Opinion
23A-PO-2833
07-08-2024
Quinisha Williams, Appellant-Respondent, v. Veronica Bonilla Rivera, Appellee-Petitioner.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court The Honorable Chad M. Miner, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 43D03-2309-PO-233
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Shepard, Senior Judge.
[¶1] Quinisha Williams appeals from the trial court's grant of a protective order directing her to refrain from stalking, harassing, or otherwise contacting Veronica Bonilla Rivera. Williams contends Bonilla Rivera did not meet her burden of proof for a protective order. Concluding the evidence supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2023, Bonilla Rivera lived with a man who was divorcing Williams. On January 24, Bonilla Rivera was at her apartment when Williams arrived and tried to open her boyfriend's vehicle. When Williams saw Bonilla Rivera, she insulted and threatened her. Williams left when Bonilla Rivera said she would call the police.
[¶3] Later that day, Bonilla Rivera returned home. Upon arriving, Williams ran up to her vehicle and tried to open the door. When that failed, Williams repeatedly hit Bonilla Rivera's window, trying to break in. Bonilla Rivera drove to the police station, with Williams following for only a short distance. Officers escorted Bonilla Rivera home.
[¶4] The next day, Bonilla Rivera returned home and found notes attached to her front door and her boyfriend's car. The notes were in Spanish. Three of them were identical and accused Bonilla Rivera of destroying Williams' family. The note further said, "You took my family and God is going to make you pay for that." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 9; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 11. Williams later admitted she had left the notes on Bonilla Rivera's door.
[¶5] On a later occasion, Bonilla Rivera and her boyfriend arrived at a pizza restaurant to pick up an order. Williams was also present and insulted her. Williams went outside when Bonilla Rivera threatened to call the police. A few minutes later, Bonilla Rivera went to the parking lot to answer a phone call. Williams got out of her vehicle and ran toward her, and she went back inside the restaurant. Bonilla Rivera's boyfriend held the front door, preventing Williams from entering. Williams yelled at her, saying she would "beat [her] anywhere she would see [her]." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. Williams left after a restaurant employee called the police. She later admitted she was angry when she followed Bonilla Rivera back to the restaurant. Williams also conceded she had yelled at Bonilla Rivera after her ex-husband prevented her from entering.
[¶6] On September 8, 2023, Bonilla Rivera petitioned for a protective order, alleging Williams had stalked and harassed her. On October 30, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing with both parties present. A court-appointed interpreter was also present. The next day, the trial court issued an order prohibiting Williams from "harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with [Bonilla Rivera]." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 7. The order further barred Williams from stalking or harassing Bonilla Rivera. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Bonilla Rivera has not filed an appellee's brief. "When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellee, and we apply a less stringent standard of review." M.R. v. B.C., 120 N.E.3d 220, 223 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). "[W]e may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it." Id. "In making this determination, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility." C.V. v. C.R., 64 N.E.3d 850, 853 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). "We look only to the evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment." Id.
[¶8] Williams is proceeding pro se. "It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys." Jones v. Hawk, 233 N.E.3d 1061, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). We have done our best to address her arguments, but "[w]e will not become a party's advocate[.]" Id. at 1067.
[¶9] The trial court issued the protective order under the Indiana Civil Protection
Act, Indiana Code sections 34-26-5-1 (2019) et seq. ("the Act"). See Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 6 (protective order cover sheet). Among other goals, the Act is intended to "promote the . . . protection and safety of all victims of harassment in a fair, prompt, and effective manner[.]" Ind. Code § 34-26-5-1. A person may petition for a protective order "against a person who has committed repeated acts of harassment against the petitioner." Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b) (2021). And a trial court may issue a protective order "[i]f it appears from a petition for an order for protection . . . that harassment has occurred[.]" Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b) (2023).
[¶10] The Act does not define harassment, but Indiana Code section 35-45-10-2 (1993) describes harassment as "conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress." See Fox v. Bonam, 45 N.E.3d 794, 798 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (applying the definition in Indiana Code section 35-45-10-2 to a protective order case).
[¶11] Williams argues Bonilla Rivera "fabricated" and misrepresented the events at issue, pointing to her own contrasting testimony. Appellant's Br. p. 13. She also claims the trial court should have disregarded Bonilla Rivera's testimony because Bonilla Rivera does not speak English and misunderstood her statements during their interactions. And Williams argues Bonilla Rivera requested a protective order to "gain an unfair advantage" in a separate lawsuit in which Williams is suing Bonilla Rivera and her ex-husband. Id. at 12. Finally, she claims Bonilla Rivera provoked her at the restaurant. These arguments are, in essence, a request to reassess the evidence the parties presented to the trial court. We must defer to the trial court's determinations of witness credibility, particularly "in protective order cases, where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events." S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 498 (Ind. 2023). The evidence presented at the hearing is more than enough to demonstrate Williams repeatedly harassed Bonilla Rivera.
[¶12] Next, Williams argues the trial court impatiently "rushed through the hearing," limiting her from presenting her side of events. Appellant's Br. pp. 13-14. The transcript reveals several instances when the trial court directed both sides to focus on whether Bonilla Rivera had shown a need for a protective order. The trial court did not err.
[¶13] Finally, Williams argues the trial court "did not apply the law fairly and based its decision on personal opinion[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 12. She explains the trial judge "made the presumption that I was angry that my ex-husband left me for someone else." Id. at 13. The trial court's conclusion was a reasonable assessment of the evidence, in light of: (1) Williams' note accusing Bonilla Rivera of destroying her family; and (2) Williams' anger at Bonilla Rivera and her ex-husband at the pizza restaurant. The trial court was not obligated to accept Williams' version of events. She has failed to establish prima facie error.
Conclusion
[¶14] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶15] Affirmed.
May, J., and Foley, J., concur.