Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11287 No. 6160
03-18-2015
KENNETH M. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Christine Schleuss, Law Office of Christine Schleuss, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 4FA-11-1968 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Paul R. Lyle, Judge. Appearances: Christine Schleuss, Law Office of Christine Schleuss, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, District Court Judge. Judge MANNHEIMER.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Around 1:00 in the morning of March 28, 2011, a car belonging to Michelle Jackson exploded in fire. At the time, Jackson's car was parked in the carport of her apartment complex; the fire damaged several other vehicles, and it caused significant damage to the roof of the carport, to the point where the integrity of the structure was endangered.
The resulting investigation led the police to Jackson's former husband, Kenneth M. Williams. Williams was ultimately found guilty of first-degree arson and third-degree criminal mischief. He received a composite sentence of 9 years' imprisonment with 1 year suspended (8 years to serve).
AS 11.46.400(a) and AS 11.46.482(a)(1), respectively.
In this appeal, Williams challenges his convictions on two grounds. First, Williams argues that the trial court wrongfully denied his request for disclosure of the personnel file of one of the officers who investigated his case, and that the trial court wrongfully prohibited his attorney from cross-examining this investigator about the reasons why he was fired from the police department. Second, Williams argues that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support the conclusion that he was complicit in the arson. In addition, Williams argues that his composite sentence is excessive.
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that none of Williams's claims has merit.
Williams's request for disclosure of the investigator's personnel file
During Williams's trial, his attorney learned for the first time that one of the investigating officers in Williams's case, Joshua Lambert, had been fired by the Fairbanks Police Department some six months after his investigation of this case.
Williams's attorney asked for disclosure of Lambert's personnel file so that he could learn the reason for Lambert's firing. The trial judge agreed that the defense attorney would be entitled to disclosure of the personnel file if Lambert was terminated for any reason relating to Williams's case, or if Lambert's termination had anything to do with a lack of quality or integrity in his investigations in general. The judge then told the parties that he would review Lambert's personnel file in camera, and that he would order disclosure of the file if it contained anything that would be pertinent to the defense's cross-examination of Lambert, under the standard announced by this Court in Booth v. State, 251 P.3d 369, 374, 376 (Alaska App. 2011).
(Williams's attorney reserved his cross-examination of Lambert, pending the trial judge's ruling.)
The next day, the trial judge announced that he had reviewed Lambert's personnel file, and that there was nothing in the file that had the kind of case-specific relevance that would require disclosure under Booth. The judge explained that the reasons for Lambert's termination from the police department were "relevant, if at all, only on [the issue of] general credibility".
After the trial judge made this ruling, Williams's attorney asked the judge if he could cross-examine Lambert about the timing of the administrative proceedings that led to his termination — on the theory that, if those administrative proceedings were pending or imminent at the time of the arson investigation, this might affect Lambert's testimony.
(Although the defense attorney did not further explain his theory of relevance, he appears to have been arguing that if Lambert knew that his job was in jeopardy, this might have provided an impetus for Lambert to "prove himself" by quickly resolving the arson investigation and making an arrest, even if the evidence was not solid.)
The trial judge agreed that the defense attorney could question Lambert about the timing of the administrative proceedings that led to his termination. Outside the presence of the jury, Lambert testified (in voir dire examination) that he was not aware of exactly when the administrative proceedings against him were initiated, but that he was put on administrative leave at the beginning of August 2011, and he was officially terminated from the police department on September 19, 2011. (Lambert participated in the arson investigation the previous March.)
Lambert added that, following his termination, he filed an administrative grievance against the police department, and this grievance was still pending at the time of Williams's trial.
Based on this testimony, the trial judge told the defense attorney that he could cross-examine Lambert (in front of the jury) about the administrative proceedings — although the judge would also advise the jury that Lambert's termination from the police department was not related to Williams's case. Williams's attorney agreed to these procedures, but he then moved for a mistrial — stating that his goal was to preserve his claim that the trial judge should have disclosed the personnel file to him. The judge denied the request for a mistrial, and the trial continued.
On appeal, Williams renews his argument that the trial judge should have disclosed Lambert's personnel file to his attorney, and that the defense attorney should have been able to use that file to cross-examine Lambert regarding the reasons for his dismissal from the police force. To assess Williams's claim, we have independently reviewed the contents of the personnel file (which was included as a sealed portion of the trial court record).
