Opinion
# 2020-038-532 Motion No. M-95155
03-16-2020
DeANDRE WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
DeANDRE WILLIAMS, Pro se LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Heather R. Rubinstein, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for late claim relief denied. Claimant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing the claim or the appearance of merit, and had other State remedies available to him.
Case information
| UID: | 2020-038-532 |
| Claimant(s): | DeANDRE WILLIAMS |
| Claimant short name: | WILLIAMS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | None |
| Motion number(s): | M-95155 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | W. BROOKS DeBOW |
| Claimant's attorney: | DeANDRE WILLIAMS, Pro se |
| Defendant's attorney: | LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Heather R. Rubinstein, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | March 16, 2020 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an individual currently incarcerated in a State correctional facility, moves for permission to file and serve a late claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6). The proposed claim alleges that claimant's right to free exercise of religion has been continuously violated since April 2011. Defendant opposes the motion.
The proposed claim was verified on October 4, 2019.
The proposed claim alleges that claimant is "being refused [his] constitutional (state & federal) right of the free exercise of [his] religious beliefs as a Nazarite which [the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS)] is refusing to recognize in violation of Correction Law § 610 (1) & subjecting [him] to cruel & unusual punishment" (Proposed Claim, ¶ 2). The proposed claim further alleges that the claim arose while claimant was "under [DOCCS] control & custody on or about April 2011 to the present" and that claimant "ha[s] also been denied a religious diet" during that time, "forcing [him] to starve" (id. at ¶ 3).
As an initial matter, defendant argues that claimant's motion for late claim relief must be denied as untimely because the proposed claim alleges that it accrued in April 2011, and the instant motion was filed long after the one-year statute of limitations for intentional tort had expired (see Rubinstein Affirmation in Opposition, ¶¶ 10-11). Claimant asks the Court "to settle the matter as to the accrual date as [his] religious rights under the NYS Constitution & Correction Law § 610 (1) (3) [are] being violated & subjected to cruel & unusual punishment by also refusing a proper religious [diet]" (Proposed Claim, ¶ 4, fn). Contrary to defendant's contention, the proposed claim alleges that it arose "on or about April 2011 to the present" (id. at ¶ 3 [emphasis added]), and it thus alleges a continuing harm. "[B]ecause a cause of action for a continuing harm continuously accrues" (Davis v Rosenblatt, 159 AD2d 163, 168 [3d Dept 1990]), claimant's motion for late claim relief is timely, and it will not be denied on that basis (see e.g. Mary K. v Levy, 109 AD3d 587, 588 [2d Dept 2013] [where plaintiff alleged "a continuing harm, no period of limitation is applicable"]; Johnson v Carro, 24 AD3d 140, 141 [1st Dept 2005], lv dismissed 6 NY3d 843 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 704 [2006] [declining to dismiss a CPLR article 78 proceeding as "time-barred, since the harm claimed . . . is a continuing one"]).
Turning to the merits of claimant's late claim motion, in deciding a motion to file a late claim, the Court is required to consider the following factors:
"whether the delay in filing the claim was excusable; whether the state had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; whether the state had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; whether the claim appears to be meritorious; whether the failure to file or serve upon the attorney general a timely claim or to serve upon the attorney general a notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to the state, and whether the claimant has any other available remedy"
(Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). The presence or absence of any particular factor is not controlling (see Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979, 981 [1982]), and the weight accorded the various factors is a matter within the discretion of the Court. Although "[t]he movant need not satisfy every statutory element[,] . . . the burden rests with the movant to persuade the court to grant his or her late claim motion" (Frederick v State of New York, 23 Misc 3d 1008, 1011 [Ct Cl 2009]).
In support of his motion for late claim relief, claimant asserts that the delay in filing this claim was excusable because "this issue was supposed to have been settled" through his federal civil rights action (Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, ¶ 2; see id., Exhibit A, Exhibit C [Muttrega Correspondence, dated Aug. 29, 2019; Calla Correspondence, dated Oct. 21, 2019; Calla Correspondence, dated Nov. 6, 2019, with attachment]). Although defendant has not addressed this factor, it nevertheless weighs against granting claimant's late claim application inasmuch as claimant was not prevented from filing a claim in the Court of Claims simply because he had previously commenced a federal action, and thus the preexisting federal action is not a reasonable excuse for failing to timely file this claim.
