Opinion
No. 05-10-00700-CR
Opinion issued March 16, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-51360-H.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tony Williams appeals from the adjudication of guilt for robbery. In a single issue, appellant contends the order of deferred adjudication and the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified. We affirm the judgment adjudicating guilt as modified. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant was indicted for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a firearm. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (West 2003). After the State reduced the charges in the indictment to robbery, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to the robbery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on two years' community supervision, and assessed a $2,000 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated several conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to all the allegations in a hearing on the motion. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment. Appellant contends the order of deferred adjudication and the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified to reflect the correct statute of the offense for which appellant was convicted. The State agrees that the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified as proposed by appellant. As to the order of deferred adjudication, we dismiss appellant's complaint. Once the trial court adjudicated appellant's guilt, the deferred adjudication order was no longer in effect. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd). A trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt expressly sets aside the underlying deferred adjudication order and declares it to be "of no further force and effect." See McCoy, 81 S.W.3d at 919. Therefore, there is no longer an order in effect requiring modification. The record shows appellant was convicted under statute 29.02 for the offense of robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (West 2003). The written judgment adjudicating guilt recites the statute for the offense as 29.03, which is the statute for the offense of aggravated robbery. Thus, the written judgment is incorrect. With regard to the judgment, we sustain appellant's issue. We modify the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt to show the statute for the offense is "29.02 Penal Code." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.