Opinion
23-CV-10323 (LTS)
01-29-2024
DERICK LOUIS WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. SAMARITAN DAYTOP VILLAGE WOODSIDE SENIOR CENTER; TONYA CHESTNUT; ROBERT KLOEPPING, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Derick Louis Williams, who is proceeding pro se, asserts claims regarding his supervisors' alleged mistreatment of him while he performed his job as a custodian at Samaritan Daytop Village Woodside Senior Center. By order dated November 20, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action asserting that Defendants threatened him with losing his job, treated him differently because he is a man, made racist comments toward him, and retaliated against him. He names as Defendants Samaritan Daytop Woodside Senior Center (“Senior Center”), which is located in Queens County; Tonya Chestnut, Senior Center's Program Director; and Robert Kloepping, Assistant to a Vice President at a Samaritan Daytop location in Bronx County.
Plaintiff alleges the following: “[Defendants] threaten my job several times and I don't have a food handler licens[e][.] I've been doing this job under pressure that I might lose my job or get written up for insubordinate.[.] I just received a write up for poor work performance by Ms. Chestnut that retaliation.” (ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered the following injuries: “On Oct 13, 2023 I ask Tonya Chestnut to call me ambulance and she refused to get me medical assistance.” (Id. at 6.) He seeks unspecified monetary damages.
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original, unless noted otherwise.
Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a charge that he filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”). The DHR charge indicates that Plaintiff works as a custodian at the Senior Center and asserts that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against him because he opposed discrimination and because of his marital status (single). (Id. at 12.) The DHR charge also indicates that he received “a disciplinary notice or negative performance review,” he suffered harassment or intimidation, and was “forced to be a kitchen helper when I'm a custodian.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff contends that Chestnut “uses her director manager status to intimidate and harass male employee like custodian Derick Williams.” (Id. at 21.)
Plaintiff also attaches a “2nd Written Warning,” dated August 3, 2023, from Chestnut, claiming that Plaintiff showed “insubordination” and “poor job performance.” (Id. at 18.) This warning, Plaintiff contends, is an example of Chestnut's retaliation against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's allegations regarding Kloepping, contained in his DHR charge, concern an incident between the two. Briefly, Plaintiff states that he informed Kloepping that he intended to take time off from work, and Kloepping stated in response, “Well if you don't show up you would be fired[.]” (Id. at 24.) This discussion led to Kloepping encouraging Plaintiff to “swing” at him, a comment Plaintiff understood to be “said in a racist manner because only thing Black men can do is swing on people and fight people they can't sit down and have a civil conversation or meeting of the minds with any other person especially Robert Kloepping . . . it's clear to see that I am the target.” (Id. at 27.) Later, after Plaintiff explained to Kloepping why he needed to take time off from work, Kloepping “came back and said Derick I'm sorry I apologize I'm very sorry[.]” (Id.)
This incident appears related to Plaintiff's allegation that Kloepping and Chestnut mistreat Plaintiff: “[H]e throw that in the air a lot and he very disrespectful with the recovery people and I guess he thought I was recovering and he can talk to me in that manner everybody deserve respect recovering or not and him, Ms. Chestnut use that tactic as a fair tactic to intimidate people and threaten their job and harass me[.]” (Id. at 26.)
DISCUSSION
The Court construes the complaint as asserting race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in a Title VII employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Still, the plaintiff need only provide “minimal support for the proposition that the [defendant] was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. at 85 (quotation marks omitted).
Where the alleged discrimination arises from comments made by the employer, “‘stray remarks' that are temporally removed from the adverse employment action at issue cannot, without more, meet even a ‘de minimis burden of raising an inference of discriminatory intent.'” Johnson v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-9600 (AJN), 2020 WL 2036708, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (quoting Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001)). “This applies with additional force when the remarks are not made by a decisionmaker.” Id. (citing Dixon v. Int'l Fed'n of Accountants, 416 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[S]tray comments [by a co-worker who played no role in the plaintiff's termination] do not create an inference of discrimination.”) (alterations in original)).
Plaintiff's allegations, that Chestnut harassed him because he was a man and that Kloepping treated him in a racist manner, do not state claims under Title VII. Plaintiff's allegation of sex discrimination against Chestnut suggests only that a female supervisor reprimanded a male supervisee, not that Chestnut treated Plaintiff differently because he is a man. His allegation of race discrimination against Kloepping suggests only that Kloepping made comments toward Plaintiff that Plaintiff understood to be racist, not that Kloepping took any adverse employment action against Plaintiff because of his race. Finally, Plaintiff's allegations that Chestnut retaliated against him are not supported by any facts describing the reason for the alleged retaliation or the adverse employment action taken in retaliation.
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to plead facts in support of his Title VII claims. As described in more detail below, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert discrimination claims, he must plead facts suggesting that his sex and/or race were motivating factors in adverse employment actions taken by Defendants. Should he pursue a retaliation claim, he must plead facts describing the unlawful discriminatory conduct Plaintiff opposed, and the nature of the retaliation taken against him because of his opposition.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state Title VII claims, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to file an amended complaint to detail these claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the amended complaint must be repeated in the second amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10323 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A copy of NYLAG's flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.