This Act was held valid in Love v. State, 107 Fla. 376, 144 So. 842. The prior statute relating to arson was held to be invalid because it violated Section 16, Article III, of the State Constitution in that it contained regulations of two distinct and incongruous subjects. See Chapter 11812, Acts of 1927; Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186; Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188. It is in effect argued here that Chapter 15603 violates Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution in that the title of the Act expresses the subject of the Act to be "to denominate as `arson' the crime hereby denounced, and to divide the same into degrees, and to provide the punishment for each degree," when "the statute does not denominate any particular crime as arson but each section deals with a different kind of burning, and instead of denouncing any one crime as arson, it has set forth four crimes and denounced each as arson"; that the crimes included in the statute are not degrees of any one offense, but four separate and distinct statutory crimes; that "the statute purports to denounce a single crime and proceeds to denounce four separate and distinct crimes."
This Act was held valid in Love v. State, 107 Fla. 376, 144 So.2d 842. The prior statute relating to arson was held to be invalid because it violated Section 16, Article III, of the State Constitution in that it contained regulations of two distinct and incongruous subjects. See Chapter 11812, Acts of 1927; Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So.2d 186; Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So.2d 188. It is in effect argued here that Chapter 15603 violates Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution in that the title of the Act expresses the subject of the Act to be "to denominate as `arson' the crime hereby denounced, and to divide the same into degrees, and to provide the punishment for each degree," when "the statute does not denominate any particular crime as arson but each section deals with a different kind of burning, and instead of denouncing any one crime as arson, it has set forth four crimes and denounced each as arson"; that the crimes included in the statute are not degrees of any one offense, but four separate and distinct statutory crimes; that "the statute purports to denounce a single crime and proceeds to denounce four separate and distinct crimes."
This failure, plus appellants' driving at an excessive speed, were at least contributing causes of the accident. See Gittings v. Schenuit, 122 Md. 282, 286, 90 A. 51, 52; Broussard v. Teche Transfer Co., 15 La.App. 439, 441, 132 So. 136, 137. We do not agree with the District Judge, however, that the appellee's conduct was free from fault.
Duke v. State, 132 Fla. 865, 870, 185 So. 422, 425 (1938). See also Sawyer v. State, 100 Fla. 1603, 132 So. 188 (1931); Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930). Under this definition, a specific intent to burn is not required.
Nevertheless, it is our view that the subject of section 1 has no cogent relationship with the subject of sections 2 and 3 and that the object of section 1 is separate and disassociated from the object of sections 2 and 3. State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 163 So. 270 (1935); and Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930). We hold that section 1 of 82-150 was enacted in violation of the one-subject provision of article III, section 6, Florida Constitution.
Nevertheless, it is our view that the subject of section 1 has no cogent relationship with the subject of sections 2 and 3 and that the object of section 1 is separate and disassociated from the object of sections 2 and 3. State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 163 So. 270 (1935); and Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186 (1930). We hold that section 1 of 82-150 was enacted in violation of the one-subject provision of article III, section 6, Florida Constitution.
The testimony shows that at the time the heater was removed the house was still under construction, an unfinished building and not a dwelling within the meaning of the statute. Code 1940, Tit. 14, ยง 331; Reeves v. State, 245 Ala. 237, 16 So.2d 699; Davis v. State, 153 Ala. 48, 44 So. 1018, 127 Am.St.Rep. 17, 15 Ann.Cas. 547; Williams v. State, 100 Fla. 1054, 132 So. 186, 188; State v. Lemoine, 178 La. 1070, 152 So. 907; Woods v. State, 186 Miss. 463, 191 So. 283. The offense is one against the ownership of the property upon which the alleged trespass was committed. It is shown without dispute that the title to the house was in another than appellant; and hence there could be no conviction under the indictment. Dunn v. State, 16 Ala. App. 478, 79 So. 152; Gravlee v. Williams, 112 Ala. 539, 20 So. 952; Austin v. Moebes, 212 Ala. 455, 102 So. 535; Smythe Lbr. Co. v. Austin, 162 Ala. 110, 49 So. 875. The offense charged is a particular kind of trespass.