We described the legal test that governs this situation in Booth v. State. If an officer's personnel file contains information that would be relevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence (in light of the facts of the case, the State's theory of prosecution, and the defendant's theory of defense), this information must be revealed to the defense. Id., 215 P.3d at 374. However, the law does not require disclosure of information "that is relevant (if at all) only for impeaching a police officer's general credibility or impeaching the officer's testimony on collateral matters". Ibid.
Based on our review of the personnel file, we agree with the trial judge that the file was not discoverable. According to the contents of the file, Lambert was not fired for reasons relating to this case; nor was he fired for reasons relating to the quality or integrity of his police investigations (i.e., dishonesty, incompetence, or bias). Although the reason for Lambert's termination potentially reflected poorly on his character, this information was not relevant to the litigation of Williams's case, and it would not have been admissible under Evidence Rule 404.
For these same reasons, the trial judge's ruling did not infringe Williams's right of cross-examination.
We accordingly uphold the trial judge's resolution of this matter.
The legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdicts
At Williams's trial, the State presented evidence that Williams and his roommate, Antwon Algee, went together to the apartment complex where Williams's ex-wife lived. They set fire to her car, and then they fled the scene.
It is true that a large portion of the State's evidence was circumstantial, but on the issue of whether evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction, Alaska law does not draw a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. The same test applies: We must ask whether, viewing the evidence (and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence) in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to convince fair-minded jurors that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Alaska App. 2008).
Wiglesworth v. State, 249 P.3d 321, 325 (Alaska App. 2011).
Viewing the evidence in Williams's case in that light, the evidence is sufficient to establish Williams's complicity in the arson beyond a reasonable doubt.
Williams's sentence appeal
Williams was a first felony offender. He therefore faced a presumptive sentencing range of 5 to 8 years' imprisonment for his first-degree arson conviction and a presumptive sentencing range of 0 to 2 years' imprisonment for his third-degree criminal mischief conviction.
See AS 12.55.125(c)(1) and AS 12.55.125(e)(1).
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The superior court sentenced Williams to a term of 8 years' imprisonment with 1 year suspended for the arson, and to a term of 2 years to serve for the criminal mischief. The court made 1 year of the criminal mischief sentence consecutive to Williams's arson sentence, thus yielding a composite sentence of 9 years with 1 year suspended — 8 years to serve.
On appeal, Williams argues that the court should not have imposed partially consecutive sentences for the arson and the criminal mischief convictions. He contends that the conduct underlying his criminal mischief conviction "did not cause a different risk or address a different societal harm than the arson conviction." It is true that Williams's arson conviction and his criminal mischief conviction arose from the same act of setting the fire. But the court concluded that partially consecutive sentences were warranted because the criminal mischief conviction was based solely on the property damage that Williams caused, while the arson conviction was focused on the danger to human life that Williams created by starting a fire in the carport of an apartment complex in the middle of the night.
Williams further contends that he should have received a lesser composite sentence. He notes that his arson sentence — 8 years with 1 year suspended — was toward the top of the 5- to 8-year presumptive range for that offense, and he argues that his arson was not that serious, since no one was physically harmed. But as the sentencing judge noted, the wooden roof of the carport was "fully engaged" by the fire when the firefighters arrived — creating a serious risk that the roof might collapse while the firefighters were working to bring the fire under control. The judge concluded that the lack of injury was attributable purely to good fortune.
Finally, Williams argues that the sentencing judge ignored his potential for rehabilitation, given that this was his first felony conviction. But Williams's crime was directed at his ex-wife, Michelle Jackson, and the State presented evidence that Williams had previously assaulted Jackson. In his sentencing remarks, the judge expressed particular concern over the intensity of Williams's anger toward Jackson, and the fact that Williams had apparently reached the point where he did not care if he hurt other people when he expressed that anger.
Given these circumstances, the sentencing judge could reasonably conclude that his sentencing decision needed to emphasize the goals of isolation and deterrence rather than rehabilitation. Under the supreme court's decision in Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1025-26 (Alaska 1973), the sentencing judge has primary responsibility for evaluating and weighing the sentencing goals in a particular case, and we are to disturb the sentencing judge's determination only if it is clearly mistaken. McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). Our review of the record convinces us that Williams's composite sentence is not clearly mistaken.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.