984). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks monetary damages from a state agency that would be paid from public funds out of the state treasury, such actions are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1356 (1974). In fact, this Court does not have jurisdiction over such claims. Lawson v. Shelby County, 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000).
Federal courts recognize three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) waiver/consent by the state, (2) abrogation of immunity by Congress, and (3) prospective injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908). Lawson, 211 F.3d at 334-35. None of the exceptions apply here. First, Defendant has not waived its immunity nor consented to suit. Second, Congress did not abrogate the state agency's immunity from suit by enacting § 1983. Like the state itself, a state agency such as Defendant is not a "person" under § 1983 and is not subject to liability under that section. Reese v. Indus. Comm'n, No. 00-3763, 2001 WL 111628, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2001); Toledo, Peoria, W. R.R. Co. v. Ill., Dep't of Transp., 744 F.2d 1296, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1984). Third, as noted above, Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from the state itself for his alleged constitutional violations, not prospective injunctive relief against an individual state actor. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the Opinion filed this date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Dismissal (docket no. 4) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
This case is closed.