The next three factors - whether the State had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim and an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim, and whether claimant's failure to file or serve upon the attorney general a timely claim or notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to the State - are closed related, and may be considered together (see Conroy v State of New York, 192 Misc 2d 71, 72 [Ct Cl 2002]; Brewer v State of New York, 176 Misc 2d 337, 342 [Ct Cl 1998]). Claimant indicates that "[t]he State had notice of the essential facts constituting this claim" by way of his federal civil rights action (Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, ¶ 3). Because defendant does not address these three factors in its opposition, they weigh in favor of claimant's late claim application.
Turning next to the appearance of merit of the proposed claim, this factor is often decisive because, although Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) reflects a legislative determination that "litigants with meritorious claims [should] be afforded their day in court" (Plate v State of New York, 92 Misc 2d 1033, 1036 [Ct Cl 1978]; see Calzada v State of New York, 121 AD2d 988, 989 [1st Dept 1986]), the courts have recognized that a late claim application should not be granted where a claim is "legally deficient . . . [and] would be subject to immediate dismissal, even if the other factors tend to favor the granting of the request" (Prusack v State of New York, 117 AD2d 729, 730 [2d Dept 1986]; Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1, 10 [Ct Cl 1977]). In general, a party seeking to establish the merit of a proposed late claim need not demonstrate a likelihood that he or she will prevail on the claim. Rather, a proposed claim has the appearance of merit within the meaning of Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) if: (1) the proposed claim is not "patently groundless, frivolous, or legally defective," and (2) all of the evidence submitted on the motion establishes "reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists" (Matter of Santana, 92 Misc 2d at 11).
Claimant argues in support of his motion for late claim relief that defendant has refused to recognize his Nazarite fath even though he began filing grievances with respect to his religious rights in 2011 and completed a "Change of Religion" form in 2015 (see Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, Exhibit D [Williams "Affirmation," ¶ 1 (a) - (c)]). Claimant further argues that his right to free exercise of religion has been violated the "whole time," that defendant has "subjected [him] to cruel & unusual punishments" by denying him his religious diet, and that various DOCCS chaplains have "tr[ied] to tell [claimant] to whom & how [he] can or should worship" and denied him access to religious events (id. at ¶¶ 3-4). Defendant argues in opposition that the claim lacks merit because it does not state a cognizable claim in the Court of Claims. Specifically, defendant argues that to the extent claimant alleges a federal constitutional cause of action, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim, and, to the extent it alleges a violation of his state constitutional right to free exercise of religion, that right must be vindicated through an action in Supreme Court pursuant to Correction Law § 610 (see Rubinstein Affirmation in Opposition, ¶¶ 6-10).
Although claimant's submission is styled an "affirmation," it is properly sworn to as an affidavit (see Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, Exhibit D [Williams "Affirmation," sworn to October 4, 2019]).
Defendant also argues that claimant's motion for late claim relief should be denied because the proposed claim fails to comply with the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) inasmuch as it fails to allege "the time when and place where such claim arose" and "the nature of same" (see Rubinstein Affirmation in Opposition, ¶¶ 3-4; see also Matos v State of New York, UID No. 2019-038-535 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Apr. 29, 2019] [a proposed claim that fails to comply with Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) is jurisdictionally defective and lacking in merit]). First, contrary to defendant's contentions, the proposed claim sufficiency alleges the time and place the claim arose inasmuch as it alleges that claimant's right to free exercise of his Nazarite faith was violated at Green Haven Correctional Facility beginning in April 2011 to the present (see Proposed Claim, ¶¶ 3-4). Moreover, in the Court's view, the allegations in the claim that defendant was continually violating claimant's right to free exercise of his religion by "refusing to recognize" his Nazarite faith and denying him his requested "religious diet" (id., ¶¶ 2-3), although brief, are sufficiently detailed "to enable [defendant] to investigate and promptly ascertain the existence and extent of its liability" (Morra v State of New York, 107 AD3d 1115, 1116 [3d Dept 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]) without "requir[ing] the State to ferret out or assemble information" required to investigate and defend the claim (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 208 [2003]). Because the proposed claim sufficiently complies with Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), claimant's late claim application will not be dismissed on that basis.
