Williams v. State

Full title: LARRY MAURICE WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Mar 10, 2004

No. 05-03-00787-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2004)

Opinion

No. 05-03-00787-CR.

Opinion Filed March 10, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 005-80138-02. Affirm.

Before Justices MOSELEY, FITZGERALD, and FRANCIS.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.

Larry Maurice Williams appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated with an open container in his possession. Appellant pleaded guilty and, pursuant to an agreement regarding punishment, the trial court imposed a fine of $500, sentenced appellant to ninety days in jail, suspended imposition of the sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision for one year. Appellant brings two issues on appeal, asserting the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the results of a blood test because the blood specimen was not lawfully taken because appellant was not lawfully under arrest. We affirm appellant's conviction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2001, at 6:45 p.m., Officers Mark Speaker and Tyra Corbett of the Plano Police Department were dispatched to a "major" two-vehicle accident involving a Ford Mustang and a Lincoln Town Car. When they arrived on the scene, appellant was being loaded into an ambulance. Speaker spoke to the firefighters, who told him appellant's injuries did not appear to be life threatening and that it appeared appellant had been drinking alcohol. The firefighters said appellant "had an odor of alcohol coming from his person." The firefighters told Speaker that appellant had been inside the Mustang and that he was the only occupant of the vehicle, "but they did not specifically say that he was driving." Corbett spoke to witnesses of the accident who said "the vehicle that Mr. Williams was driving, there was a sole occupant, it was white male; there was no other persons found." Corbett found an open can of beer inside the Mustang, and "[t]here was a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage from the vehicle." After speaking to the witnesses and the emergency medical personnel, Corbett had no doubt that appellant was the driver of the Mustang. In her investigation, Corbett concluded appellant caused the accident by making a left turn in front of the Town Car without yielding the right of way to the Town Car. After completing their investigation at the accident scene, Speaker and Corbett went to the hospital. They found appellant in an emergency room. Appellant was lying on a back board, he was wearing neck and head braces, and his head was taped down to the bed so he could not move it. Appellant had a large knot on his cheek, the right side of his face was swollen, and he had some facial cuts. Both Speaker and Corbett immediately noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from appellant. In response to Speaker's inquiries, the doctor treating appellant told Speaker that appellant's injuries were not life threatening. The doctor told Speaker he thought appellant had been drinking and was intoxicated. Speaker and Corbett then decided to arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated. At 9:15 p.m., Corbett told appellant he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated, but neither she nor Speaker put handcuffs on appellant. Corbett read appellant the DIC-24 form, which is the statutory warnings that precede a request for a breath or blood specimen. Appellant agreed the officers could obtain a specimen of his blood. After agreeing to the taking of a blood specimen, appellant asked when he could go home. The officers told appellant that his medical condition was still being evaluated. If the hospital personnel decided to admit appellant to the hospital, then the officers would leave him at the hospital, appellant could go home when he was released from the hospital, and the officers would file any charges against him while he was at large. The officers also told appellant that if the hospital personnel did not admit appellant and he was released from the hospital, then the officers would take him to jail. The officers made an audio recording of the reading of the DIC-24 form, appellant's agreement to give the blood specimen, and the officers' explanation of whether appellant could go home. A qualified technician at the hospital drew appellant's blood. After obtaining the blood specimen, the officers learned appellant needed more treatment and might be admitted to the hospital, and they left the hospital. Charges were later filed against appellant, and he was subsequently arrested. Appellant testified the officers told him he was under arrest for DWI but they never put him in handcuffs. He testified he was not sure he was under arrest, but he assumed he was. After obtaining the blood specimen, the officers left appellant in the hospital. The next morning, when he was released from the hospital, he went home. The blood specimen was tested by the Department of Public Safety's Garland Crime Laboratory and showed appellant had 0.22 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Appellant argued the blood sample was not lawfully taken because he was not under arrest at the time as required by the implied consent statute and the officers lacked authority to arrest him because he did not commit the offense in their presence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated probable cause existed for appellant's arrest, appellant was under arrest as shown by the officer's testimony and the audio tape, the implied consent statute applies, no coercion was placed upon appellant to consent, and appellant's consent was voluntary. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under the bifurcated standard enunciated in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We give almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact and review de novo the trial court's application of the law. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. When a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is correct based on any theory of law applicable to the case, the trial court's decision will be affirmed even if the trial judge has given an incorrect reason. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd).

IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE

In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his blood specimen was not lawfully taken under the implied consent statute. Under the implied consent statute of section 724.011 of the Texas Transportation Code, a person arrested for driving while intoxicated is deemed to have consented to the taking of a specimen of his breath or blood to test for the concentration of alcohol. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.011(a) (Vernon 1999). "Under the implied consent statute, consent is not implied absent an arrest." Knisley, 81 S.W.3d at 482. Appellant argues the implied consent statute does not apply because he was not, in fact, under arrest when he consented to give the specimen. Under the code of criminal procedure, "A person is arrested when he has been actually placed under restraint or taken into custody by an officer. . . ." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977).

[A]n "arrest" is complete when a person's liberty of movement is successfully restricted or restrained, whether this is achieved by an officer's physical force or the suspect's submission to the officer's authority. Furthermore, an arrest is complete only if "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest."

Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (quoting United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988)). In this case, appellant's position was that of being pinned to the bed with his head immobilized. Although the restraint was imposed by the hospital personnel for the purposes of treating appellant, it appears he was "placed under restraint" and "his freedom of movement was successfully restricted or restrained." Because of appellant's apparent head injuries and possible neck or back injuries, the trial court could reasonably conclude the officers could not have further restrained appellant without risking additional injury to him. The officers appear to have had no better way of conveying to appellant that he was under arrest other than by simply telling him so, which they did. After appellant agreed to the blood test, the officers told him that if he was not kept by the hospital staff for observation, they would take him to jail. Appellant testified that when the officers told him he was under arrest he assumed he was under arrest. We conclude the trial court did not err in concluding appellant was under arrest when the DIC-24 form was read to him and he agreed to submit a specimen of his blood and the specimen was taken because "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest." Id.; see Bell v. State, 881 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) ("A reasonable person, injured and lying on a hospital stretcher, hearing from a police officer the words `you are under arrest' and `placed under arrest,' could conclude that he was not free to leave."). The fact that the officers, after obtaining the blood sample and learning appellant would not be released immediately from the hospital, decided not to stay with appellant and released him from their custody does not affect the conclusion that appellant was under arrest at the time the officers requested and appellant agreed to give the blood specimen and when the specimen was taken. We conclude appellant's arguments that he was not under arrest as required for the application of the implied consent statute lack merit. We resolve appellant's first issue against him.

AUTHORITY TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT

In his second issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the blood specimen was not lawfully taken under Texas law. Specifically, appellant asserts his warrantless arrest was without authority and the blood specimen was evidence obtained in violation of Texas law. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp. 2004). Appellant argues the officers lacked authority to arrest him without a warrant because the offense was not committed in their presence. Appellant asserts that under article 14.01 of the code of criminal procedure, an officer cannot arrest a suspect without a warrant for a misdemeanor unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977) ("A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view."); see also id. art. 14.04 (officer's right to arrest for felony without warrant when offender is about to escape and there is no time to procure warrant). However, article 14.03 provides, "Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant: (1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some . . . breach of the peace. . . ." Id. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Driving while intoxicated in a public place is a breach of the peace. See Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Cooper v. State, 961 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant does not dispute that the Mustang driver's failure to yield the right of way to the Town Car and causing the "major accident" was a breach of the peace. Likewise, the evidence that appellant was the driver of the Mustang and was intoxicated reasonably showed appellant was guilty of the breach of the peace. Accordingly, the remaining question is whether, under these circumstances, the hospital where the officers found appellant was a "suspicious place." In Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), the court of criminal appeals held that a hospital could be a suspicious place authorizing the arrest of a suspect under article 14.03(a)(1). Id. at 468. In that case, the officer arrived at the scene of a one-car accident and learned the driver had been taken to the hospital. Id. The court of criminal appeals stated, "This information would tend to make a hospital a suspicious place in which to seek the driver who was suspected of causing the accident." Id. In this case, the officers arrived on the scene of the accident as appellant was being loaded into an ambulance for transportation to a hospital. As in Dyar, these circumstances make a hospital a "suspicious place" for purposes of article 14.03(a)(1). We conclude the officers had authority to arrest appellant under the statute. Appellant's argument that the officers did not have authority to arrest him lacks merit. We resolve appellant's second issue against him.

CONCLUSION

We hold the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.