Opinion
2:23-cv-06931-BHH-MGB
02-14-2024
Christopher S. Williams, # 811481, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Christopher S. Williams (Petitioner), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings what appears to be his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the wrong venue.Indeed, it is well-established that a § 2254 petition “must name as respondent the state officer who has custody” of the petitioner. Rule 2(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004). The custodian is typically “the person with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court.” See McLean v. Vereen, No. 2:18-cv-3600-RMG, 2019 WL 2514728, at *1 (D.S.C. June 18, 2019) (citing Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 434-35); see also Rodriguez v. Joyner, No. 5:18-cv-2294-MGL-KDW, 2020 WL 6785645, at *1 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2020) (noting that ascertaining the proper respondent is critical because “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody”) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)). Because the court issuing the writ must have jurisdiction over the custodian, “[his or her] absence from the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is fatal to habeas jurisdiction.” Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 445; see also Braden, 410 U.S. at 495 (stating that district courts are limited to granting habeas relief “within their respective jurisdictions”).
Petitioner first attempted to bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this Court on March 31, 2023. See Williams v. South Carolina, 2:23-cv-01290-BHH (D.S.C., July 27, 2023). For the same reasons discussed herein, however, Petitioner's action was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Petitioner's filings indicate that he is still confined at Tabor Correctional Institution (“Tabor”), which falls within the territory of the Eastern District of North Carolina.Therefore, while Petitioner may have been sentenced in South Carolina (see Indictment Nos. 2008-GS-26-03903, -03904), the proper respondent to his habeas action remains the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Petitioner's current custodian. See Robinson v. Buffaloe, No. 3:20-cv-397-MR, 2022 WL 1019992, at *6 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 5, 2022) (“North Carolina law mandates that the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety is the custodian of all state inmates and has the power to control and transfer them.”). Because the District of South Carolina has no personal jurisdiction over the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's habeas claims here.
The undersigned verified Petitioner's location using the North Carolina Department of Public Safety's inmate database. See https://www.ncinmatesearch.org/NCDPS.html (last visited February 13, 2024).
See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/horry/publicindex/ (last visited February 13, 2024).
The court may, “in the interest of justice,” transfer a case “to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the decision of whether to transfer or dismiss a case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court). Thus, in order to preserve any issues that may arise regarding statutes of limitation, and out of an abundance of caution for the pro se petitioner here, the undersigned finds it in the interest of justice to transfer the instant case to the proper district court. See, e.g. Cruz-Rivera v. O'Brien, No. 5:15-cv-17, 2016 WL 845279, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 4, 2016) (transferring § 2254 habeas action to the district with jurisdiction over petitioner's present custodian); Burton v. Rupert, No. 4:16-cv-178-JMC-TER, 2016 WL 5946880, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 5933964 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 2016) (same).
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this petition be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina so that the proper court may determine whether Petitioner's claims are actionable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).