Defendant is correct that to the extent that the proposed claim can be read to allege a violation of claimant's federal constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment (see Proposed Claim, ¶ 2), it patently lacks merit inasmuch as the Court of Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction over alleged violations of a claimant's rights under the United States Constitution, which must be brought in federal or state court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503, 504 [2d Dept 1989]; Ferrer v State of New York, 172 Misc 2d 1, 5 [Ct Cl 1996]). To the extent the proposed claim can be read as seeking to vindicate claimant's state constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, it is well-settled that a cause of action sounding in state constitutional tort may be pursued only when no other remedy is available to enforce the claimed constitutional right (see Brown 89 NY2d at 192 [1996]; Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83-84 [2001]; Oppenheimer v State of New York, 152 AD3d 1006, 1008-1009 [3d Dept 2017]), and is thus unavailable here inasmuch as the alleged violations could have been addressed through the inmate grievance process and CPLR article 78 proceeding (see e.g. Matter of Sylvester v Fischer, 126 AD3d 1330 [4th Dept 2015] [inmate filed grievance and subsequent CPLR article 78 petition with respect to prison officials' denial of his request for a special religious diet]; Matter of Patel v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 703 [2010] [inmate filed grievance and subsequent CPLR article 78 petition with respect to the Central Office Review Committee's denial of his grievance requesting a vegan diet for religious and medical reasons]), or, as noted above, a 42 USC § 1983 suit in federal court.
In fact, claimant's submissions in support of his late claim motion establish that claimant has filed grievances in the past with respect to the alleged ongoing violation of his free exercise right (see Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, Exhibits B-1 & B-2; see also id., Exhibit D [Williams "Affirmation," ¶ 1 (a) ("I have been filing grievances since 2011 in regards to DOCCS refusing my religious rights")]), and that he filed a federal lawsuit alleging that DOCCS officials violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in failing to accommodate "the dietary restrictions imposed by his Nazarite . . . faith" (id., Exhibit A [Williams v Annucci, No. 15-1018, pg. 2]). --------
To the extent the proposed claim alleges a cause of action for violation of claimant's right to free exercise of religion under Correction Law § 610 (1) and (3), that statute provides that an inmate alleging religious discrimination "may institute proceedings in the supreme court of the district where such institution is situated, which is hereby authorized and empowered to enforce the provisions of this section" (Correction Law § 610 [3]). Because the statute, by its own terms, vests exclusive jurisdiction over inmates' free exercise claims in Supreme Court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim. Because the proposed claim fails to allege any actionable claim in this Court, the crucial factor of the appearance of merit weighs decisively against granting claimant's late claim application.
Finally, claimant asserts that he has no other available State remedy, which defendant does not dispute. However, as noted above, claimant could have pursued a CPLR article 78 proceeding or a proceeding pursuant to Correction Law § 610 in Supreme Court, and his own submissions indicate that he has already sought to vindicate his free exercise right through an action in federal court (see Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, Exhibit A), and therefore, this factor weighs against granting claimant's application for late claim relief.
Having considered and weighed all of the factors set forth in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), the Court finds that although three of the six statutory factors weigh in support of granting claimant's late claim application, the crucial factor of the appearance of merit, as well as the reason for the delay in filing the claim and the availability of other remedies, weigh decisively against granting the motion. Thus, claimant's motion to serve and file this late claim will not be granted.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that claimant's motion number M-95155 is DENIED.
March 16, 2020
Saratoga Springs, New York
W. BROOKS DeBOW
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers considered: 1. Notice of Motion, undated; 2. Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, undated, with Exhibits A-D; 3. Proposed Claim, verified October 2, 2019; 4. Affirmation of Heather R. Rubinstein, AAG, in Opposition for Leave to File Late Claim, dated February 28, 2020, with Exhibit A.